From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/tsx: Cope with RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2024 11:41:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240404104122.2870129-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zg1stUacaDBkyDOn@mail-itl>
It turns out there is something wonky on some but not all CPUs with
MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT. The presence of RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT causes Xen to think
it's safe to offer HLE/RTM to guests, but in this case, XBEGIN instructions
genuinely #UD.
Spot this case and try to back out as cleanly as we can.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
In the meantime, I'll see if anyone at Intel knows what's going on. Because
these parts are fully out of support now, it's very unlikely that we're going
to get a fix.
---
xen/arch/x86/tsx.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
index 50d8059f23a9..41bb39d10074 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
#include <xen/init.h>
#include <xen/param.h>
+#include <asm/microcode.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
/*
@@ -9,6 +10,7 @@
* -1 => Default, altered to 0/1 (if unspecified) by:
* - TAA heuristics/settings for speculative safety
* - "TSX vs PCR3" select for TSX memory ordering safety
+ * -2 => Implicit tsx=0 (from RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch)
* -3 => Implicit tsx=1 (feed-through from spec-ctrl=0)
*
* This is arranged such that the bottom bit encodes whether TSX is actually
@@ -114,11 +116,50 @@ void tsx_init(void)
if ( cpu_has_tsx_force_abort )
{
+ uint64_t val;
+
/*
- * On an early TSX-enable Skylake part subject to the memory
+ * On an early TSX-enabled Skylake part subject to the memory
* ordering erratum, with at least the March 2019 microcode.
*/
+ rdmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, val);
+
+ /*
+ * At the time of writing (April 2024), it was discovered that
+ * some parts (e.g. CoffeeLake 8th Gen, 06-9e-0a, ucode 0xf6)
+ * advertise RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT, but XBEGIN instructions #UD. Other
+ * similar parts (e.g. KabyLake Xeon-E3, 06-9e-09, ucode 0xf8)
+ * operate as expected.
+ *
+ * In this case:
+ * - RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT and MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT are enumerated.
+ * - XBEGIN instructions genuinely #UD.
+ * - MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT is write-discard and fails to hold its
+ * value.
+ * - HLE and RTM are not enumerated, despite
+ * MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT.TSX_CPUID_CLEAR being clear.
+ *
+ * Spot this case, and treat it as if no TSX is available at all.
+ * This will prevent Xen from thinking it's safe to offer HLE/RTM
+ * to VMs.
+ */
+ if ( val == 0 && cpu_has_rtm_always_abort && !cpu_has_rtm )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR
+ "FIRMWARE BUG: CPU %02x-%02x-%02x, ucode 0x%08x: RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch\n",
+ boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model,
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_mask, this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev);
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT);
+
+ if ( opt_tsx < 0 )
+ opt_tsx = -2;
+
+ goto done_setup;
+ }
+
/*
* Probe for the June 2021 microcode which de-features TSX on
* client parts. (Note - this is a subset of parts impacted by
@@ -128,15 +169,8 @@ void tsx_init(void)
* read as zero if TSX_FORCE_ABORT.ENABLE_RTM has been set before
* we run.
*/
- if ( !has_rtm_always_abort )
- {
- uint64_t val;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, val);
-
- if ( val & TSX_ENABLE_RTM )
- has_rtm_always_abort = true;
- }
+ if ( val & TSX_ENABLE_RTM )
+ has_rtm_always_abort = true;
/*
* If no explicit tsx= option is provided, pick a default.
@@ -191,6 +225,7 @@ void tsx_init(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
}
}
+ done_setup:
/*
* Note: MSR_TSX_CTRL is enumerated on TSX-enabled MDS_NO and later parts.
base-commit: 6117179dd99958e4ef2687617d12c9b15bdbae24
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-04 10:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-03 14:50 text-tsx fails on Intel core 8th gen system Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2024-04-03 15:04 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 16:41 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2024-04-04 6:07 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 17:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-04 10:41 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2024-04-04 11:02 ` [PATCH] x86/tsx: Cope with RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2024-04-04 12:45 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-04 13:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-04 13:32 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-05 13:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-05 13:25 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-05 13:07 ` [PATCH v2] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-05 13:40 ` Jan Beulich
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