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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
	Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>, Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Pavel Tikhomirov <snorcht@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	criu@lists.linux.dev, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH][RFC][CFT] use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 06:51:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250814055142.GN222315@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250814044239.GM222315@ZenIV>

[this should fix userland regression from do_change_type() fix last cycle;
we have too little self-test coverage in the area, unfortunately.  First
approximation for selftest in the followup to this posting.  Review and
testing of both the patch and test would be very welcome]

do_change_type() and do_set_group() are operating on different
aspects of the same thing - propagation graph.  The latter
asks for mounts involved to be mounted in namespace(s) the caller
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN for.  The former is a mess - originally it
didn't even check that mount *is* mounted.  That got fixed,
but the resulting check turns out to be too strict for userland -
in effect, we check that mount is in our namespace, having already
checked that we have CAP_SYS_ADMIN there.

What we really need (in both cases) is
	* we only touch mounts that are mounted.  Hard requirement,
data corruption if that's get violated.
	* we don't allow to mess with a namespace unless you already
have enough permissions to do so (i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its userns).

That's an equivalent of what do_set_group() does; let's extract that
into a helper (may_change_propagation()) and use it in both
do_set_group() and do_change_type().

Fixes: 12f147ddd6de "do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ddfd4457d338..a191c6519e36 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2862,6 +2862,19 @@ static int graft_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *p, struct mountpoint *mp)
 	return attach_recursive_mnt(mnt, p, mp);
 }
 
+static int may_change_propagation(const struct mount *m)
+{
+        struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->mnt_ns;
+
+	 // it must be mounted in some namespace
+	 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ns))         // is_mounted()
+		 return -EINVAL;
+	 // and the caller must be admin in userns of that namespace
+	 if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		 return -EPERM;
+	 return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Sanity check the flags to change_mnt_propagation.
  */
@@ -2898,10 +2911,10 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	namespace_lock();
-	if (!check_mnt(mnt)) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
+	err = may_change_propagation(mnt);
+	if (err)
 		goto out_unlock;
-	}
+
 	if (type == MS_SHARED) {
 		err = invent_group_ids(mnt, recurse);
 		if (err)
@@ -3347,18 +3360,11 @@ static int do_set_group(struct path *from_path, struct path *to_path)
 
 	namespace_lock();
 
-	err = -EINVAL;
-	/* To and From must be mounted */
-	if (!is_mounted(&from->mnt))
-		goto out;
-	if (!is_mounted(&to->mnt))
-		goto out;
-
-	err = -EPERM;
-	/* We should be allowed to modify mount namespaces of both mounts */
-	if (!ns_capable(from->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	err = may_change_propagation(from);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
-	if (!ns_capable(to->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	err = may_change_propagation(to);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	err = -EINVAL;

  reply	other threads:[~2025-08-14  5:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-24 20:02 do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Andrei Vagin
2025-07-24 23:00 ` Al Viro
2025-07-24 23:38   ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-26 17:12   ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-26 17:53     ` Al Viro
2025-07-26 21:01       ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-31  2:40         ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-07-31  7:53           ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-31  8:11             ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-13 18:56         ` Al Viro
2025-08-13 19:09           ` Tycho Andersen
2025-08-13 19:41             ` Al Viro
2025-08-14  4:08               ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-14  4:42                 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14  5:51                   ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-08-14  5:52                     ` [PATCH][RFC][CFT] use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes kernel test robot
2025-08-14  5:57                     ` [RFC][CFT] selftest for permission checks in " Al Viro
2025-08-14  6:37                       ` Al Viro
2025-08-14  7:07                 ` do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Pavel Tikhomirov

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