From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
To: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@redhat.com>
Cc: "Amir Goldstein" <amir73il@gmail.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Pali Rohár" <pali@kernel.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org,
"Andrey Albershteyn" <aalbersh@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr
Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2025 11:18:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250701181813.GN10009@frogsfrogsfrogs> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250630-xattrat-syscall-v6-2-c4e3bc35227b@kernel.org>
On Mon, Jun 30, 2025 at 06:20:12PM +0200, Andrey Albershteyn wrote:
> Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended
> attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR).
>
> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
I wonder, were FS_IOC_FS[GS]ETXATTR already covered by the
security_file_ioctl hook? If so, will an out of date security policy
on a 6.17 kernel now fail to check the new file_[gs]etattr syscalls?
Though AFAICT the future of managing these "extra" file attributes is
the system call so it's probably appropriate to have an explicit
callout to LSMs.
Acked-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
--D
> ---
> fs/file_attr.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> security/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/file_attr.c b/fs/file_attr.c
> index 2910b7047721..be62d97cc444 100644
> --- a/fs/file_attr.c
> +++ b/fs/file_attr.c
> @@ -76,10 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fileattr_fill_flags);
> int vfs_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> {
> struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
> + int error;
>
> if (!inode->i_op->fileattr_get)
> return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
>
> + error = security_inode_file_getattr(dentry, fa);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
> return inode->i_op->fileattr_get(dentry, fa);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_get);
> @@ -242,12 +247,20 @@ int vfs_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> } else {
> fa->flags |= old_ma.flags & ~FS_COMMON_FL;
> }
> +
> err = fileattr_set_prepare(inode, &old_ma, fa);
> - if (!err)
> - err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> + err = security_inode_file_setattr(dentry, fa);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> + err = inode->i_op->fileattr_set(idmap, dentry, fa);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> }
> +
> +out:
> inode_unlock(inode);
> -
> return err;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_fileattr_set);
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index bf3bbac4e02a..9600a4350e79 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *name)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index dba349629229..9ed0d0e0c81f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -451,6 +451,10 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> +int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa);
> +int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa);
> int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> @@ -1052,6 +1056,18 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> const char *name)
> { }
>
> +static inline int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 596d41818577..711b4de40b8d 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2622,6 +2622,36 @@ void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_inode_file_setattr() - check if setting fsxattr is allowed
> + * @dentry: file to set filesystem extended attributes on
> + * @fa: extended attributes to set on the inode
> + *
> + * Called when file_setattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl() is called on
> + * inode
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(inode_file_setattr, dentry, fa);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * security_inode_file_getattr() - check if retrieving fsxattr is allowed
> + * @dentry: file to retrieve filesystem extended attributes from
> + * @fa: extended attributes to get
> + *
> + * Called when file_getattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl() is called on
> + * inode
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(inode_file_getattr, dentry, fa);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
> * @dentry: associated dentry
>
> --
> 2.47.2
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-01 18:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-30 16:20 [PATCH v6 0/6] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2025-06-30 16:20 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file Andrey Albershteyn
2025-07-01 5:39 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-01 12:38 ` Jan Kara
2025-07-01 18:13 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-06-30 16:20 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr Andrey Albershteyn
2025-07-01 12:39 ` Jan Kara
2025-07-01 18:18 ` Darrick J. Wong [this message]
2025-07-02 8:47 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-06-30 16:20 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] selinux: implement inode_file_[g|s]etattr hooks Andrey Albershteyn
2025-06-30 16:20 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] fs: make vfs_fileattr_[get|set] return -EOPNOSUPP Andrey Albershteyn
2025-06-30 18:05 ` Pali Rohár
2025-07-01 6:05 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-01 12:51 ` Jan Kara
2025-07-01 14:16 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-01 12:52 ` Jan Kara
2025-07-01 18:18 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-10-06 11:09 ` Jiri Slaby
2025-10-06 11:43 ` Arnd Bergmann
2025-10-06 15:39 ` Jan Kara
2025-10-06 18:52 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-10-07 11:00 ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-30 16:20 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] fs: prepare for extending file_get/setattr() Andrey Albershteyn
2025-07-01 13:06 ` Jan Kara
2025-07-01 18:31 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-07-01 19:27 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-01 19:40 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-07-01 19:54 ` Pali Rohár
2025-07-02 7:03 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-02 9:48 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-02 12:24 ` Christian Brauner
2025-06-30 16:20 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls Andrey Albershteyn
2025-07-01 12:34 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-02 9:13 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-01 13:24 ` Jan Kara
2025-07-01 18:43 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-07-01 18:54 ` Pali Rohár
2025-07-01 19:08 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-07-01 19:17 ` Pali Rohár
2025-07-02 12:40 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-02 13:43 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-02 18:37 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-07-03 8:28 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-03 8:42 ` Amir Goldstein
2025-07-03 8:46 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-03 22:35 ` Darrick J. Wong
2025-07-01 6:11 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] " Amir Goldstein
2025-07-01 12:29 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-07 12:05 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-07-07 12:19 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-07 12:27 ` Andrey Albershteyn
2025-07-07 12:19 ` Christian Brauner
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