From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Nicolas Schier <nicolas.schier@linux.dev>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_STACKLEAK
Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 11:16:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250507181615.1947159-7-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250507180852.work.231-kees@kernel.org>
Since we can wipe the stack with both Clang and GCC plugins, enable this
for the "hardening.config" for wider testing.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
kernel/configs/hardening.config | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
index dd7c32fb5ac1..3da00926b4eb 100644
--- a/kernel/configs/hardening.config
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
# Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
+# Wipe kernel stack after syscall completion to reduce stale data lifetime.
+CONFIG_STACKLEAK=y
+
# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see:
# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
--
2.34.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Nicolas Schier <nicolas.schier@linux.dev>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_STACKLEAK
Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 11:16:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250507181615.1947159-7-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250507180852.work.231-kees@kernel.org>
Since we can wipe the stack with both Clang and GCC plugins, enable this
for the "hardening.config" for wider testing.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
kernel/configs/hardening.config | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
index dd7c32fb5ac1..3da00926b4eb 100644
--- a/kernel/configs/hardening.config
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
# Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
+# Wipe kernel stack after syscall completion to reduce stale data lifetime.
+CONFIG_STACKLEAK=y
+
# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see:
# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
--
2.34.1
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-07 18:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-07 18:16 [PATCH 0/8] stackleak: Support Clang stack depth tracking Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 1/8] nvme-pci: Make nvme_pci_npages_prp() __always_inline Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:22 ` Keith Busch
2025-05-07 18:22 ` Keith Busch
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 2/8] init.h: Disable sanitizer coverage for __init and __head Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-08 12:22 ` Marco Elver
2025-05-08 12:22 ` Marco Elver
2025-05-08 12:25 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2025-05-08 12:25 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2025-05-14 0:55 ` kernel test robot
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 3/8] stackleak: Rename CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK to CONFIG_STACKLEAK Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-07 18:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-07 19:36 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 19:36 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 19:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-07 19:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 4/8] stackleak: Rename stackleak_track_stack to __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 5/8] stackleak: Split STACKLEAK_CFLAGS from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 6/8] stackleak: Support Clang stack depth tracking Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 7/8] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_STACKLEAK Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` [PATCH 8/8] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON Kees Cook
2025-05-07 18:16 ` Kees Cook
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