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From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
To: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52451: powerpc/pseries/memhp: Fix access beyond end of drmem array
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 15:52:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zdylmz28rZ-mCeiN@tiehlicka> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2024022257-CVE-2023-52451-7bdb@gregkh>

On Thu 22-02-24 17:21:58, Greg KH wrote:
> Description
> ===========
> 
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> 
> powerpc/pseries/memhp: Fix access beyond end of drmem array
> 
> dlpar_memory_remove_by_index() may access beyond the bounds of the
> drmem lmb array when the LMB lookup fails to match an entry with the
> given DRC index. When the search fails, the cursor is left pointing to
> &drmem_info->lmbs[drmem_info->n_lmbs], which is one element past the
> last valid entry in the array. The debug message at the end of the
> function then dereferences this pointer:
> 
>         pr_debug("Failed to hot-remove memory at %llx\n",
>                  lmb->base_addr);

While this is a reasonable fix and the stable material it is really
unclear to me why it has gained a CVE. Memory hotplug is a privileged
operation. Could you clarify please?

-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-26 14:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-22 16:21 CVE-2023-52451: powerpc/pseries/memhp: Fix access beyond end of drmem array Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-26 14:52 ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2024-02-26 15:06   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-26 15:25     ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-26 16:12       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-26 16:36         ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-27  5:14           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-27  8:51             ` Michal Hocko
2024-03-03 12:02               ` Michael Ellerman
2024-03-03 12:02                 ` Michael Ellerman
2024-02-27  9:53             ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-27 18:35       ` Kees Cook
2024-02-28 12:04         ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-28 17:12           ` Kees Cook
2024-02-29  8:22             ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-29  8:35               ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-29  9:41                 ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-29 14:18                   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-29 15:08                     ` Kees Cook
2024-02-29 17:36                       ` Michal Hocko
2024-02-29 15:09                     ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-29 16:09                       ` Sasha Levin
2024-02-29 17:11                         ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-29 17:36                           ` Jiri Kosina
2024-02-29 18:32                             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-29 17:38                           ` Sasha Levin
2024-02-29 10:03                 ` Pavel Machek
2024-02-29 10:00         ` Pavel Machek

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