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From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>, Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 05/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest()
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 16:03:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240318150316.138501-6-hare@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240318150316.138501-1-hare@kernel.org>

From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>

Add a function to calculate the PSK digest as specified in TP8018.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
 drivers/nvme/common/auth.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/nvme-auth.h  |   2 +
 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
index 7a4b6589351d..f56f08a4461e 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
@@ -547,5 +547,110 @@ u8 *nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_psk);
 
+u8 *nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+			      char *subsysnqn, char *hostnqn)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *shash;
+	u8 *digest, *hmac;
+	const char *hmac_name;
+	size_t digest_len, hmac_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!subsysnqn || !hostnqn))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id);
+	if (!hmac_name) {
+		pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algoritm %d\n",
+			__func__, hmac_id);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	switch (nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id)) {
+	case 32:
+		hmac_len = 44;
+		break;
+	case 48:
+		hmac_len = 64;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n",
+			__func__, hmac_name);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	hmac = kzalloc(hmac_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hmac)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		goto out_free_hmac;
+
+	digest_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+	}
+
+	shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+			crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+			GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!shash) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_digest;
+	}
+
+	shash->tfm = tfm;
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, psk, psk_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_shash;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_shash;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, hostnqn, strlen(hostnqn));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_shash;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, " ", 1);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_shash;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, subsysnqn, strlen(subsysnqn));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_shash;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, " NVMe-over-Fabrics", 18);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_shash;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_shash;
+
+	ret = base64_encode(digest, digest_len, hmac);
+	if (ret < hmac_len)
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+	ret = 0;
+
+out_free_shash:
+	kfree_sensitive(shash);
+out_free_digest:
+	kfree_sensitive(digest);
+out_free_tfm:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+out_free_hmac:
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree_sensitive(hmac);
+		hmac = NULL;
+	}
+	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : hmac;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_digest);
+
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Authentication framework");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
index 31dc1db2d4d6..2cbb9249a8b3 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
@@ -42,5 +42,7 @@ int nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
 				u8 *sess_key, size_t sess_key_len);
 u8 *nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
 			   u8 *c1, u8 *c2, size_t hash_len, size_t *ret_len);
+u8 *nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+			      char *subsysnqn, char *hostnqn);
 
 #endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */
-- 
2.35.3



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-03-18 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-18 15:02 [PATCHv3 00/17] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 01/17] nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 02/17] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 20:51   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  5:18     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 03/17] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 04/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 20:59   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  5:20     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2024-04-07 21:02   ` [PATCH 05/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 06/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:04   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-18 11:00     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 07/17] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 08/17] nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:15   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  6:48     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:07       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 21:32         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 09/17] nvme-tcp: do not quiesce admin queue in nvme_tcp_teardown_io_queues() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:24   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-18 11:33     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 10/17] nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:24   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 11/17] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:41   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  5:32     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:09       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 21:48         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:14           ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 12/17] nvme-fabrics: reset connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:46   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  6:21     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:21       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 22:08         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:20           ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-05-08  9:21             ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 13/17] nvme-tcp: reset after recovery " Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:49   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08  6:25     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:23       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 22:10         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:22           ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-21 14:37             ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 15:09               ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 14/17] nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:50   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 15/17] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands twice Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:53   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 16/17] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for I/O " Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:53   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 17/17] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke

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