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* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
@ 2025-08-23 15:44 gregkh
  2025-08-24 13:58 ` [PATCH 5.15.y 1/2] tracing: Remove unneeded goto out logic Sasha Levin
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2025-08-23 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pulehui, rostedt; +Cc: stable


The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 6a909ea83f226803ea0e718f6e88613df9234d58
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025082331-pushing-surrender-b647@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 6a909ea83f226803ea0e718f6e88613df9234d58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2025 04:02:32 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user
 failed

When the length of the string written to set_ftrace_filter exceeds
FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, the following KASAN alarm will be triggered:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000d00bd5ba by task ash/165

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: ash Not tainted 6.16.0-g6bcdbd62bd56-dirty
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 show_stack+0x34/0x50 (C)
 dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0x158
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x398
 print_report+0xb0/0x280
 kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x30
 strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
 ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x100/0x2d8
 ftrace_regex_release+0x484/0x618
 __fput+0x364/0xa58
 ____fput+0x28/0x40
 task_work_run+0x154/0x278
 do_notify_resume+0x1f0/0x220
 el0_svc+0xec/0xf0
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
 el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0

The reason is that trace_get_user will fail when processing a string
longer than FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, but not set the end of parser->buffer to 0.
Then an OOB access will be triggered in ftrace_regex_release->
ftrace_process_regex->strsep->strpbrk. We can solve this problem by
limiting access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250813040232.1344527-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
Fixes: 8c9af478c06b ("ftrace: Handle commands when closing set_ftrace_filter file")
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 4283ed4e8f59..8d8935ed416d 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ int trace_get_user(struct trace_parser *parser, const char __user *ubuf,
 
 	ret = get_user(ch, ubuf++);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto fail;
 
 	read++;
 	cnt--;
@@ -1830,7 +1830,7 @@ int trace_get_user(struct trace_parser *parser, const char __user *ubuf,
 		while (cnt && isspace(ch)) {
 			ret = get_user(ch, ubuf++);
 			if (ret)
-				return ret;
+				goto fail;
 			read++;
 			cnt--;
 		}
@@ -1848,12 +1848,14 @@ int trace_get_user(struct trace_parser *parser, const char __user *ubuf,
 	while (cnt && !isspace(ch) && ch) {
 		if (parser->idx < parser->size - 1)
 			parser->buffer[parser->idx++] = ch;
-		else
-			return -EINVAL;
+		else {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
 
 		ret = get_user(ch, ubuf++);
 		if (ret)
-			return ret;
+			goto fail;
 		read++;
 		cnt--;
 	}
@@ -1868,11 +1870,15 @@ int trace_get_user(struct trace_parser *parser, const char __user *ubuf,
 		/* Make sure the parsed string always terminates with '\0'. */
 		parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;
 	} else {
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
 	*ppos += read;
 	return read;
+fail:
+	trace_parser_fail(parser);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /* TODO add a seq_buf_to_buffer() */
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h
index 1dbf1d3cf2f1..be6654899cae 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h
@@ -1292,6 +1292,7 @@ bool ftrace_event_is_function(struct trace_event_call *call);
  */
 struct trace_parser {
 	bool		cont;
+	bool		fail;
 	char		*buffer;
 	unsigned	idx;
 	unsigned	size;
@@ -1299,7 +1300,7 @@ struct trace_parser {
 
 static inline bool trace_parser_loaded(struct trace_parser *parser)
 {
-	return (parser->idx != 0);
+	return !parser->fail && parser->idx != 0;
 }
 
 static inline bool trace_parser_cont(struct trace_parser *parser)
@@ -1313,6 +1314,11 @@ static inline void trace_parser_clear(struct trace_parser *parser)
 	parser->idx = 0;
 }
 
+static inline void trace_parser_fail(struct trace_parser *parser)
+{
+	parser->fail = true;
+}
+
 extern int trace_parser_get_init(struct trace_parser *parser, int size);
 extern void trace_parser_put(struct trace_parser *parser);
 extern int trace_get_user(struct trace_parser *parser, const char __user *ubuf,


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Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2025-08-23 15:44 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2025-08-24 13:58 ` [PATCH 5.15.y 1/2] tracing: Remove unneeded goto out logic Sasha Levin
2025-08-24 13:58   ` [PATCH 5.15.y 2/2] tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed Sasha Levin

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