Re: [RFC V2 10/18] famfs_fuse: Basic fuse kernel ABI enablement for famfs

["Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>]

On Wed, Aug 13, 2025 at 08:07:00AM -0500, John Groves wrote:
> On 25/08/12 09:37AM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 11, 2025 at 01:30:53PM -0500, John Groves wrote:
> > > On 25/07/10 08:32PM, John Groves wrote:
> > > > On 25/07/08 06:53PM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, Jul 08, 2025 at 07:02:03AM -0500, John Groves wrote:
> > > > > > On 25/07/07 10:39AM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 04, 2025 at 08:39:59AM -0500, John Groves wrote:
> > > > > > > > On 25/07/04 09:54AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 3, 2025 at 8:51 PM John Groves <John@groves.net> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > * FUSE_DAX_FMAP flag in INIT request/reply
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > * fuse_conn->famfs_iomap (enable famfs-mapped files) to denote a
> > > > > > > > > >   famfs-enabled connection
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: John Groves <john@groves.net>
> > > > > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > > > > >  fs/fuse/fuse_i.h          |  3 +++
> > > > > > > > > >  fs/fuse/inode.c           | 14 ++++++++++++++
> > > > > > > > > >  include/uapi/linux/fuse.h |  4 ++++
> > > > > > > > > >  3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
> > > > > > > > > > index 9d87ac48d724..a592c1002861 100644
> > > > > > > > > > --- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
> > > > > > > > > > +++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
> > > > > > > > > > @@ -873,6 +873,9 @@ struct fuse_conn {
> > > > > > > > > >         /* Use io_uring for communication */
> > > > > > > > > >         unsigned int io_uring;
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > +       /* dev_dax_iomap support for famfs */
> > > > > > > > > > +       unsigned int famfs_iomap:1;
> > > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > pls move up to the bit fields members.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > Oops, done, thanks.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > >         /** Maximum stack depth for passthrough backing files */
> > > > > > > > > >         int max_stack_depth;
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
> > > > > > > > > > index 29147657a99f..e48e11c3f9f3 100644
> > > > > > > > > > --- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
> > > > > > > > > > +++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
> > > > > > > > > > @@ -1392,6 +1392,18 @@ static void process_init_reply(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args,
> > > > > > > > > >                         }
> > > > > > > > > >                         if (flags & FUSE_OVER_IO_URING && fuse_uring_enabled())
> > > > > > > > > >                                 fc->io_uring = 1;
> > > > > > > > > > +                       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUSE_FAMFS_DAX) &&
> > > > > > > > > > +                           flags & FUSE_DAX_FMAP) {
> > > > > > > > > > +                               /* XXX: Should also check that fuse server
> > > > > > > > > > +                                * has CAP_SYS_RAWIO and/or CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> > > > > > > > > > +                                * since it is directing the kernel to access
> > > > > > > > > > +                                * dax memory directly - but this function
> > > > > > > > > > +                                * appears not to be called in fuse server
> > > > > > > > > > +                                * process context (b/c even if it drops
> > > > > > > > > > +                                * those capabilities, they are held here).
> > > > > > > > > > +                                */
> > > > > > > > > > +                               fc->famfs_iomap = 1;
> > > > > > > > > > +                       }
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 1. As long as the mapping requests are checking capabilities we should be ok
> > > > > > > > >     Right?
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > It depends on the definition of "are", or maybe of "mapping requests" ;)
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > Forgive me if this *is* obvious, but the fuse server capabilities are what
> > > > > > > > I think need to be checked here - not the app that it accessing a file.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > An app accessing a regular file doesn't need permission to do raw access to
> > > > > > > > the underlying block dev, but the fuse server does - becuase it is directing
> > > > > > > > the kernel to access that for apps.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 2. What's the deal with capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) in process_init_limits then?
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > I *think* that's checking the capabilities of the app that is accessing the
> > > > > > > > file, and not the fuse server. But I might be wrong - I have not pulled very
> > > > > > > > hard on that thread yet.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > The init reply should be processed in the context of the fuse server.
> > > > > > > At that point the kernel hasn't exposed the fs to user programs, so
> > > > > > > (AFAICT) there won't be any other programs accessing that fuse mount.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Hmm. It would be good if you're right about that. My fuse server *is* running
> > > > > > as root, and when I check those capabilities in process_init_reply(), I
> > > > > > find those capabilities. So far so good.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Then I added code to my fuse server to drop those capabilities prior to
> > > > > > starting the fuse session (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_SYS_RAWIO) and 
> > > > > > prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_SYS_ADMIN). I expected (hoped?) to see those 
> > > > > > capabilities disappear in process_init_reply() - but they did not disappear.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I'm all ears if somebody can see a flaw in my logic here. Otherwise, the
> > > > > > capabilities need to be stashed away before the reply is processsed, when 
> > > > > > fs/fuse *is* running in fuse server context.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I'm somewhat surprised if that isn't already happening somewhere...
> > > > > 
> > > > > Hrm.  I *thought* that since FUSE_INIT isn't queued as a background
> > > > > command, it should still execute in the same process context as the fuse
> > > > > server.
> > > > > 
> > > > > OTOH it also occurs to me that I have this code in fuse_send_init:
> > > > > 
> > > > > 	if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> > > > > 		flags |= FUSE_IOMAP | FUSE_IOMAP_DIRECTIO | FUSE_IOMAP_PAGECACHE;
> > > > > 	...
> > > > > 	ia->in.flags = flags;
> > > > > 	ia->in.flags2 = flags >> 32;
> > > > > 
> > > > > which means that we only advertise iomap support in FUSE_INIT if the
> > > > > process running fuse_fill_super (which you hope is the fuse server)
> > > > > actually has CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  Would that work for you?  Or are you
> > > > > dropping privileges before you even open /dev/fuse?
> > > > 
> > > > Ah - that might be the answer. I will check if dropped capabilities 
> > > > disappear in fuse_send_init. If so, I can work with that - not advertising 
> > > > the famfs capability unless the capability is present at that point looks 
> > > > like a perfectly good option. Thanks for that idea!
> > > 
> > > Review: the famfs fuse server directs the kernel to provide access to raw
> > > (memory) devices, so it should should be required to have have the
> > > CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability. fs/fuse needs to detect this at init time,
> > > and fail the connection/mount if the capability is missing.
> > > 
> > > I initially attempted to do this verification in process_init_reply(), but
> > > that doesn't run in the fuse server process context.
> > > 
> > > I am now checking the capability in fuse_send_init(), and not advertising
> > > the FUSE_DAX_FMAP capability (in in_args->flags[2]) unless the server has 
> > > CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
> > > 
> > > That requires that process_init_reply() reject FUSE_DAX_FMAP from a server
> > > if FUSE_DAX_FMAP was not set in in_args->flags[2]. process_init_reply() was
> > > not previously checking the in_args, but no big deal - this works.
> > > 
> > > This leads to an apparent dilemma in libfuse. In fuse_lowlevel_ops->init(),
> > > I should check for (flags & FUSE_DAX_IOMAP), and fail the connection if
> > > that capability is not on offer. But fuse_lowlevel_ops->init() doesn't
> > > have an obvious way to fail the connection. 
> > 
> > Yeah, I really wish it did.  I particularly wish that it had a way to
> > negotiate all the FUSE_INIT stuff before libfuse daemonizes and starts
> > up the event loop.  Well, not all of it -- by the time we get to
> > FUSE_INIT we've basically decided to commit to mounting.
> > 
> > For fuseblk servers this is horrible, because the kernel needs to be
> > able to open the block device with O_EXCL during the mount() process,
> > which means you actually have to be able to (re)open the block device
> > from op_init, which can fail.  Unless there's a way to drop O_EXCL from
> > an open fd?
> > 
> > The awful way that I handle failure in FUSE_INIT is to call
> > fuse_session_exit, but that grossly leaves a dead mount in its place.
> > 
> > Hey wait, is this what Mikulas was talking about when he mentioned
> > synchronous initialization?
> > 
> > For iomap I created a discovery ioctl so that you can open /dev/fuse and
> > ask the kernel about the iomap functionality that it supports, and you
> > can exit(1) without creating a fuse session.  The one goofy problem with
> > that is that there's a TOCTOU race if someone else does echo N >
> > /sys/module/fuse/parameters/enable_iomap, though fuse4fs can always
> > fall back to non-iomap mode.
> > 
> > --D
> 
> Thanks Darrick.
> 
> Hmm - synchronous init would be nice.
> 
> I tried calling fuse_session_exit(), but the broken mount was not an
> improvement over a can't-do-I/O mount - which I get if the kernel rejects 
> the capability currently known as FUSE_DAX_FMAP due to lack of CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
> 
> In my case, I think letting the mount complete with FUSE_DAX_FMAP rejected
> is easier to detect and cleanup than a fuse_session_exit() aborted mount.

Yeah, you can always adjust the fuse server to react to an FMAP
rejection by returning EIO or something.  Though I guess it's nice to
have some detection that you can do prior to calling fuse_main so that
you can print complaints and exit(1) while the user is still paying
attention. :)

--D

> Famfs mount is a cli operation that does a sequence of stuff before and after
> the fork/exec of the famfs fuse server. That fork/exec can't really return 
> an error in the conventional sense, so I'm stuck diagnosing whether the 
> mount is good (which I already do, but it's a WIP). 
> 
> I already have to poll for the .meta files to appear (superblock and log), 
> and that can be adapted pretty easily to check whether they can be read 
> correctly (which they can't if famfs doesn't have daxdev access).
> 
> If mount was synchronous, I'd still need to give the fork/exec enough time
> to fail and then detect that. That would probably be cleaner, but not by
> a huge amount.
> 
> Thanks,
> John
> 
> <snip>
> 
>