From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing()
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 16:03:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250128150313.GA15336@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250128150228.GA15298@redhat.com>
After the previous changes 'sd' is always NULL.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c | 2 +-
include/linux/seccomp.h | 6 +++---
kernel/entry/common.c | 2 +-
kernel/seccomp.c | 12 +++++-------
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
index 727ed4a14545..c6997df63287 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs)
* have already loaded -ENOSYS into r3, or seccomp has put
* something else in r3 (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
*/
- if (__secure_computing(NULL))
+ if (__secure_computing())
return -1;
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index d55949071c30..9b959972bf4a 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/seccomp.h>
-extern int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd);
+extern int __secure_computing(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
static inline int secure_computing(void)
{
if (unlikely(test_syscall_work(SECCOMP)))
- return __secure_computing(NULL);
+ return __secure_computing();
return 0;
}
#else
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
#else
static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
#endif
-static inline int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) { return 0; }
+static inline int __secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
{
diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c
index e33691d5adf7..20154572ede9 100644
--- a/kernel/entry/common.c
+++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall,
/* Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes. */
if (work & SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP) {
- ret = __secure_computing(NULL);
+ ret = __secure_computing();
if (ret == -1L)
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 327b7b486f1c..281e853bae8c 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1060,10 +1060,9 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
else
BUG();
}
-int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+int __secure_computing(void)
{
- int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
- syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
+ int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
return 0;
@@ -1353,7 +1352,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
}
#endif
-int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+int __secure_computing(void)
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int this_syscall;
@@ -1362,15 +1361,14 @@ int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
return 0;
- this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
- syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
+ this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
switch (mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */
return 0;
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
- return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false);
+ return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, false);
/* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
--
2.25.1.362.g51ebf55
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-28 15:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-28 15:02 [PATCH v2 0/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] seccomp/mips: change syscall_trace_enter() to use secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] seccomp: fix the __secure_computing() stub for !HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-29 14:26 ` Linus Walleij
2025-01-28 15:03 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __seccomp_filter() Oleg Nesterov
2025-02-10 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Kees Cook
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