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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>,
	kees@kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net, wad@chromium.org,
	andrii@kernel.org, jolsa@kernel.org,
	alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, olsajiri@gmail.com,
	cyphar@cyphar.com, songliubraving@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
	john.fastabend@gmail.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	ast@kernel.org, andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
	rafi@rbk.io, shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 15:09:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250117140924.GA21203@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250117170229.f1e1a9f03a8547d31cd875db@kernel.org>

On 01/17, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
>
> On Fri, 17 Jan 2025 02:39:28 +0100
> Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> > A note for the seccomp maintainers...
> >
> > I don't know what do you think, but I agree in advance that the very fact this
> > patch adds "#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64" into __secure_computing() doesn't look nice.
> >
>
> Indeed. in_ia32_syscall() depends arch/x86 too.
> We can add an inline function like;
>
> ``` uprobes.h
> static inline bool is_uprobe_syscall(int syscall)
> {

We can, and this is what I tried to suggest from the very beginning.
But I agree with Eyal who decided to send the most trivial fix for
-stable, we can add the helper later.

I don't think it should live in uprobes.h and I'd prefer something
like arch_seccomp_ignored(int) but I won't insist.

> 	// arch_is_uprobe_syscall check can be replaced by Kconfig,
> 	// something like CONFIG_ARCH_URETPROBE_SYSCALL.

Or sysctl or both. This is another issue.

> ``` arch/x86/include/asm/uprobes.h
> #define arch_is_uprobe_syscall(syscall) \
> 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && syscall == __NR_uretprobe && !in_ia32_syscall())
> ```

This won't compile if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) == false, __NR_uretprobe
will be undefined.

> > The problem is that we need a simple patch for -stable which fixes the real
> > problem. We can cleanup this logic later, I think.
>
> Hmm, at least we should make it is_uprobe_syscall() in uprobes.h so that
> do not pollute the seccomp subsystem with #ifdef.

See above. But I won't insist.

Oleg.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-17 14:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-17  0:55 [PATCH] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering Eyal Birger
2025-01-17  1:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17  8:02   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2025-01-17 13:36     ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 14:09     ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2025-01-17 17:51       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-17 19:24         ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-17 19:34           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-18 15:05         ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-17 18:34 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2025-01-17 18:52   ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-18 20:21 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-18 20:31   ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-01-18 20:45   ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-19  2:24     ` Kees Cook
2025-01-19  3:39       ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-19 10:44         ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-20 21:34         ` Kees Cook
2025-01-27 19:24           ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-27 19:33             ` Kees Cook
2025-01-27 19:39               ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-27 19:43                 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 14:38         ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-21 14:47           ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-21 16:16           ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-21 16:44             ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-21 16:55             ` Jiri Olsa
2025-01-21 22:38               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-01-21 22:46                 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-21 23:13                   ` Eyal Birger
2025-01-21 23:29                     ` Steven Rostedt
2025-01-19 18:36       ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-01-19 12:40   ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 21:32     ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 15:28       ` Oleg Nesterov

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