From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] hardening: Refresh KCFI options, add some more
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 10:48:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202404301037.9E34D4811@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240430092140.GE40213@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Tue, Apr 30, 2024 at 11:21:40AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 03:29:44PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > - CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y for x86 and arm64. (And disable FINEIBT since
> > it isn't as secure as straight KCFI.)
>
> Oi ?
Same objection I always had[1]: moving the check into the destination
means attacks with control over executable memory contents can just omit
the check.
But now that I went to go look I see 0c3e806ec0f9 ("x86/cfi: Add boot
time hash randomization") is only enabled under FINEIBT... seems better
if that were always enabled...
-Kees
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/202210181020.79AF7F7@keescook/
--
Kees Cook
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] hardening: Refresh KCFI options, add some more
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 10:48:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202404301037.9E34D4811@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240430092140.GE40213@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Tue, Apr 30, 2024 at 11:21:40AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 03:29:44PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > - CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y for x86 and arm64. (And disable FINEIBT since
> > it isn't as secure as straight KCFI.)
>
> Oi ?
Same objection I always had[1]: moving the check into the destination
means attacks with control over executable memory contents can just omit
the check.
But now that I went to go look I see 0c3e806ec0f9 ("x86/cfi: Add boot
time hash randomization") is only enabled under FINEIBT... seems better
if that were always enabled...
-Kees
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/202210181020.79AF7F7@keescook/
--
Kees Cook
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-30 17:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-26 22:29 [PATCH] hardening: Refresh KCFI options, add some more Kees Cook
2024-04-26 22:29 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-29 22:16 ` Nathan Chancellor
2024-04-29 22:16 ` Nathan Chancellor
2024-04-30 5:35 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-30 5:35 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-30 15:12 ` Nathan Chancellor
2024-04-30 15:12 ` Nathan Chancellor
2024-04-30 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-04-30 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-04-30 17:48 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-04-30 17:48 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-30 21:15 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-30 21:15 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-30 21:25 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-30 21:25 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-01 11:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-05-01 11:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-05-01 19:27 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-01 19:27 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=202404301037.9E34D4811@keescook \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=gustavoars@kernel.org \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=justinstitt@google.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=llvm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=morbo@google.com \
--cc=nathan@kernel.org \
--cc=ndesaulniers@google.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.