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From: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
To: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] riscv: enable HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 20:30:29 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240617123029.723-1-jszhang@kernel.org> (raw)

Add support for the stackleak feature. Whenever the kernel returns to user
space the kernel stack is filled with a poison value.

At the same time, disables the plugin in EFI stub code because EFI stub
is out of scope for the protection.

Tested on qemu and milkv duo:
/ # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
[   38.675575] lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
[   38.678448] lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
[   38.678448]   high offset: 288 bytes
[   38.678448]   current:     496 bytes
[   38.678448]   lowest:      1328 bytes
[   38.678448]   tracked:     1328 bytes
[   38.678448]   untracked:   448 bytes
[   38.678448]   poisoned:    14312 bytes
[   38.678448]   low offset:  8 bytes
[   38.689887] lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                    | 1 +
 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S             | 4 ++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index 0525ee2d63c7..9cbfdffec96c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ config RISCV
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if 64BIT && MMU
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
index 68a24cf9481a..80ff55a26d13 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(ret_from_exception)
 #endif
 	bnez s0, 1f
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	call	stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
+#endif
+
 	/* Save unwound kernel stack pointer in thread_info */
 	addi s0, sp, PT_SIZE_ON_STACK
 	REG_S s0, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 06f0428a723c..3a9521c57641 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM)		+= -DEFI_HAVE_STRLEN -DEFI_HAVE_STRNLEN \
 				   -DEFI_HAVE_MEMCHR -DEFI_HAVE_STRRCHR \
 				   -DEFI_HAVE_STRCMP -fno-builtin -fpic \
 				   $(call cc-option,-mno-single-pic-base)
-cflags-$(CONFIG_RISCV)		+= -fpic -DNO_ALTERNATIVE -mno-relax
+cflags-$(CONFIG_RISCV)		+= -fpic -DNO_ALTERNATIVE -mno-relax \
+				   $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
 cflags-$(CONFIG_LOONGARCH)	+= -fpie
 
 cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT)	+= -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
-- 
2.43.0


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
To: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] riscv: enable HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 20:30:29 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240617123029.723-1-jszhang@kernel.org> (raw)

Add support for the stackleak feature. Whenever the kernel returns to user
space the kernel stack is filled with a poison value.

At the same time, disables the plugin in EFI stub code because EFI stub
is out of scope for the protection.

Tested on qemu and milkv duo:
/ # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
[   38.675575] lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
[   38.678448] lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
[   38.678448]   high offset: 288 bytes
[   38.678448]   current:     496 bytes
[   38.678448]   lowest:      1328 bytes
[   38.678448]   tracked:     1328 bytes
[   38.678448]   untracked:   448 bytes
[   38.678448]   poisoned:    14312 bytes
[   38.678448]   low offset:  8 bytes
[   38.689887] lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                    | 1 +
 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S             | 4 ++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index 0525ee2d63c7..9cbfdffec96c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ config RISCV
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if 64BIT && MMU
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
index 68a24cf9481a..80ff55a26d13 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(ret_from_exception)
 #endif
 	bnez s0, 1f
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	call	stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
+#endif
+
 	/* Save unwound kernel stack pointer in thread_info */
 	addi s0, sp, PT_SIZE_ON_STACK
 	REG_S s0, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 06f0428a723c..3a9521c57641 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM)		+= -DEFI_HAVE_STRLEN -DEFI_HAVE_STRNLEN \
 				   -DEFI_HAVE_MEMCHR -DEFI_HAVE_STRRCHR \
 				   -DEFI_HAVE_STRCMP -fno-builtin -fpic \
 				   $(call cc-option,-mno-single-pic-base)
-cflags-$(CONFIG_RISCV)		+= -fpic -DNO_ALTERNATIVE -mno-relax
+cflags-$(CONFIG_RISCV)		+= -fpic -DNO_ALTERNATIVE -mno-relax \
+				   $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
 cflags-$(CONFIG_LOONGARCH)	+= -fpie
 
 cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT)	+= -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
-- 
2.43.0


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linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

             reply	other threads:[~2024-06-17 12:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-17 12:30 Jisheng Zhang [this message]
2024-06-17 12:30 ` [PATCH] riscv: enable HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK Jisheng Zhang
2024-06-21 22:10 ` Charlie Jenkins
2024-06-21 22:10   ` Charlie Jenkins
2024-06-22  0:45   ` Jisheng Zhang
2024-06-22  0:45     ` Jisheng Zhang
2024-06-22  1:28     ` Charlie Jenkins
2024-06-22  3:43     ` Charlie Jenkins
2024-06-22  3:43       ` Charlie Jenkins
2024-06-23 14:31       ` Jisheng Zhang
2024-06-23 14:31         ` Jisheng Zhang

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