From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
yilun.xu@linux.intel.com, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org, aik@amd.com,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/ioremap, resource: Introduce IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED for encrypted PCI MMIO
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2025 18:30:11 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250917213011.GA2101646@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250827035259.1356758-5-dan.j.williams@intel.com>
On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 08:52:56PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> PCIe Trusted Execution Environment Device Interface Security Protocol
> (TDISP) arranges for a PCI device to support encrypted MMIO. In support of
> that capability, ioremap() needs a mechanism to detect when a PCI device
> has been dynamically transitioned into this secure state and enforce
> encrypted MMIO mappings.
>
> Teach ioremap() about a new IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED type that supplements the
> existing PCI Memory Space (MMIO) BAR resources. The proposal is that a
> resource, "PCI MMIO Encrypted", with this description type is injected by
> the PCI/TSM core for each PCI device BAR that is to be protected.
>
> Unlike the existing encryption determination which is "implied with a silent
> fallback to an unencrypted mapping", this indication is "explicit with an
> expectation that the request fails instead of fallback". IORES_MUST_ENCRYPT
> is added to manage this expectation.
>
> Given that "PCI MMIO Encrypted" is an additional resource in the tree, the
> IORESOURCE_BUSY flag will only be set on a descendant/child of that
> resource. Adjust the resource tree walk to use walk_iomem_res_desc() and
> check all intersecting resources for the IORES_MUST_ENCRYPT determination.
I was just looking at the ioremap stuff from the core mm side, and I
really don't understand this patch. I agree with the commit message
though..
What I expect to see in this series is not x86 code (that should be in
a series enabling x86 TSM!) but code to update the pgprot_decrypted()
calls in io_remap_pfn_range() so they are conditional.
And futher code to validate that the pfn range requested by
io_remap_pfn_range() on a TEE secured device is one that has been
checked and validated with the TSM as being actually authentic and
private.
Bascially when a driver on a T=1 struct device calls
io_remap_pfn_range() it must be private MMIO, enforced by core code.
That probably does involve a new IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED flag..
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-17 21:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-27 3:52 [PATCH 0/7] PCI/TSM: TEE I/O infrastructure Dan Williams
2025-08-27 3:52 ` [PATCH 1/7] PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_{bind,unbind}() methods for instantiating TDIs Dan Williams
2025-09-02 0:12 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-02 15:04 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10 4:47 ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-10 4:46 ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-02 15:05 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10 4:50 ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-03 15:17 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-04 10:38 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-04 12:56 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-05 2:32 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-10 5:09 ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-27 3:52 ` [PATCH 2/7] PCI/TSM: Add pci_tsm_guest_req() for managing TDIs Dan Williams
2025-08-28 9:53 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-28 22:07 ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-29 2:21 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-30 2:37 ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-01 23:49 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-08 11:09 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-09-10 5:35 ` dan.j.williams
2025-10-10 4:48 ` Xu Yilun
2025-08-28 13:02 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-08-28 22:14 ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-27 3:52 ` [PATCH 3/7] device core: Introduce confidential device acceptance Dan Williams
2025-08-27 6:14 ` Greg KH
2025-08-28 20:07 ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-16 16:58 ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-08-27 3:52 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/ioremap, resource: Introduce IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED for encrypted PCI MMIO Dan Williams
2025-09-17 21:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2025-10-07 8:23 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-10-07 21:31 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-27 3:52 ` [PATCH 5/7] PCI/TSM: Add Device Security (TVM Guest) operations support Dan Williams
2025-09-03 15:22 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10 5:15 ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-11 8:31 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-04 15:02 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-09-10 5:31 ` dan.j.williams
2025-09-16 17:10 ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-08-27 3:52 ` [PATCH 6/7] samples/devsec: Introduce a "Device Security TSM" sample driver Dan Williams
2025-08-27 12:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-27 23:47 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-08-28 21:38 ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-29 16:02 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-29 20:00 ` dan.j.williams
2025-08-29 23:34 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-27 3:52 ` [PATCH 7/7] tools/testing/devsec: Add a script to exercise samples/devsec/ Dan Williams
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