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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
	Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>, Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Pavel Tikhomirov <snorcht@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	criu@lists.linux.dev, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][CFT] selftest for permission checks in mount propagation changes
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 07:37:45 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250814063745.GP222315@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250814055702.GO222315@ZenIV>

> void do_unshare(void)
> {
> 	FILE *f;
> 	uid_t uid = geteuid();
> 	gid_t gid = getegid();
> 	unshare(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWUSER);
> 	f = fopen("/proc/self/uid_map", "w");
> 	fprintf(f, "0 %d 1", uid);
> 	fclose(f);
> 	f = fopen("/proc/self/setgroups", "w");
> 	fprintf(f, "deny");
> 	fclose(f);
> 	f = fopen("/proc/self/gid_map", "w");
> 	fprintf(f, "0 %d 1", gid);
> 	fclose(f);
> 	mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC|MS_PRIVATE, NULL);
> }

This obviously needs error checking - in this form it won't do
anything good without userns enabled (coredump on the first
fprintf() in there, since there won't be /proc/self/uid_map);
should probably just report CLONE_NEWUSER failure, warn about
skipped tests, fall back to unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and skip
everything in in_child()...

  reply	other threads:[~2025-08-14  6:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-24 20:02 do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Andrei Vagin
2025-07-24 23:00 ` Al Viro
2025-07-24 23:38   ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-26 17:12   ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-26 17:53     ` Al Viro
2025-07-26 21:01       ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-31  2:40         ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-07-31  7:53           ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-31  8:11             ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-13 18:56         ` Al Viro
2025-08-13 19:09           ` Tycho Andersen
2025-08-13 19:41             ` Al Viro
2025-08-14  4:08               ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-14  4:42                 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14  5:51                   ` [PATCH][RFC][CFT] use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes Al Viro
2025-08-14  5:52                     ` kernel test robot
2025-08-14  5:57                     ` [RFC][CFT] selftest for permission checks in " Al Viro
2025-08-14  6:37                       ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-08-14  7:07                 ` do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Pavel Tikhomirov

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