From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52451: powerpc/pseries/memhp: Fix access beyond end of drmem array
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 16:06:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024022639-wronged-grafted-6777@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zdylmz28rZ-mCeiN@tiehlicka>
On Mon, Feb 26, 2024 at 03:52:11PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 22-02-24 17:21:58, Greg KH wrote:
> > Description
> > ===========
> >
> > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> >
> > powerpc/pseries/memhp: Fix access beyond end of drmem array
> >
> > dlpar_memory_remove_by_index() may access beyond the bounds of the
> > drmem lmb array when the LMB lookup fails to match an entry with the
> > given DRC index. When the search fails, the cursor is left pointing to
> > &drmem_info->lmbs[drmem_info->n_lmbs], which is one element past the
> > last valid entry in the array. The debug message at the end of the
> > function then dereferences this pointer:
> >
> > pr_debug("Failed to hot-remove memory at %llx\n",
> > lmb->base_addr);
>
> While this is a reasonable fix and the stable material it is really
> unclear to me why it has gained a CVE. Memory hotplug is a privileged
> operation. Could you clarify please?
As you know, history has shown us that accessing out of your allocated
memory can cause problems, and we can not assume use-cases, as we don't
know how everyone uses our codebase, so marking places where we fix
out-of-bound memory accesses is resolving a weakness in the codebase,
hence a CVE assignment.
If your systems are not vulnerable to this specific issue, wonderful, no
need to take it, but why wouldn't you want to take a fix that resolves a
known weakness?
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-26 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-22 16:21 CVE-2023-52451: powerpc/pseries/memhp: Fix access beyond end of drmem array Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-26 14:52 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-26 15:06 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2024-02-26 15:25 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-26 16:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-26 16:36 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-27 5:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-27 8:51 ` Michal Hocko
2024-03-03 12:02 ` Michael Ellerman
2024-03-03 12:02 ` Michael Ellerman
2024-02-27 9:53 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-27 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-28 12:04 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-28 17:12 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-29 8:22 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-29 8:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-29 9:41 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-29 14:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-29 15:08 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-29 17:36 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-29 15:09 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-29 16:09 ` Sasha Levin
2024-02-29 17:11 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-29 17:36 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-29 18:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-29 17:38 ` Sasha Levin
2024-02-29 10:03 ` Pavel Machek
2024-02-29 10:00 ` Pavel Machek
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