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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] seccomp: fix the __secure_computing() stub for !HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 16:03:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250128150307.GA15325@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250128150228.GA15298@redhat.com>

Depending on CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER, __secure_computing(NULL)
will crash or not. This is not consistent/safe, especially considering
that after the previous change __secure_computing(sd) is always called
with sd == NULL.

Fortunately, if CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER=n, __secure_computing()
has no callers, these architectures use secure_computing_strict(). Yet
it make sense make __secure_computing(NULL) safe in this case.

Note also that with this change we can unexport secure_computing_strict()
and change the current callers to use __secure_computing(NULL).

Fixes: 8cf8dfceebda ("seccomp: Stub for !HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/seccomp.h |  8 ++------
 kernel/seccomp.c        | 14 ++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index e45531455d3b..d55949071c30 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <asm/seccomp.h>
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 extern int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 static inline int secure_computing(void)
 {
 	if (unlikely(test_syscall_work(SECCOMP)))
@@ -32,11 +33,6 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void)
 }
 #else
 extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
-static inline int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
-{
-	secure_computing_strict(sd->nr);
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 385d48293a5f..327b7b486f1c 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -29,13 +29,11 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
+#include <asm/syscall.h>
+
 /* Not exposed in headers: strictly internal use only. */
 #define SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD	(SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER + 1)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-#include <asm/syscall.h>
-#endif
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
@@ -1062,6 +1060,14 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
 	else
 		BUG();
 }
+int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+	int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
+		syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
+
+	secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
+	return 0;
+}
 #else
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
-- 
2.25.1.362.g51ebf55


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-28 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-28 15:02 [PATCH v2 0/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] seccomp/mips: change syscall_trace_enter() to use secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2025-01-29 14:26   ` [PATCH v2 2/4] seccomp: fix the __secure_computing() stub for !HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Linus Walleij
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __seccomp_filter() Oleg Nesterov
2025-02-10 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Kees Cook

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