Re: [PATCH] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering

[Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>]

On Thu, Jan 16, 2025 at 04:55:39PM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
> Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
> not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and
> there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to
> explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.

How is this any different from sigreturn, rt_sigreturn, or
restart_syscall? These are all handled explicitly by userspace filters
already, and I don't see why uretprobe should be any different. Docker
has had plenty of experience with fixing their seccomp filters for new
syscalls. For example, many times already a given libc will suddenly
start using a new syscall when it sees its available, etc.

Basically, this is a Docker issue, not a kernel issue. Seccomp is
behaving correctly. I don't want to start making syscalls invisible
without an extremely good reason. If _anything_ should be invisible, it
is restart_syscall (which actually IS invisible under certain
architectures).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook