From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Nicolas Schier <nicolas.schier@linux.dev>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/14] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 21:39:23 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250523043935.2009972-13-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250523043251.it.550-kees@kernel.org>
Since we can wipe the stack with both Clang and GCC plugins, enable this
for the "hardening.config" for wider testing.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
kernel/configs/hardening.config | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
index dd7c32fb5ac1..d24c2772d04d 100644
--- a/kernel/configs/hardening.config
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
# Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
+# Wipe kernel stack after syscall completion to reduce stale data lifetime.
+CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE=y
+
# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see:
# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
--
2.34.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Nicolas Schier <nicolas.schier@linux.dev>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/14] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 21:39:23 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250523043935.2009972-13-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250523043251.it.550-kees@kernel.org>
Since we can wipe the stack with both Clang and GCC plugins, enable this
for the "hardening.config" for wider testing.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
kernel/configs/hardening.config | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
index dd7c32fb5ac1..d24c2772d04d 100644
--- a/kernel/configs/hardening.config
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
# Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
+# Wipe kernel stack after syscall completion to reduce stale data lifetime.
+CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE=y
+
# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see:
# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
--
2.34.1
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-23 4:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-23 4:39 [PATCH v2 00/14] stackleak: Support Clang stack depth tracking Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] stackleak: Rename STACKLEAK to KSTACK_ERASE Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] stackleak: Rename stackleak_track_stack to __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] stackleak: Split KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 14:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-23 14:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-23 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-25 21:53 ` Ilpo Järvinen
2025-05-25 21:53 ` Ilpo Järvinen
2025-05-27 3:30 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-27 3:30 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] arm: " Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 11:19 ` Nishanth Menon
2025-05-23 11:19 ` Nishanth Menon
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] arm64: " Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] s390: " Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 9:35 ` Heiko Carstens
2025-05-23 9:35 ` Heiko Carstens
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] powerpc: " Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 5:24 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-23 5:24 ` Andrew Donnellan
2025-05-23 15:15 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 15:15 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-24 10:43 ` Ritesh Harjani
2025-05-24 10:43 ` Ritesh Harjani
2025-07-10 1:57 ` Kees Cook
2025-07-10 1:57 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] mips: " Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-06-19 8:55 ` Huacai Chen
2025-06-19 8:55 ` Huacai Chen
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] loongarch: " Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-06-19 8:55 ` Huacai Chen
2025-06-19 8:55 ` Huacai Chen
2025-06-24 12:31 ` Huacai Chen
2025-06-24 12:31 ` Huacai Chen
2025-06-25 1:09 ` Kees Cook
2025-06-25 1:09 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] init.h: Disable sanitizer coverage for __init and __head Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] kstack_erase: Support Clang stack depth tracking Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON Kees Cook
2025-05-23 4:39 ` Kees Cook
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