* [PATCH 6.6.y] mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between
@ 2025-03-17 3:16 jianqi.ren.cn
2025-03-17 16:40 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: jianqi.ren.cn @ 2025-03-17 3:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: patches, gregkh, linux-kernel, akpm, paul, stephen.smalley.work,
ebpqwerty472123, linux-mm, kirill.shutemov, roberto.sassu, jannh,
lorenzo.stoakes, Liam.Howlett, jarkko, dmitry.kasatkin,
eric.snowberg, jmorris, zohar, serge, vbabka
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 58a039e679fe72bd0efa8b2abe669a7914bb4429 ]
Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in
remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when
trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate
such action like for other memory operations such as mmap() and
mprotect().
However, that commit called security_mmap_file() inside the mmap_lock
lock, while the other calls do it before taking the lock, after commit
8b3ec6814c83 ("take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem").
This caused lock inversion issue with IMA which was taking the mmap_lock
and i_mutex lock in the opposite way when the remap_file_pages() system
call was called.
Solve the issue by splitting the critical region in remap_file_pages() in
two regions: the first takes a read lock of mmap_lock, retrieves the VMA
and the file descriptor associated, and calculates the 'prot' and 'flags'
variables; the second takes a write lock on mmap_lock, checks that the VMA
flags and the VMA file descriptor are the same as the ones obtained in the
first critical region (otherwise the system call fails), and calls
do_mmap().
In between, after releasing the read lock and before taking the write
lock, call security_mmap_file(), and solve the lock inversion issue.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241018161415.3845146-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.GAE@google.com/
Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
---
Verified the build test
---
mm/mmap.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index e4dfeaef668a..03a24cb3951d 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2981,6 +2981,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
unsigned long populate = 0;
unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
struct file *file;
+ vm_flags_t vm_flags;
pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n",
current->comm, current->pid);
@@ -2997,12 +2998,60 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
if (pgoff + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) < pgoff)
return ret;
- if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+ if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ /*
+ * Look up VMA under read lock first so we can perform the security
+ * without holding locks (which can be problematic). We reacquire a
+ * write lock later and check nothing changed underneath us.
+ */
+ vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
+
+ if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
+ prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
+ prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
+
+ flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
+ flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
+ flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
+
+ /* Save vm_flags used to calculate prot and flags, and recheck later. */
+ vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+ file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+
+ /* Call outside mmap_lock to be consistent with other callers. */
+ ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
+ if (ret) {
+ fput(file);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* OK security check passed, take write lock + let it rip. */
+ if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) {
+ fput(file);
return -EINTR;
+ }
vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
- if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+ if (!vma)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Make sure things didn't change under us. */
+ if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags)
+ goto out;
+ if (vma->vm_file != file)
goto out;
if (start + size > vma->vm_end) {
@@ -3030,25 +3079,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
goto out;
}
- prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
- prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
- prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
-
- flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
- flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
- flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
-
- file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
- ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags);
- if (ret)
- goto out_fput;
ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
-out_fput:
- fput(file);
out:
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+ fput(file);
if (populate)
mm_populate(ret, populate);
if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret))
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6.6.y] mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between
2025-03-17 3:16 [PATCH 6.6.y] mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between jianqi.ren.cn
@ 2025-03-17 16:40 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2025-03-17 16:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: jianqi.ren.cn, Sasha Levin
[ Sasha's backport helper bot ]
Hi,
✅ All tests passed successfully. No issues detected.
No action required from the submitter.
The upstream commit SHA1 provided is correct: 58a039e679fe72bd0efa8b2abe669a7914bb4429
WARNING: Author mismatch between patch and upstream commit:
Backport author: <jianqi.ren.cn@windriver.com>
Commit author: Kirill A. Shutemov<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Status in newer kernel trees:
6.13.y | Present (exact SHA1)
6.12.y | Present (exact SHA1)
Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit:
---
1: 58a039e679fe7 ! 1: 8ef52303f2705 mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between
@@ Metadata
## Commit message ##
mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between
+ [ Upstream commit 58a039e679fe72bd0efa8b2abe669a7914bb4429 ]
+
Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in
remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when
trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate
@@ Commit message
Cc: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+ Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn@windriver.com>
+ Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
## mm/mmap.c ##
@@ mm/mmap.c: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
@@ mm/mmap.c: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long
- if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+ if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm))
- return -EINTR;
-
++ return -EINTR;
++
+ /*
+ * Look up VMA under read lock first so we can perform the security
+ * without holding locks (which can be problematic). We reacquire a
+ * write lock later and check nothing changed underneath us.
+ */
- vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
-
-- if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
++ vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
++
+ if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+ return -EINVAL;
@@ mm/mmap.c: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long
+ /* OK security check passed, take write lock + let it rip. */
+ if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) {
+ fput(file);
-+ return -EINTR;
+ return -EINTR;
+ }
-+
-+ vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
-+
+
+ vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
+
+- if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+ if (!vma)
+ goto out;
+
---
Results of testing on various branches:
| Branch | Patch Apply | Build Test |
|---------------------------|-------------|------------|
| stable/linux-6.6.y | Success | Success |
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2025-03-17 16:40 ` Sasha Levin
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