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From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>, Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCHv3 00/17] nvme: implement secure concatenation
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 16:02:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240318150316.138501-1-hare@kernel.org> (raw)

Hi all,

here's my attempt to implement secure concatenation for NVMe-of TCP
as outlined in TP8018.
Secure concatenation means that a TLS PSK is generated from the key
material negotiated by the DH-HMAC-CHAP protocol, and the TLS PSK
is then used for a subsequent TLS connection.
The difference between the original definition of secure concatenation
and the method outlined in TP8018 is that with TP8018 the connection
is reset after DH-HMAC-CHAP negotiation, and a new connection is setup
with the generated TLS PSK.

To implement that I have decided on resetting the connection from the
nvme-tcp driver after the initial connection has been set up.
Another way would have been to offload the connection reset to userspace,
and let nvme-cli reset the connection. But that would be a modification
to the userspace interface, and hence I didn't go that way.
The drawback with this approach is that we'll create all I/O queues
before resetting for TLS, even though these queues should never be used.
But fixing that requires a larger rewrite of the TCP driver to unify the
setup and reconnect paths. So keep it that way for now.

As usual, comments and reviews are welcome.

Changes to v2:
- Fixup reset after dhchap negotiation
- Disable namespace scanning on I/O queues after
  dhchap negotiation
- Reworked TLS key handling (again)

Changes to the original submission:
- Sanitize TLS key handling
- Fixup modconfig compilation

Hannes Reinecke (17):
  nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers
  nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key
  crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand()
  nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk()
  nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest()
  nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk()
  nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh()
  nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling
  nvme-tcp: do not quiesce admin queue in nvme_tcp_teardown_io_queues()
  nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute
  nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation
  nvme-fabrics: reset connection for secure concatenation
  nvme-tcp: reset after recovery for secure concatenation
  nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys
  nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands
    twice
  nvme-target: do not check authentication status for I/O commands twice
  nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation

 crypto/Makefile                        |   1 +
 crypto/hkdf.c                          | 112 +++++++++++
 drivers/nvme/common/auth.c             | 252 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c          |  84 ++++++++-
 drivers/nvme/host/auth.c               | 108 ++++++++++-
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c               |   9 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c            |  38 +++-
 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h            |   3 +
 drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c              |  11 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c                | 132 +++++++++++--
 drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c        |   3 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/auth.c             |  82 +++++++-
 drivers/nvme/target/core.c             |   3 -
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c |  46 ++++-
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c      |  29 ++-
 drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h            |  30 ++-
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c              |  34 +++-
 fs/crypto/hkdf.c                       |  68 +------
 include/crypto/hkdf.h                  |  18 ++
 include/linux/nvme-auth.h              |   5 +
 include/linux/nvme-keyring.h           |   7 +
 include/linux/nvme.h                   |   7 +
 22 files changed, 958 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/hkdf.c
 create mode 100644 include/crypto/hkdf.h

-- 
2.35.3



             reply	other threads:[~2024-03-18 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-18 15:02 Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 01/17] nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 02/17] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 20:51   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  5:18     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 03/17] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 04/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 20:59   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  5:20     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 05/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:02   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 06/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:04   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-18 11:00     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 07/17] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 08/17] nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:15   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  6:48     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:07       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 21:32         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 09/17] nvme-tcp: do not quiesce admin queue in nvme_tcp_teardown_io_queues() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:24   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-18 11:33     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 10/17] nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:24   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 11/17] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:41   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  5:32     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:09       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 21:48         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:14           ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 12/17] nvme-fabrics: reset connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:46   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  6:21     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:21       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 22:08         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:20           ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-05-08  9:21             ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 13/17] nvme-tcp: reset after recovery " Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:49   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  6:25     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:23       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 22:10         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:22           ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-21 14:37             ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 15:09               ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 14/17] nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:50   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 15/17] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands twice Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:53   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 16/17] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for I/O " Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:53   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 17/17] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke

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