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From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
	yilun.xu@linux.intel.com, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org, aik@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] samples/devsec: Introduce a "Device Security TSM" sample driver
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 09:39:24 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250827123924.GA2186489@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250827035259.1356758-7-dan.j.williams@intel.com>

On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 08:52:58PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> +static int devsec_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
> +			    const struct pci_device_id *id)
> +{
> +	void __iomem *base;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	rc = pcim_enable_device(pdev);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, rc, "enable failed\n");
> +
> +	base = pcim_iomap_region(pdev, 0, KBUILD_MODNAME);
> +	if (IS_ERR(base))
> +		return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, PTR_ERR(base),
> +				     "iomap failed\n");
> +
> +	rc = device_cc_probe(&pdev->dev);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;

I really don't understand what the proposal is here?

device_cc_probe() doesn't save anything, doesn't this just get into an
endless loop of EPROBE_DEFER? Usually the kernel will retry these
things during booting?

How does userspace accept through the sysfs retrigger probing?

As we discussed in the prior chain we need to have a policy decision
before auto-binding drivers at all in a CC environment, I don't see
that in the code though the cover letter talked about it??

How does the kernel/userspace tell the difference between drivers that
want this early binding and those that don't?

Can you write out the whole flow from a userspace perspective in one
of the commit messages?

This also disables BME, we talked about that a lot, the commit
messages didn't seem to describe what solution was settled on here?

Jason

  reply	other threads:[~2025-08-27 12:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-27  3:52 [PATCH 0/7] PCI/TSM: TEE I/O infrastructure Dan Williams
2025-08-27  3:52 ` [PATCH 1/7] PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_{bind,unbind}() methods for instantiating TDIs Dan Williams
2025-09-02  0:12   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-02 15:04     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10  4:47       ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-10  4:46     ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-02 15:05   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10  4:50     ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-03 15:17   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-04 10:38     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-04 12:56       ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-05  2:32         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-10  5:09     ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-27  3:52 ` [PATCH 2/7] PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_guest_req() for managing TDIs Dan Williams
2025-08-28  9:53   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-28 22:07     ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-29  2:21       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-30  2:37         ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-01 23:49           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-08 11:09             ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-10  5:35               ` dan.j.williams
2025-10-10  4:48           ` Xu Yilun
2025-08-28 13:02   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-08-28 22:14     ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-27  3:52 ` [PATCH 3/7] device core: Introduce confidential device acceptance Dan Williams
2025-08-27  6:14   ` Greg KH
2025-08-28 20:07     ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-16 16:58   ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-08-27  3:52 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/ioremap, resource: Introduce IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED for encrypted PCI MMIO Dan Williams
2025-09-17 21:30   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-10-07  8:23   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-10-07 21:31     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-27  3:52 ` [PATCH 5/7] PCI/TSM: Add Device Security (TVM Guest) operations support Dan Williams
2025-09-03 15:22   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10  5:15     ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-11  8:31       ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-04 15:02   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10  5:31     ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-16 17:10   ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-08-27  3:52 ` [PATCH 6/7] samples/devsec: Introduce a "Device Security TSM" sample driver Dan Williams
2025-08-27 12:39   ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2025-08-27 23:47     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-28 21:38     ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-29 16:02       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-29 20:00         ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-29 23:34           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-27  3:52 ` [PATCH 7/7] tools/testing/devsec: Add a script to exercise samples/devsec/ Dan Williams

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