From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
<pgonda@google.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 20:43:50 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231220151358.2147066-9-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231220151358.2147066-1-nikunj@amd.com>
Add generic enc_init guest hook for performing any type of initialization
that is vendor specific. Generic enc_init hook can be used for early guest
feature initialization before secondary processors are up.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index c878616a18b8..8095553e14a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -148,12 +148,14 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
* @enc_status_change_finish Notify HV after the encryption status of a range is changed
* @enc_tlb_flush_required Returns true if a TLB flush is needed before changing page encryption status
* @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
+ * @enc_init Prepare and initialize encryption features
*/
struct x86_guest {
bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
+ void (*enc_init)(void);
};
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index a37ebd3b4773..a07985a96ca5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
+static void enc_init_noop(void) { }
struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
.calibrate_cpu = native_calibrate_cpu_early,
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
.enc_status_change_finish = enc_status_change_finish_noop,
.enc_tlb_flush_required = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop,
.enc_cache_flush_required = enc_cache_flush_required_noop,
+ .enc_init = enc_init_noop,
},
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index c290c55b632b..d5bcd63211de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_init();
+
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-20 15:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-20 15:13 [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 10:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 3:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 4:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-31 13:58 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 10:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-01 11:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-02 3:50 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-02 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-05 9:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-06 10:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 4:05 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-26 22:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 4:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-01 15:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-01 15:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 6:08 ` [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-26 1:00 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27 4:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
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