From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
<pgonda@google.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 20:43:46 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231220151358.2147066-5-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231220151358.2147066-1-nikunj@amd.com>
Drop vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno pointers so that secret page layout
does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework.
Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno when
needed. Added define for maximum supported VMPCK.
Also, change function is_vmpck_empty() to snp_is_vmpck_empty() in
preparation for moving to sev.c.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 1 +
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 95 ++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 78465a8c7dc6..97ff8c28d3b8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct secrets_os_area {
} __packed;
#define VMPCK_KEY_LEN 32
+#define VMPCK_MAX_NUM 4
/* See the SNP spec version 0.9 for secrets page format */
struct snp_secrets_page_layout {
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 5cafbd1c42cb..9c0ff69a16da 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -56,8 +56,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {
struct snp_derived_key_req derived_key;
struct snp_ext_report_req ext_report;
} req;
- u32 *os_area_msg_seqno;
- u8 *vmpck;
+ unsigned int vmpck_id;
};
static u32 vmpck_id;
@@ -67,14 +66,22 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.
/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex);
-static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
- char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
+ return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id * VMPCK_KEY_LEN;
+}
- if (snp_dev->vmpck)
- return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+ return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id;
+}
- return true;
+static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+ char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
+ u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev);
+
+ return !memcmp(key, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
}
/*
@@ -96,20 +103,22 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
*/
static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
- dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id %d to prevent IV reuse.\n",
- vmpck_id);
- memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
- snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
+ u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev);
+
+ dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id %u to prevent IV reuse.\n",
+ snp_dev->vmpck_id);
+ memzero_explicit(key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
}
static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
+ u32 *os_area_msg_seqno = snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
u64 count;
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */
- count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno;
+ count = *os_area_msg_seqno;
return count + 1;
}
@@ -137,11 +146,13 @@ static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
+ u32 *os_area_msg_seqno = snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
+
/*
* The counter is also incremented by the PSP, so increment it by 2
* and save in secrets page.
*/
- *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno += 2;
+ *os_area_msg_seqno += 2;
}
static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file)
@@ -151,15 +162,22 @@ static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file)
return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc);
}
-static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, size_t keylen)
+static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx;
+ u8 *key;
+
+ if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+ pr_err("VM communication key VMPCK%u is null\n", vmpck_id);
+ return NULL;
+ }
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!ctx)
return NULL;
- if (aesgcm_expandkey(ctx, key, keylen, AUTHTAG_LEN)) {
+ key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev);
+ if (aesgcm_expandkey(ctx, key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN, AUTHTAG_LEN)) {
pr_err("Crypto context initialization failed\n");
kfree(ctx);
return NULL;
@@ -589,7 +607,7 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long
mutex_lock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
- if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+ if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
return -ENOTTY;
@@ -666,32 +684,14 @@ static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = {
.unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl,
};
-static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout, u32 **seqno)
+bool snp_assign_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *dev, unsigned int vmpck_id)
{
- u8 *key = NULL;
+ if (WARN_ON((vmpck_id + 1) > VMPCK_MAX_NUM))
+ return false;
- switch (id) {
- case 0:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0;
- key = layout->vmpck0;
- break;
- case 1:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_1;
- key = layout->vmpck1;
- break;
- case 2:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_2;
- key = layout->vmpck2;
- break;
- case 3:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_3;
- key = layout->vmpck3;
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
+ dev->vmpck_id = vmpck_id;
- return key;
+ return true;
}
struct snp_msg_report_resp_hdr {
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ static int sev_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);
/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
- if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+ if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
return -ENOTTY;
}
@@ -847,21 +847,20 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
goto e_unmap;
ret = -EINVAL;
- snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, layout, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
- if (!snp_dev->vmpck) {
- dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %d\n", vmpck_id);
+ snp_dev->layout = layout;
+ if (!snp_assign_vmpck(snp_dev, vmpck_id)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %u\n", vmpck_id);
goto e_unmap;
}
/* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */
- if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
- dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %d is null\n", vmpck_id);
+ if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %u is null\n", vmpck_id);
goto e_unmap;
}
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev);
snp_dev->dev = dev;
- snp_dev->layout = layout;
/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
snp_dev->request = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
@@ -877,7 +876,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
goto e_free_response;
ret = -EIO;
- snp_dev->ctx = snp_init_crypto(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+ snp_dev->ctx = snp_init_crypto(snp_dev);
if (!snp_dev->ctx)
goto e_free_cert_data;
@@ -902,7 +901,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (ret)
goto e_free_ctx;
- dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using vmpck_id %d)\n", vmpck_id);
+ dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using vmpck_id %u)\n", vmpck_id);
return 0;
e_free_ctx:
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-20 15:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-20 15:13 [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 10:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 3:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 4:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-31 13:58 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 10:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-01 11:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-02 3:50 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-02 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-05 9:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-06 10:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 4:05 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-26 22:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 4:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-01 15:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-01 15:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 6:08 ` [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-26 1:00 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27 4:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
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