[LTP] [PATCH v2 1/2] lib: add SAFE_CALLOC macro

[LTP] [PATCH v2 1/2] lib: add SAFE_CALLOC macro

[Li Wang]

Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@redhat.com>
---
 include/tst_safe_macros.h |  5 +++++
 lib/tst_safe_macros.c     | 15 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/tst_safe_macros.h b/include/tst_safe_macros.h
index 53aceb5ca..f228b99e1 100644
--- a/include/tst_safe_macros.h
+++ b/include/tst_safe_macros.h
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ int safe_dup2(const char *file, const int lineno, int oldfd, int newfd);
 #define SAFE_MALLOC(size) \
 	safe_malloc(__FILE__, __LINE__, NULL, (size))
 
+void *safe_calloc(const char *file, const int lineno, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
+
+#define SAFE_CALLOC(nmemb, size) \
+	safe_calloc(__FILE__, __LINE__, (nmemb), (size))
+
 void *safe_realloc(const char *file, const int lineno, void *ptr, size_t size);
 
 #define SAFE_REALLOC(ptr, size) \
diff --git a/lib/tst_safe_macros.c b/lib/tst_safe_macros.c
index c6e6b15dc..40fdaca76 100644
--- a/lib/tst_safe_macros.c
+++ b/lib/tst_safe_macros.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sched.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
 #include "config.h"
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H
@@ -546,6 +547,20 @@ int safe_dup2(const char *file, const int lineno, int oldfd, int newfd)
 	return rval;
 }
 
+void *safe_calloc(const char *file, const int lineno, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	void *rval;
+
+	rval = calloc(nmemb, size);
+
+	if (rval == NULL) {
+		tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK | TERRNO,
+			"calloc(%zu, %zu) failed", nmemb, size);
+	}
+
+	return rval;
+}
+
 void *safe_realloc(const char *file, const int lineno, void *ptr, size_t size)
 {
 	void *ret;
-- 
2.40.1


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Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

[LTP] [PATCH v2 2/2] kallsyms01: Utilize ksymbol table for unauthorized address access

[Li Wang]

Access the system symbols with root permission to test whether it's
possible to read and write the memory addresses of kernel-space
from user-space. This helps in identifying potential vulnerabilities
where user-space processes can inappropriately access kernel memory.

Suggested-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@redhat.com>
---
 runtest/mm                                    |   2 +
 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile   |   6 +
 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 150 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c

diff --git a/runtest/mm b/runtest/mm
index d859b331c..6a8cd0b9d 100644
--- a/runtest/mm
+++ b/runtest/mm
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ mmap10_2 mmap10 -s
 mmap10_3 mmap10 -a -s
 mmap10_4 mmap10 -a -s -i 60
 
+kallsyms kallsyms
+
 ksm01 ksm01
 ksm01_1 ksm01 -u 128
 ksm02 ksm02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7074d4e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+kallsyms
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5ea7d67db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+top_srcdir		?= ../../../..
+
+include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk
+include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_leaf_target.mk
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..228d4d973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * [Description]
+ *
+ *  Utilize kernel's symbol table for unauthorized address access.
+ *
+ *  Access the system symbols with root permission to test whether it's
+ *  possible to read and write the memory addresses of kernel-space
+ *  from user-space. This helps in identifying potential vulnerabilities
+ *  where user-space processes can inappropriately access kernel memory.
+ *
+ * Steps:
+ *  1. Start a process that reads all symbols and their addresses from
+ *     '/proc/kallsyms' and stores them in a linked list.
+ *
+ *  2. Attempt to write to each kernel address found in the linked list.
+ *     The expectation is that each attempt will fail with a SIGSEGV
+ *     (segmentation fault), indicating that the user-space process
+ *     cannot write to kernel memory.
+ *
+ *  3. Handle each SIGSEGV using a signal handler that sets a flag and
+ *     long jumps out of the faulting context.
+ *
+ *  4. If any write operation does not result in a SIGSEGV, log this as
+ *     a potential security vulnerability.
+ *
+ *  5. Observe and log the behavior and any system responses to these
+ *     unauthorized access attempts.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_stdio.h"
+
+struct kallsym {
+	unsigned long addr;
+	char type;
+	char name[128];
+};
+
+static struct kallsym *sym_table;
+static unsigned int nr_symbols;
+static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
+volatile sig_atomic_t segv_caught = 0;
+
+static void segv_handler(int sig)
+{
+	if (sig == SIGSEGV)
+		segv_caught++;
+	else
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "Unexpected signal %s", strsignal(sig));
+
+	siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
+}
+
+static unsigned int read_kallsyms(struct kallsym *table, unsigned int table_size)
+{
+	char *line = NULL;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	unsigned int nr_syms = 0;
+	FILE *stream = SAFE_FOPEN("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
+
+	while (getline(&line, &len, stream) != -1) {
+
+		if (table && nr_syms < table_size) {
+			sscanf(line, "%lx %c %s",
+					&table[nr_syms].addr,
+					&table[nr_syms].type,
+					table[nr_syms].name);
+		}
+
+		nr_syms++;
+	}
+
+	SAFE_FCLOSE(stream);
+
+	return nr_syms;
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+	nr_symbols = read_kallsyms(NULL, 0);
+	sym_table = SAFE_CALLOC(nr_symbols, sizeof(*sym_table));
+	unsigned int read_symbols = read_kallsyms(sym_table, nr_symbols);
+
+	if (nr_symbols != read_symbols)
+		tst_res(TWARN, "/proc/kallsyms changed size!?");
+}
+
+static void access_ksymbols_address(struct kallsym *table)
+{
+	tst_res(TDEBUG, "Access kernel addr: 0x%lx (%c) (%s)",
+				table->addr, table->type, table->name);
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+		*(volatile unsigned long *)table->addr = 0;
+
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "Successfully accessed kernel addr 0x%lx (%c) (%s)",
+				table->addr, table->type, table->name);
+	}
+}
+
+static void test_access_kernel_address(void)
+{
+	struct sigaction sa;
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.sa_handler = segv_handler;
+	sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL);
+
+	for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nr_symbols; i++)
+		access_ksymbols_address(&sym_table[i]);
+
+	if (segv_caught == (sig_atomic_t)nr_symbols)
+		tst_res(TPASS, "Caught %d times SIGSEGV in access ksymbols addr", segv_caught);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+	if (sym_table)
+		free(sym_table);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+	.needs_root = 1,
+	.setup = setup,
+	.cleanup = cleanup,
+	.max_runtime = 60,
+	.test_all = test_access_kernel_address,
+};
-- 
2.40.1


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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v2 2/2] kallsyms01: Utilize ksymbol table for unauthorized address access

[Li Wang]

Sorry forgot to attach the change from patch v1 to v2.

Notes:
    V1 --> V2
        * make use of SAFE_CALLOC macro
        * drop the linked list to store the ksymbols table
        * make use of onetime memory alloc to speed up test
        * add TDEBUG to print ksymbols if needed



On Tue, Apr 30, 2024 at 1:29 PM Li Wang <liwang@redhat.com> wrote:

> Access the system symbols with root permission to test whether it's
> possible to read and write the memory addresses of kernel-space
> from user-space. This helps in identifying potential vulnerabilities
> where user-space processes can inappropriately access kernel memory.
>
> Suggested-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@redhat.com>
> ---
>  runtest/mm                                    |   2 +
>  testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore |   1 +
>  testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile   |   6 +
>  testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 150 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore
>  create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c
>
> diff --git a/runtest/mm b/runtest/mm
> index d859b331c..6a8cd0b9d 100644
> --- a/runtest/mm
> +++ b/runtest/mm
> @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ mmap10_2 mmap10 -s
>  mmap10_3 mmap10 -a -s
>  mmap10_4 mmap10 -a -s -i 60
>
> +kallsyms kallsyms
> +
>  ksm01 ksm01
>  ksm01_1 ksm01 -u 128
>  ksm02 ksm02
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore
> b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..7074d4e24
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/.gitignore
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +kallsyms
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile
> b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..5ea7d67db
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +
> +top_srcdir             ?= ../../../..
> +
> +include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk
> +include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_leaf_target.mk
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c
> b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..228d4d973
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/kallsyms/kallsyms.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2024 Red Hat, Inc.
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * [Description]
> + *
> + *  Utilize kernel's symbol table for unauthorized address access.
> + *
> + *  Access the system symbols with root permission to test whether it's
> + *  possible to read and write the memory addresses of kernel-space
> + *  from user-space. This helps in identifying potential vulnerabilities
> + *  where user-space processes can inappropriately access kernel memory.
> + *
> + * Steps:
> + *  1. Start a process that reads all symbols and their addresses from
> + *     '/proc/kallsyms' and stores them in a linked list.
> + *
> + *  2. Attempt to write to each kernel address found in the linked list.
> + *     The expectation is that each attempt will fail with a SIGSEGV
> + *     (segmentation fault), indicating that the user-space process
> + *     cannot write to kernel memory.
> + *
> + *  3. Handle each SIGSEGV using a signal handler that sets a flag and
> + *     long jumps out of the faulting context.
> + *
> + *  4. If any write operation does not result in a SIGSEGV, log this as
> + *     a potential security vulnerability.
> + *
> + *  5. Observe and log the behavior and any system responses to these
> + *     unauthorized access attempts.
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <assert.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <setjmp.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_stdio.h"
> +
> +struct kallsym {
> +       unsigned long addr;
> +       char type;
> +       char name[128];
> +};
> +
> +static struct kallsym *sym_table;
> +static unsigned int nr_symbols;
> +static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
> +volatile sig_atomic_t segv_caught = 0;
> +
> +static void segv_handler(int sig)
> +{
> +       if (sig == SIGSEGV)
> +               segv_caught++;
> +       else
> +               tst_res(TFAIL, "Unexpected signal %s", strsignal(sig));
> +
> +       siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned int read_kallsyms(struct kallsym *table, unsigned int
> table_size)
> +{
> +       char *line = NULL;
> +       size_t len = 0;
> +       unsigned int nr_syms = 0;
> +       FILE *stream = SAFE_FOPEN("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
> +
> +       while (getline(&line, &len, stream) != -1) {
> +
> +               if (table && nr_syms < table_size) {
> +                       sscanf(line, "%lx %c %s",
> +                                       &table[nr_syms].addr,
> +                                       &table[nr_syms].type,
> +                                       table[nr_syms].name);
> +               }
> +
> +               nr_syms++;
> +       }
> +
> +       SAFE_FCLOSE(stream);
> +
> +       return nr_syms;
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> +       nr_symbols = read_kallsyms(NULL, 0);
> +       sym_table = SAFE_CALLOC(nr_symbols, sizeof(*sym_table));
> +       unsigned int read_symbols = read_kallsyms(sym_table, nr_symbols);
> +
> +       if (nr_symbols != read_symbols)
> +               tst_res(TWARN, "/proc/kallsyms changed size!?");
> +}
> +
> +static void access_ksymbols_address(struct kallsym *table)
> +{
> +       tst_res(TDEBUG, "Access kernel addr: 0x%lx (%c) (%s)",
> +                               table->addr, table->type, table->name);
> +
> +       if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
> +               *(volatile unsigned long *)table->addr = 0;
> +
> +               tst_res(TFAIL, "Successfully accessed kernel addr 0x%lx
> (%c) (%s)",
> +                               table->addr, table->type, table->name);
> +       }
> +}
> +
> +static void test_access_kernel_address(void)
> +{
> +       struct sigaction sa;
> +       memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
> +       sa.sa_handler = segv_handler;
> +       sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL);
> +
> +       for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nr_symbols; i++)
> +               access_ksymbols_address(&sym_table[i]);
> +
> +       if (segv_caught == (sig_atomic_t)nr_symbols)
> +               tst_res(TPASS, "Caught %d times SIGSEGV in access ksymbols
> addr", segv_caught);
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> +       if (sym_table)
> +               free(sym_table);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> +       .needs_root = 1,
> +       .setup = setup,
> +       .cleanup = cleanup,
> +       .max_runtime = 60,
> +       .test_all = test_access_kernel_address,
> +};
> --
> 2.40.1
>
>
> --
> Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
>
>

-- 
Regards,
Li Wang

-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

Re: [LTP] [PATCH v2 2/2] kallsyms01: Utilize ksymbol table for unauthorized address access

[Cyril Hrubis]

Hi!
> @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only

Any reason this is GPL-2.0-only and not 2.0-or-later?

> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2024 Red Hat, Inc.
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * [Description]
> + *
> + *  Utilize kernel's symbol table for unauthorized address access.
> + *
> + *  Access the system symbols with root permission to test whether it's
> + *  possible to read and write the memory addresses of kernel-space
> + *  from user-space. This helps in identifying potential vulnerabilities
> + *  where user-space processes can inappropriately access kernel memory.
> + *
> + * Steps:
> + *  1. Start a process that reads all symbols and their addresses from
> + *     '/proc/kallsyms' and stores them in a linked list.
> + *
> + *  2. Attempt to write to each kernel address found in the linked list.
> + *     The expectation is that each attempt will fail with a SIGSEGV
> + *     (segmentation fault), indicating that the user-space process
> + *     cannot write to kernel memory.
> + *
> + *  3. Handle each SIGSEGV using a signal handler that sets a flag and
> + *     long jumps out of the faulting context.
> + *
> + *  4. If any write operation does not result in a SIGSEGV, log this as
> + *     a potential security vulnerability.
> + *
> + *  5. Observe and log the behavior and any system responses to these
> + *     unauthorized access attempts.
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <assert.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <setjmp.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_stdio.h"
> +
> +struct kallsym {
> +	unsigned long addr;
> +	char type;
> +	char name[128];
> +};
> +
> +static struct kallsym *sym_table;
> +static unsigned int nr_symbols;
> +static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
> +volatile sig_atomic_t segv_caught = 0;
> +
> +static void segv_handler(int sig)
> +{
> +	if (sig == SIGSEGV)
> +		segv_caught++;
> +	else
> +		tst_res(TFAIL, "Unexpected signal %s", strsignal(sig));
> +
> +	siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned int read_kallsyms(struct kallsym *table, unsigned int table_size)
> +{
> +	char *line = NULL;
> +	size_t len = 0;
> +	unsigned int nr_syms = 0;
> +	FILE *stream = SAFE_FOPEN("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
> +
> +	while (getline(&line, &len, stream) != -1) {
> +
> +		if (table && nr_syms < table_size) {
> +			sscanf(line, "%lx %c %s",
> +					&table[nr_syms].addr,
> +					&table[nr_syms].type,
> +					table[nr_syms].name);
> +		}
> +
> +		nr_syms++;
> +	}
> +
> +	SAFE_FCLOSE(stream);
> +
> +	return nr_syms;
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> +	nr_symbols = read_kallsyms(NULL, 0);
> +	sym_table = SAFE_CALLOC(nr_symbols, sizeof(*sym_table));
> +	unsigned int read_symbols = read_kallsyms(sym_table, nr_symbols);
> +
> +	if (nr_symbols != read_symbols)
> +		tst_res(TWARN, "/proc/kallsyms changed size!?");
> +}
> +
> +static void access_ksymbols_address(struct kallsym *table)
> +{
> +	tst_res(TDEBUG, "Access kernel addr: 0x%lx (%c) (%s)",
> +				table->addr, table->type, table->name);
> +
> +	if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
> +		*(volatile unsigned long *)table->addr = 0;
> +
> +		tst_res(TFAIL, "Successfully accessed kernel addr 0x%lx (%c) (%s)",
> +				table->addr, table->type, table->name);
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +static void test_access_kernel_address(void)
> +{
> +	struct sigaction sa;
> +	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
> +	sa.sa_handler = segv_handler;
> +	sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL);

We can move the sigaction to the test setup.

> +	for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nr_symbols; i++)
> +		access_ksymbols_address(&sym_table[i]);

And we have to set the segv_caught to 0 before this loop, otherwise the
test does not work with -i 2

> +	if (segv_caught == (sig_atomic_t)nr_symbols)
> +		tst_res(TPASS, "Caught %d times SIGSEGV in access ksymbols addr", segv_caught);

And also in a case that we got wrong number on segfaults this does not
produce any results. I guess that we need to do:

	if (...)
		tst_res(TPASS, "...");
	else
		tst_res(TFAIL, "Caught %d SIGSEGV expected %d", ...);


> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> +	if (sym_table)
> +		free(sym_table);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> +	.needs_root = 1,
> +	.setup = setup,
> +	.cleanup = cleanup,
> +	.max_runtime = 60,
> +	.test_all = test_access_kernel_address,
> +};
> -- 
> 2.40.1
> 
> 
> -- 
> Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

-- 
Cyril Hrubis
chrubis@suse.cz

-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

Re: [LTP] [PATCH v2 2/2] kallsyms01: Utilize ksymbol table for unauthorized address access

[Li Wang]

Hi Cyril,

All comments make sense, patch v3 is coming.

On Thu, May 2, 2024 at 6:30 PM Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz> wrote:

> Hi!
> > @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>
> Any reason this is GPL-2.0-only and not 2.0-or-later?
>
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2024 Red Hat, Inc.
> > + */
> > +
> > +/*\
> > + * [Description]
> > + *
> > + *  Utilize kernel's symbol table for unauthorized address access.
> > + *
> > + *  Access the system symbols with root permission to test whether it's
> > + *  possible to read and write the memory addresses of kernel-space
> > + *  from user-space. This helps in identifying potential vulnerabilities
> > + *  where user-space processes can inappropriately access kernel memory.
> > + *
> > + * Steps:
> > + *  1. Start a process that reads all symbols and their addresses from
> > + *     '/proc/kallsyms' and stores them in a linked list.
> > + *
> > + *  2. Attempt to write to each kernel address found in the linked list.
> > + *     The expectation is that each attempt will fail with a SIGSEGV
> > + *     (segmentation fault), indicating that the user-space process
> > + *     cannot write to kernel memory.
> > + *
> > + *  3. Handle each SIGSEGV using a signal handler that sets a flag and
> > + *     long jumps out of the faulting context.
> > + *
> > + *  4. If any write operation does not result in a SIGSEGV, log this as
> > + *     a potential security vulnerability.
> > + *
> > + *  5. Observe and log the behavior and any system responses to these
> > + *     unauthorized access attempts.
> > + *
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <stdio.h>
> > +#include <stdlib.h>
> > +#include <assert.h>
> > +#include <unistd.h>
> > +#include <string.h>
> > +#include <setjmp.h>
> > +#include <signal.h>
> > +
> > +#include "tst_test.h"
> > +#include "tst_safe_stdio.h"
> > +
> > +struct kallsym {
> > +     unsigned long addr;
> > +     char type;
> > +     char name[128];
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct kallsym *sym_table;
> > +static unsigned int nr_symbols;
> > +static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
> > +volatile sig_atomic_t segv_caught = 0;
> > +
> > +static void segv_handler(int sig)
> > +{
> > +     if (sig == SIGSEGV)
> > +             segv_caught++;
> > +     else
> > +             tst_res(TFAIL, "Unexpected signal %s", strsignal(sig));
> > +
> > +     siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static unsigned int read_kallsyms(struct kallsym *table, unsigned int
> table_size)
> > +{
> > +     char *line = NULL;
> > +     size_t len = 0;
> > +     unsigned int nr_syms = 0;
> > +     FILE *stream = SAFE_FOPEN("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
> > +
> > +     while (getline(&line, &len, stream) != -1) {
> > +
> > +             if (table && nr_syms < table_size) {
> > +                     sscanf(line, "%lx %c %s",
> > +                                     &table[nr_syms].addr,
> > +                                     &table[nr_syms].type,
> > +                                     table[nr_syms].name);
> > +             }
> > +
> > +             nr_syms++;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     SAFE_FCLOSE(stream);
> > +
> > +     return nr_syms;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void setup(void)
> > +{
> > +     nr_symbols = read_kallsyms(NULL, 0);
> > +     sym_table = SAFE_CALLOC(nr_symbols, sizeof(*sym_table));
> > +     unsigned int read_symbols = read_kallsyms(sym_table, nr_symbols);
> > +
> > +     if (nr_symbols != read_symbols)
> > +             tst_res(TWARN, "/proc/kallsyms changed size!?");
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void access_ksymbols_address(struct kallsym *table)
> > +{
> > +     tst_res(TDEBUG, "Access kernel addr: 0x%lx (%c) (%s)",
> > +                             table->addr, table->type, table->name);
> > +
> > +     if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
> > +             *(volatile unsigned long *)table->addr = 0;
> > +
> > +             tst_res(TFAIL, "Successfully accessed kernel addr 0x%lx
> (%c) (%s)",
> > +                             table->addr, table->type, table->name);
> > +     }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void test_access_kernel_address(void)
> > +{
> > +     struct sigaction sa;
> > +     memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
> > +     sa.sa_handler = segv_handler;
> > +     sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL);
>
> We can move the sigaction to the test setup.
>
> > +     for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nr_symbols; i++)
> > +             access_ksymbols_address(&sym_table[i]);
>
> And we have to set the segv_caught to 0 before this loop, otherwise the
> test does not work with -i 2
>
> > +     if (segv_caught == (sig_atomic_t)nr_symbols)
> > +             tst_res(TPASS, "Caught %d times SIGSEGV in access ksymbols
> addr", segv_caught);
>
> And also in a case that we got wrong number on segfaults this does not
> produce any results. I guess that we need to do:
>
>         if (...)
>                 tst_res(TPASS, "...");
>         else
>                 tst_res(TFAIL, "Caught %d SIGSEGV expected %d", ...);
>
>
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void cleanup(void)
> > +{
> > +     if (sym_table)
> > +             free(sym_table);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static struct tst_test test = {
> > +     .needs_root = 1,
> > +     .setup = setup,
> > +     .cleanup = cleanup,
> > +     .max_runtime = 60,
> > +     .test_all = test_access_kernel_address,
> > +};
> > --
> > 2.40.1
> >
> >
> > --
> > Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
>
> --
> Cyril Hrubis
> chrubis@suse.cz
>
>

-- 
Regards,
Li Wang

-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

Re: [LTP] [PATCH v2 1/2] lib: add SAFE_CALLOC macro

[Cyril Hrubis]

Hi!
> diff --git a/include/tst_safe_macros.h b/include/tst_safe_macros.h
> index 53aceb5ca..f228b99e1 100644
> --- a/include/tst_safe_macros.h
> +++ b/include/tst_safe_macros.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ int safe_dup2(const char *file, const int lineno, int oldfd, int newfd);
>  #define SAFE_MALLOC(size) \
>  	safe_malloc(__FILE__, __LINE__, NULL, (size))
>  
> +void *safe_calloc(const char *file, const int lineno, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
> +
> +#define SAFE_CALLOC(nmemb, size) \
> +	safe_calloc(__FILE__, __LINE__, (nmemb), (size))
> +
>  void *safe_realloc(const char *file, const int lineno, void *ptr, size_t size);
>  
>  #define SAFE_REALLOC(ptr, size) \
> diff --git a/lib/tst_safe_macros.c b/lib/tst_safe_macros.c
> index c6e6b15dc..40fdaca76 100644
> --- a/lib/tst_safe_macros.c
> +++ b/lib/tst_safe_macros.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>  #include <stdlib.h>
>  #include <errno.h>
>  #include <sched.h>
> +#include <malloc.h>

calloc() should be included from stdlib.h as far as I can tell malloc.h
is needed for mallopt() and such.

>  #include <sys/ptrace.h>
>  #include "config.h"
>  #ifdef HAVE_SYS_FANOTIFY_H
> @@ -546,6 +547,20 @@ int safe_dup2(const char *file, const int lineno, int oldfd, int newfd)
>  	return rval;
>  }
>  
> +void *safe_calloc(const char *file, const int lineno, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
> +{
> +	void *rval;
> +
> +	rval = calloc(nmemb, size);
> +
> +	if (rval == NULL) {
> +		tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK | TERRNO,
> +			"calloc(%zu, %zu) failed", nmemb, size);
> +	}
> +
> +	return rval;
> +}


Otherwise it looks good.

-- 
Cyril Hrubis
chrubis@suse.cz

-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp