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* syztest
  2025-04-24  2:02 [syzbot] [xfs?] KMSAN: uninit-value in xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt syzbot
@ 2025-04-24  8:59 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-04-24  8:59   ` syztest syzbot
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-04-24  8:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+b4a84825ea149bb99bfc; +Cc: cem, linux-kernel, linux-xfs, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
@@ -1182,6 +1182,8 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
                        if (error)
                                goto error1;
                } else {
+                       pag->pagl_leftrec = NULLAGINO;
+                       pag->pagl_rightrec = NULLAGINO;
                        /* search left with tcur, back up 1 record */
                        error = xfs_ialloc_next_rec(tcur, &trec, &doneleft, 1);
                        if (error)


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: syztest
  2025-04-24  8:59 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-04-24  8:59   ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-04-24  8:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: contact; +Cc: cem, contact, linux-kernel, linux-xfs, syzkaller-bugs

> #syz test

This crash does not have a reproducer. I cannot test it.

>
> --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ialloc.c
> @@ -1182,6 +1182,8 @@ xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt(
>                         if (error)
>                                 goto error1;
>                 } else {
> +                       pag->pagl_leftrec = NULLAGINO;
> +                       pag->pagl_rightrec = NULLAGINO;
>                         /* search left with tcur, back up 1 record */
>                         error = xfs_ialloc_next_rec(tcur, &trec, &doneleft, 1);
>                         if (error)
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-04-25  0:57 [syzbot] [block?] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in guard_bio_eod syzbot
@ 2025-04-27 15:57 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-04-27 16:03 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-04-27 15:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+3291296495fc970e4b1c
  Cc: axboe, linux-block, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/block/bio.c
+++ b/block/bio.c
@@ -691,6 +691,9 @@ static void bio_truncate(struct bio *bio, unsigned new_size)
  */
 void guard_bio_eod(struct bio *bio)
 {
+	if (unlikely(!bio->bi_bdev)
+		return;
+
 	sector_t maxsector = bdev_nr_sectors(bio->bi_bdev);
 
 	if (!maxsector)
-- 
2.43.0



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-04-25  0:57 [syzbot] [block?] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in guard_bio_eod syzbot
  2025-04-27 15:57 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-04-27 16:03 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-04-27 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+3291296495fc970e4b1c
  Cc: axboe, linux-block, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/block/bio.c
+++ b/block/bio.c
@@ -691,6 +691,9 @@ static void bio_truncate(struct bio *bio, unsigned new_size)
  */
 void guard_bio_eod(struct bio *bio)
 {
+	if (unlikely(!bio->bi_bdev))
+		return;
+
 	sector_t maxsector = bdev_nr_sectors(bio->bi_bdev);
 
 	if (!maxsector)
-- 
2.43.0



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-04-10  6:58 [syzbot] [bcachefs?] kernel BUG in __bch2_str_hash_check_key syzbot
@ 2025-04-28 16:09 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-04-28 16:26   ` syztest Kent Overstreet
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-04-28 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+843981bb836d699c07d1
  Cc: kent.overstreet, linux-bcachefs, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/fs/bcachefs/fsck.c
+++ b/fs/bcachefs/fsck.c
@@ -976,7 +976,24 @@ int bch2_fsck_update_backpointers(struct btree_trans *trans,
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (d->v.d_type == DT_SUBVOL) {
-		BUG();
+		struct bch_subvolume subvol;
+
+		ret = bch2_subvolume_get(trans, le32_to_cpu(d->v.d_child_subvol),
+					     false, &subvol);
+		if (ret && !bch2_err_matches(ret, ENOENT))
+			goto err;
+
+		ret = get_visible_inodes(trans, &target, s, le64_to_cpu(subvol.inode));
+		if (ret)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (target.inodes.nr) {
+			target.inodes.data[0].inode.bi_dir_offset = d->k.p.offset;
+			ret = __bch2_fsck_write_inode(trans, &target.inodes.data[0].inode);
+			if (ret)
+				goto err;
+		}
+
 	} else {
 		ret = get_visible_inodes(trans, &target, s, le64_to_cpu(d->v.d_inum));
 		if (ret)
-- 
2.43.0

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: syztest
  2025-04-28 16:09 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-04-28 16:26   ` Kent Overstreet
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Kent Overstreet @ 2025-04-28 16:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnaud Lecomte
  Cc: syzbot+843981bb836d699c07d1, linux-bcachefs, linux-kernel,
	syzkaller-bugs

On Mon, Apr 28, 2025 at 06:09:03PM +0200, Arnaud Lecomte wrote:
> #syz test

Don't rely on syzbot for testing, you really need to be running the
tests yourself and looking at all the output.

It's not enough to know that we're not crashing anymore, we want the
filesystem to repair and mount successfully.

> --- a/fs/bcachefs/fsck.c
> +++ b/fs/bcachefs/fsck.c
> @@ -976,7 +976,24 @@ int bch2_fsck_update_backpointers(struct btree_trans *trans,
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
>  	if (d->v.d_type == DT_SUBVOL) {
> -		BUG();
> +		struct bch_subvolume subvol;
> +
> +		ret = bch2_subvolume_get(trans, le32_to_cpu(d->v.d_child_subvol),
> +					     false, &subvol);
> +		if (ret && !bch2_err_matches(ret, ENOENT))
> +			goto err;
> +
> +		ret = get_visible_inodes(trans, &target, s, le64_to_cpu(subvol.inode));
> +		if (ret)
> +			goto err;
> +
> +		if (target.inodes.nr) {
> +			target.inodes.data[0].inode.bi_dir_offset = d->k.p.offset;
> +			ret = __bch2_fsck_write_inode(trans, &target.inodes.data[0].inode);
> +			if (ret)
> +				goto err;
> +		}
> +
>  	} else {
>  		ret = get_visible_inodes(trans, &target, s, le64_to_cpu(d->v.d_inum));
>  		if (ret)
> -- 
> 2.43.0

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-03-31 20:23 [syzbot] [rdma?] [s390?] [net?] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock syzbot
@ 2025-06-29 13:29 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-06-30  6:51   ` syztest Paolo Abeni
  2025-06-29 14:47 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-06-29 15:10 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-06-29 13:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+827ae2bfb3a3529333e9
  Cc: agordeev, alibuda, davem, edumazet, guwen, horms, jaka, kuba,
	linux-kernel, linux-rdma, linux-s390, netdev, pabeni,
	syzkaller-bugs, tonylu, wenjia

#syz test

--- a/net/smc/af_smc.c
+++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c
@@ -123,11 +123,14 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
 					  struct request_sock *req_unhash,
 					  bool *own_req)
 {
+        read_lock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
 	struct smc_sock *smc;
 	struct sock *child;
-
 	smc = smc_clcsock_user_data(sk);
 
+	if (!smc)
+		goto drop;
+
 	if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) + atomic_read(&smc->queued_smc_hs) >
 				sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)
 		goto drop;
@@ -148,9 +151,11 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
 		if (inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops == inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops)
 			inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops = smc->ori_af_ops;
 	}
+	read_unlock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
 	return child;
 
 drop:
+	read_unlock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
 	dst_release(dst);
 	tcp_listendrop(sk);
 	return NULL;
@@ -2613,7 +2618,7 @@ int smc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 	int rc;
 
 	smc = smc_sk(sk);
-	lock_sock(sk);
+	lock_sock(sock->sk);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if ((sk->sk_state != SMC_INIT && sk->sk_state != SMC_LISTEN) ||
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-03-31 20:23 [syzbot] [rdma?] [s390?] [net?] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock syzbot
  2025-06-29 13:29 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-06-29 14:47 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-06-29 15:10 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-06-29 14:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+827ae2bfb3a3529333e9
  Cc: agordeev, alibuda, davem, edumazet, guwen, horms, jaka, kuba,
	linux-kernel, linux-rdma, linux-s390, netdev, pabeni,
	syzkaller-bugs, tonylu, wenjia

#syz test

--- a/net/smc/af_smc.c
+++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c
@@ -126,8 +126,12 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
 	struct smc_sock *smc;
 	struct sock *child;
 
+	lockdep_assert_held_read(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
 	smc = smc_clcsock_user_data(sk);
 
+	if (!smc)
+		goto drop;
+
 	if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) + atomic_read(&smc->queued_smc_hs) >
 				sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)
 		goto drop;
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-03-31 20:23 [syzbot] [rdma?] [s390?] [net?] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock syzbot
  2025-06-29 13:29 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-06-29 14:47 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-06-29 15:10 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-06-29 15:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+827ae2bfb3a3529333e9
  Cc: agordeev, alibuda, davem, edumazet, guwen, horms, jaka, kuba,
	linux-kernel, linux-rdma, linux-s390, netdev, pabeni,
	syzkaller-bugs, tonylu, wenjia

#syz test

--- a/net/smc/af_smc.c
+++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c
@@ -125,9 +125,12 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
 {
 	struct smc_sock *smc;
 	struct sock *child;
-
+	read_lock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
 	smc = smc_clcsock_user_data(sk);
 
+	if (!smc)
+		goto drop;
+
 	if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) + atomic_read(&smc->queued_smc_hs) >
 				sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)
 		goto drop;
@@ -148,9 +151,11 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
 		if (inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops == inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops)
 			inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops = smc->ori_af_ops;
 	}
+	read_unlock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
 	return child;
 
 drop:
+	read_unlock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
 	dst_release(dst);
 	tcp_listendrop(sk);
 	return NULL;
-- 
2.43.0

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: syztest
  2025-06-29 13:29 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-06-30  6:51   ` Paolo Abeni
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2025-06-30  6:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnaud Lecomte, syzbot+827ae2bfb3a3529333e9
  Cc: agordeev, alibuda, davem, edumazet, guwen, horms, jaka, kuba,
	linux-kernel, linux-rdma, linux-s390, netdev, syzkaller-bugs,
	tonylu, wenjia

On 6/29/25 3:29 PM, Arnaud Lecomte wrote:
> #syz test
> 
> --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c
> +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c
> @@ -123,11 +123,14 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
>  					  struct request_sock *req_unhash,
>  					  bool *own_req)
>  {
> +        read_lock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
>  	struct smc_sock *smc;
>  	struct sock *child;
> -
>  	smc = smc_clcsock_user_data(sk);
>  
> +	if (!smc)
> +		goto drop;
> +
>  	if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) + atomic_read(&smc->queued_smc_hs) >
>  				sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)
>  		goto drop;
> @@ -148,9 +151,11 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
>  		if (inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops == inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops)
>  			inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops = smc->ori_af_ops;
>  	}
> +	read_unlock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
>  	return child;
>  
>  drop:
> +	read_unlock_bh(&((struct sock *)sk)->sk_callback_lock);
>  	dst_release(dst);
>  	tcp_listendrop(sk);
>  	return NULL;
> @@ -2613,7 +2618,7 @@ int smc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
>  	int rc;
>  
>  	smc = smc_sk(sk);
> -	lock_sock(sk);
> +	lock_sock(sock->sk);
>  
>  	rc = -EINVAL;
>  	if ((sk->sk_state != SMC_INIT && sk->sk_state != SMC_LISTEN) ||

Please stop cc-ing netdev and other kernel ML with this tests. You
should keep just the syzkaller related MLs and a very restricted list of
individuals (i.e. no maintainers).

Thanks,

Paolo


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2024-12-06 20:05 [syzbot] [input?] [usb?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in mcp2221_raw_event syzbot
@ 2025-07-26 20:41 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-07-26 20:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+52c1a7d3e5b361ccd346
  Cc: linux-input, linux-kernel, linux-usb, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c
@@ -814,6 +814,10 @@ static int mcp2221_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
 			}
 			if (data[2] == MCP2221_I2C_READ_COMPL ||
 			    data[2] == MCP2221_I2C_READ_PARTIAL) {
+				if (!mcp->rxbuf || mcp->rxbuf_idx < 0 || data[3] > 60) {
+					mcp->status = -EINVAL;
+					break;
+				}	
 				buf = mcp->rxbuf;
 				memcpy(&buf[mcp->rxbuf_idx], &data[4], data[3]);
 				mcp->rxbuf_idx = mcp->rxbuf_idx + data[3];
-- 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2024-01-22  9:48 [syzbot] [hfs?] KASAN: out-of-bounds Read in hfsplus_bnode_move syzbot
@ 2025-07-27 18:17 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-07-27 18:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+6df204b70bf3261691c5; +Cc: linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/fs/hfsplus/brec.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/brec.c
@@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ int hfs_brec_insert(struct hfs_find_data *fd, void *entry, int entry_len)
 		data_rec_off += 2;
 	} while (data_rec_off < idx_rec_off);
 
+	if (end_off < data_off) {
+		hfs_dbg(BNODE_MOD, "corrupted node: end_off %u < data_off %u\n", end_off, data_off);
+		if (new_node)
+			hfs_bnode_put(new_node);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 	/* move data away */
 	hfs_bnode_move(node, data_off + size, data_off,
 		       end_off - data_off);
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid
@ 2025-07-28 20:55 syzbot
  2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-07-28 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: andrii, ast, bpf, daniel, eddyz87, haoluo, john.fastabend, jolsa,
	kpsingh, linux-kernel, martin.lau, netdev, sdf, song,
	syzkaller-bugs, yonghong.song

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    5345e64760d3 bpf: Simplify bounds refinement from s32
git tree:       bpf-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1052e782580000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=934611ae034ab218
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
compiler:       Debian clang version 20.1.7 (++20250616065708+6146a88f6049-1~exp1~20250616065826.132), Debian LLD 20.1.7

Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/533f77de596b/disk-5345e647.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/771fbeaf8fb5/vmlinux-5345e647.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6bb4eec6d31b/bzImage-5345e647.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

hrtimer: interrupt took 66349 ns
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:265
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888143fd0a58 by task syz.1.2/5975

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5975 Comm: syz.1.2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-syzkaller-g5345e64760d3 #0 PREEMPT(full) 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593
 __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:265
 ____bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1810 [inline]
 bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp+0x196/0x210 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1799
 bpf_prog_b724608cae728045+0x27/0x2f
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1322 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
 __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2257 [inline]
 bpf_trace_run2+0x284/0x4b0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2298
 __do_trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 kfree+0x3a0/0x440 mm/slub.c:4829
 slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x60/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4680
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2576 [inline]
 rcu_core+0xca8/0x1710 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2832
 handle_softirqs+0x283/0x870 kernel/softirq.c:579
 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:613 [inline]
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:453 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x1f0 kernel/softirq.c:680
 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:696
 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 [inline]
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
RIP: 0010:bytes_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:87 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:104 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned_n mm/kasan/generic.c:129 [inline]
RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned mm/kasan/generic.c:161 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x9f/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
Code: 00 fc ff df 4d 8d 34 19 4d 89 f4 4d 29 dc 49 83 fc 10 7f 29 4d 85 e4 0f 84 41 01 00 00 4c 89 cb 48 f7 d3 4c 01 fb 41 80 3b 00 <0f> 85 de 01 00 00 49 ff c3 48 ff c3 75 ee e9 21 01 00 00 44 89 dd
RSP: 0018:ffffc900044dee68 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: ffffffff8215d67f
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffea0000c7f634
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffea0000c7f637 R09: 1ffffd400018fec6
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff9400018fec6 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffff9400018fec7 R15: 1ffffd400018fec6
 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
 atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 [inline]
 page_ref_count include/linux/page_ref.h:67 [inline]
 set_page_refcounted+0x4f/0x160 mm/internal.h:491
 __alloc_pages_noprof mm/page_alloc.c:4995 [inline]
 alloc_pages_bulk_noprof+0x570/0x710 mm/page_alloc.c:4913
 ___alloc_pages_bulk mm/kasan/shadow.c:344 [inline]
 __kasan_populate_vmalloc mm/kasan/shadow.c:368 [inline]
 kasan_populate_vmalloc+0xba/0x1a0 mm/kasan/shadow.c:417
 alloc_vmap_area+0xd51/0x1490 mm/vmalloc.c:2092
 __get_vm_area_node+0x1f8/0x300 mm/vmalloc.c:3187
 __vmalloc_node_range_noprof+0x301/0x12f0 mm/vmalloc.c:3853
 __vmalloc_node_noprof mm/vmalloc.c:3956 [inline]
 vmalloc_noprof+0xb2/0xf0 mm/vmalloc.c:3989
 bpf_prog_calc_tag+0xb9/0x620 kernel/bpf/core.c:307
 resolve_pseudo_ldimm64+0xbc/0xc50 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:20479
 bpf_check+0x1c58/0x1d2e0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:24614
 bpf_prog_load+0x1318/0x1930 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2972
 __sys_bpf+0x528/0x870 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6022
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6132 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6130 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6130
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1cabb8e9a9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1cac9f6038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1cabdb5fa0 RCX: 00007f1cabb8e9a9
RDX: 0000000000000094 RSI: 0000200000000640 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007f1cabc10d69 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1cabdb5fa0 R15: 00007ffee0b40348
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5979:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4328 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x276/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:4334
 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:932 [inline]
 __bpf_map_area_alloc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:391 [inline]
 bpf_map_area_alloc+0x64/0x180 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:404
 prealloc_elems_and_freelist+0x86/0x1d0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:51
 stack_map_alloc+0x33f/0x4c0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:114
 map_create+0xaa0/0x1310 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1477
 __sys_bpf+0x60f/0x870 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6004
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6132 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6130 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6130
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888143fd0800
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 24 bytes to the right of
 allocated 576-byte region [ffff888143fd0800, ffff888143fd0a40)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x143fd0
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
memcg:ffff88814cb20d01
flags: 0x57ff00000000040(head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 057ff00000000040 ffff88801a44b280 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 ffff88814cb20d01
head: 057ff00000000040 ffff88801a44b280 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 ffff88814cb20d01
head: 057ff00000000003 ffffea00050ff401 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x252800(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_THISNODE), pid 5854, tgid 5854 (syz-executor), ts 88680071975, free_ts 62656261060
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1704
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1712 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3669
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:4959
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2453 [inline]
 allocate_slab+0x65/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2619
 new_slab mm/slub.c:2673 [inline]
 ___slab_alloc+0xbfc/0x1480 mm/slub.c:3859
 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3949 [inline]
 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4024 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4185 [inline]
 __kmalloc_cache_node_noprof+0x29a/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4367
 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:928 [inline]
 alloc_mem_cgroup_per_node_info mm/memcontrol.c:3665 [inline]
 mem_cgroup_alloc mm/memcontrol.c:3747 [inline]
 mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x4b2/0x1f20 mm/memcontrol.c:3789
 css_create kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5669 [inline]
 cgroup_apply_control_enable+0x3d1/0xa80 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:3289
 cgroup_mkdir+0xc40/0xe60 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5893
 kernfs_iop_mkdir+0x211/0x350 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1268
 vfs_mkdir+0x306/0x510 fs/namei.c:4375
 do_mkdirat+0x247/0x590 fs/namei.c:4408
 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4425 [inline]
 __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4423 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4423
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5696 tgid 5696 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1248 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0xc71/0xe70 mm/page_alloc.c:2706
 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2717 [inline]
 __put_partials+0x161/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:3186
 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3261
 __slab_free+0x2f7/0x400 mm/slub.c:4513
 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
 qlist_free_all+0x97/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:329
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:250 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4148 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x1c1/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:4204
 ptlock_alloc+0x20/0x70 mm/memory.c:7174
 ptlock_init include/linux/mm.h:2939 [inline]
 pagetable_pte_ctor include/linux/mm.h:2988 [inline]
 __pte_alloc_one_noprof include/asm-generic/pgalloc.h:78 [inline]
 pte_alloc_one+0x7d/0x170 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:18
 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:5542 [inline]
 do_read_fault mm/memory.c:5581 [inline]
 do_fault mm/memory.c:5724 [inline]
 do_pte_missing mm/memory.c:4251 [inline]
 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:6069 [inline]
 __handle_mm_fault+0x294d/0x5620 mm/memory.c:6212
 handle_mm_fault+0x40a/0x8e0 mm/memory.c:6381
 do_user_addr_fault+0xa81/0x1390 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1336
 handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1476 [inline]
 exc_page_fault+0x76/0xf0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1532
 asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888143fd0900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff888143fd0980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888143fd0a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                    ^
 ffff888143fd0a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff888143fd0b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess), 3 bytes skipped:
   0:	df 4d 8d             	fisttps -0x73(%rbp)
   3:	34 19                	xor    $0x19,%al
   5:	4d 89 f4             	mov    %r14,%r12
   8:	4d 29 dc             	sub    %r11,%r12
   b:	49 83 fc 10          	cmp    $0x10,%r12
   f:	7f 29                	jg     0x3a
  11:	4d 85 e4             	test   %r12,%r12
  14:	0f 84 41 01 00 00    	je     0x15b
  1a:	4c 89 cb             	mov    %r9,%rbx
  1d:	48 f7 d3             	not    %rbx
  20:	4c 01 fb             	add    %r15,%rbx
  23:	41 80 3b 00          	cmpb   $0x0,(%r11)
* 27:	0f 85 de 01 00 00    	jne    0x20b <-- trapping instruction
  2d:	49 ff c3             	inc    %r11
  30:	48 ff c3             	inc    %rbx
  33:	75 ee                	jne    0x23
  35:	e9 21 01 00 00       	jmp    0x15b
  3a:	44 89 dd             	mov    %r11d,%ebp


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
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If the report is already addressed, let syzbot know by replying with:
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If you want to overwrite report's subsystems, reply with:
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If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
#syz undup

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid
  2025-07-28 20:55 [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
@ 2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
  2025-07-29  7:22   ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
                     ` (2 more replies)
  2025-09-04 10:17 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-09-04 14:11 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2 siblings, 3 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-07-28 23:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: andrii, ast, bpf, daniel, eddyz87, haoluo, john.fastabend, jolsa,
	kpsingh, linux-kernel, martin.lau, netdev, sdf, song,
	syzkaller-bugs, yonghong.song

syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    5b4c54ac49af bpf: Fix various typos in verifier.c comments
git tree:       bpf-next
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17441782580000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=934611ae034ab218
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
compiler:       Debian clang version 20.1.7 (++20250616065708+6146a88f6049-1~exp1~20250616065826.132), Debian LLD 20.1.7
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=16f294a2580000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14349034580000

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5a5cfac28d08/disk-5b4c54ac.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/bb5b9f9f1b33/vmlinux-5b4c54ac.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/14b928da2760/bzImage-5b4c54ac.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:265
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880439aa258 by task syz-executor265/6114

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6114 Comm: syz-executor265 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-syzkaller-g5b4c54ac49af #0 PREEMPT(full) 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593
 __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:265
 ____bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1810 [inline]
 bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp+0x196/0x210 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1799
 bpf_prog_b724608cae728045+0x27/0x2f
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1322 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
 __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2257 [inline]
 bpf_trace_run2+0x284/0x4b0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2298
 __do_trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 kfree+0x3a0/0x440 mm/slub.c:4829
 slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x60/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4680
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2576 [inline]
 rcu_core+0xca8/0x1710 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2832
 handle_softirqs+0x283/0x870 kernel/softirq.c:579
 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:613 [inline]
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:453 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x1f0 kernel/softirq.c:680
 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:696
 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 [inline]
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
RIP: 0010:xas_load+0xd9/0x5b0 lib/xarray.c:244
Code: 42 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 3a 04 00 00 49 8d 5e fe 48 8b 44 24 08 0f b6 28 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 48 89 44 24 20 42 0f b6 04 28 <84> c0 0f 85 34 04 00 00 44 0f b6 23 44 0f b6 fd 44 89 ff 44 89 e6
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000459f898 EFLAGS: 00000a02
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888025438840 RCX: ffff88807c050000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88807c050000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc9000459fb32
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888025438842 R15: 0000000000000002
 xas_find+0x157/0x990 lib/xarray.c:1406
 next_uptodate_folio+0x32/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3562
 filemap_map_pages+0x21f/0x1740 mm/filemap.c:3714
 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:5548 [inline]
 do_read_fault mm/memory.c:5581 [inline]
 do_fault mm/memory.c:5724 [inline]
 do_pte_missing mm/memory.c:4251 [inline]
 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:6069 [inline]
 __handle_mm_fault+0x3687/0x5620 mm/memory.c:6212
 handle_mm_fault+0x40a/0x8e0 mm/memory.c:6381
 do_user_addr_fault+0xa81/0x1390 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1336
 handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1476 [inline]
 exc_page_fault+0x76/0xf0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1532
 asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623
RIP: 0033:0x7f3d52e29438
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f3d52e2940e.
RSP: 002b:00007fff46c399c8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 00007f3d52e59ad8 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: 00007f3d52e5ad00 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f3d52e59ad8
RBP: 00007f3d52e58118 R08: 00007fff46c39a3c R09: 00007fff46c39a3c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3d52e5ace8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f3d52e5ad00 R15: 00007f3d52db0290
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 6114:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4328 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x276/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:4334
 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:932 [inline]
 __bpf_map_area_alloc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:391 [inline]
 bpf_map_area_alloc+0x64/0x180 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:404
 prealloc_elems_and_freelist+0x86/0x1d0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:51
 stack_map_alloc+0x33f/0x4c0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:114
 map_create+0xaa0/0x1310 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1477
 __sys_bpf+0x60f/0x870 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6004
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6132 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6130 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6130
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880439aa000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 24 bytes to the right of
 allocated 576-byte region [ffff8880439aa000, ffff8880439aa240)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x439a8
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
anon flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801a441dc0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801a441dc0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea00010e6a01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 5514, tgid 5514 (dhcpcd), ts 48384102667, free_ts 48383277611
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1704
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1712 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3669
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:4959
 alloc_pages_mpol+0x232/0x4a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2419
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2451 [inline]
 allocate_slab+0x8a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2619
 new_slab mm/slub.c:2673 [inline]
 ___slab_alloc+0xbfc/0x1480 mm/slub.c:3859
 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3949 [inline]
 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4024 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4185 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4327 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x305/0x4f0 mm/slub.c:4340
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline]
 load_elf_phdrs fs/binfmt_elf.c:525 [inline]
 load_elf_binary+0x2cd/0x2790 fs/binfmt_elf.c:854
 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1670 [inline]
 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1702 [inline]
 bprm_execve+0x999/0x1450 fs/exec.c:1754
 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1860
 do_execve fs/exec.c:1934 [inline]
 __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2010 [inline]
 __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2005 [inline]
 __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2005
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5514 tgid 5514 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1248 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0xc71/0xe70 mm/page_alloc.c:2706
 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2717 [inline]
 __put_partials+0x161/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:3186
 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3261
 __slab_free+0x2f7/0x400 mm/slub.c:4513
 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
 qlist_free_all+0x97/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:329
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:250 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4148 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4327 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x224/0x4f0 mm/slub.c:4340
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline]
 tomoyo_add_entry security/tomoyo/common.c:2132 [inline]
 tomoyo_supervisor+0xbd5/0x1480 security/tomoyo/common.c:2204
 tomoyo_audit_env_log security/tomoyo/environ.c:36 [inline]
 tomoyo_env_perm+0x149/0x1e0 security/tomoyo/environ.c:63
 tomoyo_environ security/tomoyo/domain.c:672 [inline]
 tomoyo_find_next_domain+0x15cf/0x1aa0 security/tomoyo/domain.c:888
 tomoyo_bprm_check_security+0x11c/0x180 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:102
 security_bprm_check+0x89/0x270 security/security.c:1302
 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1660 [inline]
 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1702 [inline]
 bprm_execve+0x8ee/0x1450 fs/exec.c:1754
 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1860
 do_execve fs/exec.c:1934 [inline]
 __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2010 [inline]
 __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2005 [inline]
 __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2005

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8880439aa100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8880439aa180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8880439aa200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                    ^
 ffff8880439aa280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8880439aa300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
   0:	42 0f b6 04 28       	movzbl (%rax,%r13,1),%eax
   5:	84 c0                	test   %al,%al
   7:	0f 85 3a 04 00 00    	jne    0x447
   d:	49 8d 5e fe          	lea    -0x2(%r14),%rbx
  11:	48 8b 44 24 08       	mov    0x8(%rsp),%rax
  16:	0f b6 28             	movzbl (%rax),%ebp
  19:	48 89 d8             	mov    %rbx,%rax
  1c:	48 c1 e8 03          	shr    $0x3,%rax
  20:	48 89 44 24 20       	mov    %rax,0x20(%rsp)
  25:	42 0f b6 04 28       	movzbl (%rax,%r13,1),%eax
* 2a:	84 c0                	test   %al,%al <-- trapping instruction
  2c:	0f 85 34 04 00 00    	jne    0x466
  32:	44 0f b6 23          	movzbl (%rbx),%r12d
  36:	44 0f b6 fd          	movzbl %bpl,%r15d
  3a:	44 89 ff             	mov    %r15d,%edi
  3d:	44 89 e6             	mov    %r12d,%esi


---
If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
@ 2025-07-29  7:22   ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-07-29  8:56     ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
  2025-10-12 13:04   ` Syz Test Arnaud lecomte
  2025-10-12 13:56   ` test Arnaud lecomte
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-07-29  7:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b; +Cc: bpf, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 	struct bpf_stack_map *smap = container_of(map, struct bpf_stack_map, map);
 	struct stack_map_bucket *bucket, *new_bucket, *old_bucket;
 	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
-	u32 hash, id, trace_nr, trace_len, i;
+	u32 hash, id, trace_nr, trace_len, i, max_depth;
 	bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
 	u64 *ips;
 	bool hash_matches;
@@ -241,6 +241,19 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 
 	trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
 	trace_len = trace_nr * sizeof(u64);
+
+	/* Clamp the trace to max allowed depth */
+	if (stack_map_use_build_id(map))
+		max_depth = smap->map.value_size / sizeof(struct bpf_stack_build_id);
+	else
+		max_depth = smap->map.value_size / sizeof(u64);
+
+	if (trace_nr > max_depth)
+		trace_nr = max_depth;
+
+ 	ips = trace->ip + skip;
+
+
 	ips = trace->ip + skip;
 	hash = jhash2((u32 *)ips, trace_len / sizeof(u32), 0);
 	id = hash & (smap->n_buckets - 1);
-- 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid
  2025-07-29  7:22   ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-07-29  8:56     ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-07-29  8:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bpf, contact, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-by: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         cd7c97f4 Merge branch 'bpf-show-precise-rejected-funct..
git tree:       bpf-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15fe44a2580000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=934611ae034ab218
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
compiler:       Debian clang version 20.1.7 (++20250616065708+6146a88f6049-1~exp1~20250616065826.132), Debian LLD 20.1.7
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=11bbb4a2580000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-07-29 21:58 [syzbot] [fuse?] [block?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in disk_add_events syzbot
@ 2025-07-30  5:51 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-07-30  6:09   ` syztest Yu Kuai
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-07-30  5:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+fa3a12519f0d3fd4ec16
  Cc: linux-block, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

--- a/drivers/md/md.c
+++ b/drivers/md/md.c
@@ -5978,10 +5978,6 @@ struct mddev *md_alloc(dev_t dev, char *name)
 
 	disk->events |= DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
 	mddev->gendisk = disk;
-	error = add_disk(disk);
-	if (error)
-		goto out_put_disk;
-
 	kobject_init(&mddev->kobj, &md_ktype);
 	error = kobject_add(&mddev->kobj, &disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, "%s", "md");
 	if (error) {
@@ -5999,6 +5995,9 @@ struct mddev *md_alloc(dev_t dev, char *name)
 	kobject_uevent(&mddev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
 	mddev->sysfs_state = sysfs_get_dirent_safe(mddev->kobj.sd, "array_state");
 	mddev->sysfs_level = sysfs_get_dirent_safe(mddev->kobj.sd, "level");
+	error = add_disk(disk);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_put_disk;
 	mutex_unlock(&disks_mutex);
 	return mddev;
 
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: syztest
  2025-07-30  5:51 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-07-30  6:09   ` Yu Kuai
  2025-07-30  7:10     ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Yu Kuai @ 2025-07-30  6:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnaud Lecomte, syzbot+fa3a12519f0d3fd4ec16
  Cc: linux-block, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs,
	yukuai (C)

Hi,

在 2025/07/30 13:51, Arnaud Lecomte 写道:
> #syz test
> 
> --- a/drivers/md/md.c
> +++ b/drivers/md/md.c
> @@ -5978,10 +5978,6 @@ struct mddev *md_alloc(dev_t dev, char *name)
>   
>   	disk->events |= DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
>   	mddev->gendisk = disk;
> -	error = add_disk(disk);
> -	if (error)
> -		goto out_put_disk;
> -
>   	kobject_init(&mddev->kobj, &md_ktype);
>   	error = kobject_add(&mddev->kobj, &disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, "%s", "md");

This is wrong, you can't add mddev >kobj under the disk without
kobject_add for the disk kobj.

Thanks,
Kuai

>   	if (error) {
> @@ -5999,6 +5995,9 @@ struct mddev *md_alloc(dev_t dev, char *name)
>   	kobject_uevent(&mddev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
>   	mddev->sysfs_state = sysfs_get_dirent_safe(mddev->kobj.sd, "array_state");
>   	mddev->sysfs_level = sysfs_get_dirent_safe(mddev->kobj.sd, "level");
> +	error = add_disk(disk);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto out_put_disk;
>   	mutex_unlock(&disks_mutex);
>   	return mddev;
>   
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: syztest
  2025-07-30  6:09   ` syztest Yu Kuai
@ 2025-07-30  7:10     ` Arnaud Lecomte
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-07-30  7:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu Kuai, syzbot+fa3a12519f0d3fd4ec16
  Cc: linux-block, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs,
	yukuai (C)


On 30/07/2025 07:09, Yu Kuai wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 在 2025/07/30 13:51, Arnaud Lecomte 写道:
>> #syz test
>>
>> --- a/drivers/md/md.c
>> +++ b/drivers/md/md.c
>> @@ -5978,10 +5978,6 @@ struct mddev *md_alloc(dev_t dev, char *name)
>>         disk->events |= DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
>>       mddev->gendisk = disk;
>> -    error = add_disk(disk);
>> -    if (error)
>> -        goto out_put_disk;
>> -
>>       kobject_init(&mddev->kobj, &md_ktype);
>>       error = kobject_add(&mddev->kobj, &disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, 
>> "%s", "md");
>
> This is wrong, you can't add mddev >kobj under the disk without
> kobject_add for the disk kobj.
>
Will dive a bit more into that after work,
Thanks

> Thanks,
> Kuai
>
>>       if (error) {
>> @@ -5999,6 +5995,9 @@ struct mddev *md_alloc(dev_t dev, char *name)
>>       kobject_uevent(&mddev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
>>       mddev->sysfs_state = sysfs_get_dirent_safe(mddev->kobj.sd, 
>> "array_state");
>>       mddev->sysfs_level = sysfs_get_dirent_safe(mddev->kobj.sd, 
>> "level");
>> +    error = add_disk(disk);
>> +    if (error)
>> +        goto out_put_disk;
>>       mutex_unlock(&disks_mutex);
>>       return mddev;
>>
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2023-06-17  5:30 [syzbot] [hfs?] kernel BUG in hfsplus_bnode_put syzbot
@ 2025-08-29  6:30 ` Chenzhi Yang
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Chenzhi Yang @ 2025-08-29  6:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+005d2a9ecd9fbf525f6a; +Cc: linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, Yang Chenzhi

From: Yang Chenzhi <yang.chenzhi@vivo.com>

#syz test

--- a/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c
@@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ static struct hfs_bnode *__hfs_bnode_create(struct hfs_btree *tree, u32 cnid)
 		tree->node_hash[hash] = node;
 		tree->node_hash_cnt++;
 	} else {
+		hfs_bnode_get(node2);
 		spin_unlock(&tree->hash_lock);
 		kfree(node);
 		wait_event(node2->lock_wq,
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-07-28 20:55 [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
  2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
@ 2025-09-04 10:17 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-09-04 11:54   ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
  2025-09-04 14:11 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-09-04 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b; +Cc: bpf, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index 3615c06b7dfa..29e05c9ff1bd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -42,6 +42,28 @@ static inline int stack_map_data_size(struct bpf_map *map)
 		sizeof(struct bpf_stack_build_id) : sizeof(u64);
 }
 
+/**
+ * stack_map_calculate_max_depth - Calculate maximum allowed stack trace depth
+ * @size:  Size of the buffer/map value in bytes
+ * @elem_size:  Size of each stack trace element
+ * @flags:  BPF stack trace flags (BPF_F_USER_STACK, BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID, ...)
+ *
+ * Return: Maximum number of stack trace entries that can be safely stored
+ */
+static u32 stack_map_calculate_max_depth(u32 size, u32 elem_size, u64 flags)
+{
+	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
+	u32 max_depth;
+	u32 curr_sysctl_max_stack = READ_ONCE(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
+
+	max_depth = size / elem_size;
+	max_depth += skip;
+	if (max_depth > curr_sysctl_max_stack)
+		return curr_sysctl_max_stack;
+
+	return max_depth;
+}
+
 static int prealloc_elems_and_freelist(struct bpf_stack_map *smap)
 {
 	u64 elem_size = sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) +
@@ -300,20 +322,17 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid, struct pt_regs *, regs, struct bpf_map *, map,
 	   u64, flags)
 {
-	u32 max_depth = map->value_size / stack_map_data_size(map);
-	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
+	u32 elem_size = stack_map_data_size(map);
 	bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
 	struct perf_callchain_entry *trace;
 	bool kernel = !user;
+	u32 max_depth;
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK | BPF_F_USER_STACK |
 			       BPF_F_FAST_STACK_CMP | BPF_F_REUSE_STACKID)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	max_depth += skip;
-	if (max_depth > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack)
-		max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
-
+	max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
 	trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
 				   false, false);
 
@@ -350,6 +369,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 {
 	struct perf_event *event = ctx->event;
 	struct perf_callchain_entry *trace;
+	u32 elem_size, max_depth;
 	bool kernel, user;
 	__u64 nr_kernel;
 	int ret;
@@ -371,11 +391,15 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	nr_kernel = count_kernel_ip(trace);
+	elem_size = stack_map_data_size(map);
 
 	if (kernel) {
 		__u64 nr = trace->nr;
 
 		trace->nr = nr_kernel;
+		max_depth =
+			stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
+		trace->nr = min_t(u32, nr_kernel, max_depth);
 		ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
 
 		/* restore nr */
@@ -388,6 +412,9 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 			return -EFAULT;
 
 		flags = (flags & ~BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK) | skip;
+		max_depth =
+			stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
+		trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
 		ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -406,8 +433,8 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 			    struct perf_callchain_entry *trace_in,
 			    void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags, bool may_fault)
 {
-	u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, num_elem, max_depth;
 	bool user_build_id = flags & BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID;
+	u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, max_depth;
 	bool crosstask = task && task != current;
 	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
 	bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
@@ -438,21 +465,20 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 		goto clear;
 	}
 
-	num_elem = size / elem_size;
-	max_depth = num_elem + skip;
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_max_stack < max_depth)
-		max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
+	max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(size, elem_size, flags);
 
 	if (may_fault)
 		rcu_read_lock(); /* need RCU for perf's callchain below */
 
-	if (trace_in)
+	if (trace_in) {
 		trace = trace_in;
-	else if (kernel && task)
+		trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
+	} else if (kernel && task) {
 		trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(task, max_depth);
-	else
+	} else {
 		trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
 					   crosstask, false);
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!trace) || trace->nr < skip) {
 		if (may_fault)
@@ -461,7 +487,6 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 	}
 
 	trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
-	trace_nr = (trace_nr <= num_elem) ? trace_nr : num_elem;
 	copy_len = trace_nr * elem_size;
 
 	ips = trace->ip + skip;
-- 
2.47.3


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid
  2025-09-04 10:17 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-09-04 11:54   ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-09-04 11:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bpf, contact, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch but the reproducer is still triggering an issue:
KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:287
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88807a2d9258 by task syz.1.290/7428

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 7428 Comm: syz.1.290 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:287
 ____bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1810 [inline]
 bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp+0x196/0x210 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1799
 bpf_prog_b724608cae728045+0x27/0x2f
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1332 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
 __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2257 [inline]
 bpf_trace_run2+0x281/0x4b0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2298
 __traceiter_kfree+0x2e/0x50 include/trace/events/kmem.h:94
 __do_trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 kfree+0x3a0/0x440 mm/slub.c:4866
 slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x60/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4717
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2605 [inline]
 rcu_core+0xcab/0x1770 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861
 handle_softirqs+0x283/0x870 kernel/softirq.c:579
 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:613 [inline]
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:453 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x1f0 kernel/softirq.c:680
 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:696
 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 [inline]
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
RIP: 0010:rcu_is_watching_curr_cpu include/linux/context_tracking.h:128 [inline]
RIP: 0010:rcu_is_watching+0x3a/0xb0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:751
Code: e8 eb f2 d2 09 89 c3 83 f8 08 73 65 49 bf 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8d 34 dd 10 ed bd 8d 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 38 00 <74> 08 4c 89 f7 e8 dc b8 7c 00 48 c7 c3 98 6f a1 92 49 03 1e 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b4d7ad8 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 1ffffffff1b7bda3 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0f1baf102ea8c100
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8be33260 RDI: ffffffff8be33220
RBP: ffffffff81b2dcc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc9000b4d7c40 R11: fffff5200169af8b R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffffffff8e139ea0 R14: ffffffff8dbded18 R15: dffffc0000000000
 trace_lock_acquire include/trace/events/lock.h:24 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x5f/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5831
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 [inline]
 class_rcu_constructor include/linux/rcupdate.h:1155 [inline]
 futex_hash+0x5d/0x2d0 kernel/futex/core.c:308
 class_hb_constructor kernel/futex/futex.h:240 [inline]
 futex_wake+0x161/0x560 kernel/futex/waitwake.c:172
 do_futex+0x395/0x420 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:107
 __do_sys_futex kernel/futex/syscalls.c:179 [inline]
 __se_sys_futex+0x36f/0x400 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:160
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f132bf8ebe9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f132cd870e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f132c1b5fa8 RCX: 00007f132bf8ebe9
RDX: 00000000000f4240 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: 00007f132c1b5fac
RBP: 00007f132c1b5fa0 R08: 7fffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f132c1b6038 R14: 00007ffd03290180 R15: 00007ffd03290268
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 7428:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4365 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x276/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:4371
 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:932 [inline]
 __bpf_map_area_alloc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:393 [inline]
 bpf_map_area_alloc+0x64/0x180 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:406
 prealloc_elems_and_freelist+0x86/0x1d0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:73
 stack_map_alloc+0x33f/0x4c0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:136
 map_create+0xaa3/0x14d0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1480
 __sys_bpf+0x60f/0x870 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6011
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6139 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6137 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6137
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807a2d9000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 24 bytes to the right of
 allocated 576-byte region [ffff88807a2d9000, ffff88807a2d9240)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x7a2d8
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
memcg:ffff888054d19001
flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801a44b280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 ffff888054d19001
head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801a44b280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 ffff888054d19001
head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea0001e8b601 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 5237, tgid 5237 (udevd), ts 36597748986, free_ts 36397116210
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1851
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1859 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3858
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5148
 alloc_pages_mpol+0x232/0x4a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2416
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2487 [inline]
 allocate_slab+0x8a/0x370 mm/slub.c:2655
 new_slab mm/slub.c:2709 [inline]
 ___slab_alloc+0xbeb/0x1410 mm/slub.c:3891
 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4056 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4217 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4364 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x305/0x4f0 mm/slub.c:4377
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline]
 kmalloc_array_noprof include/linux/slab.h:948 [inline]
 alloc_pipe_info+0x1fd/0x4d0 fs/pipe.c:815
 get_pipe_inode fs/pipe.c:894 [inline]
 create_pipe_files+0x8a/0x7e0 fs/pipe.c:926
 __do_pipe_flags+0x46/0x1f0 fs/pipe.c:988
 do_pipe2+0x9c/0x170 fs/pipe.c:1036
 __do_sys_pipe2 fs/pipe.c:1054 [inline]
 __se_sys_pipe2 fs/pipe.c:1052 [inline]
 __x64_sys_pipe2+0x5a/0x70 fs/pipe.c:1052
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5244 tgid 5244 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1395 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0xbc4/0xd30 mm/page_alloc.c:2895
 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
 __put_partials+0x156/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:3218
 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3293
 __slab_free+0x2d5/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:4550
 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
 qlist_free_all+0x97/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:340
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:250 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4180 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4229 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x1c1/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:4236
 getname_flags+0xb8/0x540 fs/namei.c:146
 do_readlinkat+0xbc/0x500 fs/stat.c:575
 __do_sys_readlink fs/stat.c:613 [inline]
 __se_sys_readlink fs/stat.c:610 [inline]
 __x64_sys_readlink+0x7f/0x90 fs/stat.c:610
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88807a2d9100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88807a2d9180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88807a2d9200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                    ^
 ffff88807a2d9280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88807a2d9300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
   0:	e8 eb f2 d2 09       	call   0x9d2f2f0
   5:	89 c3                	mov    %eax,%ebx
   7:	83 f8 08             	cmp    $0x8,%eax
   a:	73 65                	jae    0x71
   c:	49 bf 00 00 00 00 00 	movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%r15
  13:	fc ff df
  16:	4c 8d 34 dd 10 ed bd 	lea    -0x724212f0(,%rbx,8),%r14
  1d:	8d
  1e:	4c 89 f0             	mov    %r14,%rax
  21:	48 c1 e8 03          	shr    $0x3,%rax
  25:	42 80 3c 38 00       	cmpb   $0x0,(%rax,%r15,1)
* 2a:	74 08                	je     0x34 <-- trapping instruction
  2c:	4c 89 f7             	mov    %r14,%rdi
  2f:	e8 dc b8 7c 00       	call   0x7cb910
  34:	48 c7 c3 98 6f a1 92 	mov    $0xffffffff92a16f98,%rbx
  3b:	49 03 1e             	add    (%r14),%rbx
  3e:	48                   	rex.W
  3f:	89                   	.byte 0x89


Tested on:

commit:         71ca59e2 Merge branch 'fix-bpf_strnstr-len-error'
git tree:       bpf
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=143c1162580000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=807fffde4ddbe9ec
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
compiler:       Debian clang version 20.1.8 (++20250708063551+0c9f909b7976-1~exp1~20250708183702.136), Debian LLD 20.1.8
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=158e0134580000


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* syztest
  2025-07-28 20:55 [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
  2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
  2025-09-04 10:17 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-09-04 14:11 ` Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-09-04 14:32   ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
  2025-09-04 14:47   ` syztest Jakub Kicinski
  2 siblings, 2 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud Lecomte @ 2025-09-04 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b; +Cc: bpf, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index 3615c06b7dfa..1389712bc1df 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -42,6 +42,28 @@ static inline int stack_map_data_size(struct bpf_map *map)
 		sizeof(struct bpf_stack_build_id) : sizeof(u64);
 }
 
+/**
+ * stack_map_calculate_max_depth - Calculate maximum allowed stack trace depth
+ * @size:  Size of the buffer/map value in bytes
+ * @elem_size:  Size of each stack trace element
+ * @flags:  BPF stack trace flags (BPF_F_USER_STACK, BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID, ...)
+ *
+ * Return: Maximum number of stack trace entries that can be safely stored
+ */
+static u32 stack_map_calculate_max_depth(u32 size, u32 elem_size, u64 flags)
+{
+	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
+	u32 max_depth;
+	u32 curr_sysctl_max_stack = READ_ONCE(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
+
+	max_depth = size / elem_size;
+	max_depth += skip;
+	if (max_depth > curr_sysctl_max_stack)
+		return curr_sysctl_max_stack;
+
+	return max_depth;
+}
+
 static int prealloc_elems_and_freelist(struct bpf_stack_map *smap)
 {
 	u64 elem_size = sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) +
@@ -300,22 +322,20 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid, struct pt_regs *, regs, struct bpf_map *, map,
 	   u64, flags)
 {
-	u32 max_depth = map->value_size / stack_map_data_size(map);
-	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
+	u32 elem_size = stack_map_data_size(map);
 	bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
 	struct perf_callchain_entry *trace;
 	bool kernel = !user;
+	u32 max_depth;
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK | BPF_F_USER_STACK |
 			       BPF_F_FAST_STACK_CMP | BPF_F_REUSE_STACKID)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	max_depth += skip;
-	if (max_depth > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack)
-		max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
-
+	max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
 	trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
 				   false, false);
+	trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
 
 	if (unlikely(!trace))
 		/* couldn't fetch the stack trace */
@@ -350,6 +370,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 {
 	struct perf_event *event = ctx->event;
 	struct perf_callchain_entry *trace;
+	u32 elem_size, max_depth;
 	bool kernel, user;
 	__u64 nr_kernel;
 	int ret;
@@ -371,11 +392,15 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	nr_kernel = count_kernel_ip(trace);
+	elem_size = stack_map_data_size(map);
 
 	if (kernel) {
 		__u64 nr = trace->nr;
 
 		trace->nr = nr_kernel;
+		max_depth =
+			stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
+		trace->nr = min_t(u32, nr_kernel, max_depth);
 		ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
 
 		/* restore nr */
@@ -388,6 +413,9 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 			return -EFAULT;
 
 		flags = (flags & ~BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK) | skip;
+		max_depth =
+			stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
+		trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
 		ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -406,8 +434,8 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 			    struct perf_callchain_entry *trace_in,
 			    void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags, bool may_fault)
 {
-	u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, num_elem, max_depth;
 	bool user_build_id = flags & BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID;
+	u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, max_depth;
 	bool crosstask = task && task != current;
 	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
 	bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
@@ -438,21 +466,20 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 		goto clear;
 	}
 
-	num_elem = size / elem_size;
-	max_depth = num_elem + skip;
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_max_stack < max_depth)
-		max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
+	max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(size, elem_size, flags);
 
 	if (may_fault)
 		rcu_read_lock(); /* need RCU for perf's callchain below */
 
-	if (trace_in)
+	if (trace_in) {
 		trace = trace_in;
-	else if (kernel && task)
+		trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
+	} else if (kernel && task) {
 		trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(task, max_depth);
-	else
+	} else {
 		trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
 					   crosstask, false);
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!trace) || trace->nr < skip) {
 		if (may_fault)
@@ -461,7 +488,6 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 	}
 
 	trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
-	trace_nr = (trace_nr <= num_elem) ? trace_nr : num_elem;
 	copy_len = trace_nr * elem_size;
 
 	ips = trace->ip + skip;
-- 
2.47.3


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid
  2025-09-04 14:11 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-09-04 14:32   ` syzbot
  2025-09-04 14:47   ` syztest Jakub Kicinski
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-09-04 14:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bpf, contact, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch but the reproducer is still triggering an issue:
KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:287
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88802fd43258 by task syz.3.65/6980

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6980 Comm: syz.3.65 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 __bpf_get_stackid+0x677/0xcf0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:287
 ____bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1810 [inline]
 bpf_get_stackid_raw_tp+0x196/0x210 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1799
 bpf_prog_b724608cae728045+0x27/0x2f
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1332 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
 __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2257 [inline]
 bpf_trace_run2+0x281/0x4b0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2298
 __do_trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 trace_kfree include/trace/events/kmem.h:94 [inline]
 kfree+0x3a0/0x440 mm/slub.c:4866
 slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x60/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4717
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2605 [inline]
 rcu_core+0xcab/0x1770 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861
 handle_softirqs+0x283/0x870 kernel/softirq.c:579
 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:613 [inline]
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:453 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x1f0 kernel/softirq.c:680
 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:696
 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 [inline]
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
RIP: 0010:__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 [inline]
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194
Code: 74 05 e8 4b 87 4b f6 48 c7 44 24 20 00 00 00 00 9c 8f 44 24 20 f6 44 24 21 02 75 4f f7 c3 00 02 00 00 74 01 fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> 93 2e 14 f6 65 8b 05 6c 71 24 07 85 c0 74 40 48 c7 04 24 0e 36
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f6fc60 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 237d7f7a06c71d00 RBX: 0000000000000a06 RCX: 237d7f7a06c71d00
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffffffff8d9b68b0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffc90003f6fcf0 R08: ffffffff8fa37e37 R09: 1ffffffff1f46fc6
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f46fc7 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff8880641d6a40 R14: ffff888057cc1000 R15: 1ffff920007edf8c
 __do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:13712 [inline]
 __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x1942/0x1d70 kernel/events/core.c:13353
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd9da58ebe9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd9db415038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd9da7b5fa0 RCX: 00007fd9da58ebe9
RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00002000000003c0
RBP: 00007fd9da611e19 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fd9da7b6038 R14: 00007fd9da7b5fa0 R15: 00007ffee6a22f78
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 6980:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4365 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x276/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:4371
 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:932 [inline]
 __bpf_map_area_alloc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:393 [inline]
 bpf_map_area_alloc+0x64/0x180 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:406
 prealloc_elems_and_freelist+0x86/0x1d0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:73
 stack_map_alloc+0x33f/0x4c0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:136
 map_create+0xaa3/0x14d0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1480
 __sys_bpf+0x60f/0x870 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6011
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6139 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6137 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6137
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802fd43000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 24 bytes to the right of
 allocated 576-byte region [ffff88802fd43000, ffff88802fd43240)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2fd40
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
memcg:ffff88806f32bf01
ksm flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801a44b280 ffffea0001e83e00 dead000000000003
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 ffff88806f32bf01
head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801a44b280 ffffea0001e83e00 dead000000000003
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 ffff88806f32bf01
head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea0000bf5001 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 5882, tgid 5882 (syz-executor), ts 81348212299, free_ts 80466086651
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1851
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1859 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3858
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5148
 alloc_pages_mpol+0x232/0x4a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2416
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2487 [inline]
 allocate_slab+0x8a/0x370 mm/slub.c:2655
 new_slab mm/slub.c:2709 [inline]
 ___slab_alloc+0xbeb/0x1410 mm/slub.c:3891
 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4056 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4217 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4364 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x305/0x4f0 mm/slub.c:4377
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
 __register_sysctl_table+0x72/0x1340 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1379
 neigh_sysctl_register+0x9a2/0xa80 net/core/neighbour.c:3887
 devinet_sysctl_register+0xad/0x200 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2715
 inetdev_init+0x2b4/0x500 net/ipv4/devinet.c:291
 inetdev_event+0x301/0x15b0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1591
 notifier_call_chain+0x1b3/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:85
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2267 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2281 [inline]
 register_netdevice+0x1608/0x1ae0 net/core/dev.c:11227
 __ip_tunnel_create+0x3e7/0x560 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:268
 ip_tunnel_init_net+0x2ba/0x800 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:1161
page last free pid 5526 tgid 5526 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1395 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0xbc4/0xd30 mm/page_alloc.c:2895
 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
 __put_partials+0x156/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:3218
 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3293
 __slab_free+0x2d5/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:4550
 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
 qlist_free_all+0x97/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:340
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:250 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4180 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4229 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x1bb/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:4281
 __alloc_skb+0x112/0x2d0 net/core/skbuff.c:659
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1336 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0xca/0x890 net/core/skbuff.c:6665
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x857/0x990 net/core/sock.c:2980
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x461/0x1850 net/unix/af_unix.c:2153
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:729
 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1179
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x5c6/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802fd43100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88802fd43180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88802fd43200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                    ^
 ffff88802fd43280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802fd43300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
   0:	74 05                	je     0x7
   2:	e8 4b 87 4b f6       	call   0xf64b8752
   7:	48 c7 44 24 20 00 00 	movq   $0x0,0x20(%rsp)
   e:	00 00
  10:	9c                   	pushf
  11:	8f 44 24 20          	pop    0x20(%rsp)
  15:	f6 44 24 21 02       	testb  $0x2,0x21(%rsp)
  1a:	75 4f                	jne    0x6b
  1c:	f7 c3 00 02 00 00    	test   $0x200,%ebx
  22:	74 01                	je     0x25
  24:	fb                   	sti
  25:	bf 01 00 00 00       	mov    $0x1,%edi
* 2a:	e8 93 2e 14 f6       	call   0xf6142ec2 <-- trapping instruction
  2f:	65 8b 05 6c 71 24 07 	mov    %gs:0x724716c(%rip),%eax        # 0x72471a2
  36:	85 c0                	test   %eax,%eax
  38:	74 40                	je     0x7a
  3a:	48                   	rex.W
  3b:	c7                   	.byte 0xc7
  3c:	04 24                	add    $0x24,%al
  3e:	0e                   	(bad)
  3f:	36                   	ss


Tested on:

commit:         71ca59e2 Merge branch 'fix-bpf_strnstr-len-error'
git tree:       bpf
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=127c3e62580000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=807fffde4ddbe9ec
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
compiler:       Debian clang version 20.1.8 (++20250708063551+0c9f909b7976-1~exp1~20250708183702.136), Debian LLD 20.1.8
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=1381fe62580000


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: syztest
  2025-09-04 14:11 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-09-04 14:32   ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
@ 2025-09-04 14:47   ` Jakub Kicinski
  2025-09-04 14:53     ` syztest Lecomte, Arnaud
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2025-09-04 14:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnaud Lecomte
  Cc: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b, bpf, linux-kernel, netdev,
	syzkaller-bugs

On Thu,  4 Sep 2025 16:11:13 +0200 Arnaud Lecomte wrote:
> #syz test

You are hereby encouraged to not CC the vger MLs on your attempts 
to get your patches tested by syzbot. It's not necessary.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: syztest
  2025-09-04 14:47   ` syztest Jakub Kicinski
@ 2025-09-04 14:53     ` Lecomte, Arnaud
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Lecomte, Arnaud @ 2025-09-04 14:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jakub Kicinski
  Cc: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b, bpf, linux-kernel, netdev,
	syzkaller-bugs


On 04/09/2025 16:47, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Thu,  4 Sep 2025 16:11:13 +0200 Arnaud Lecomte wrote:
>> #syz test
> You are hereby encouraged to not CC the vger MLs on your attempts
> to get your patches tested by syzbot. It's not necessary.
>
Hey, sorry for the inconvenience.
Will be removed.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Syz Test
  2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
  2025-07-29  7:22   ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
@ 2025-10-12 13:04   ` Arnaud lecomte
  2025-10-12 13:29     ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
  2025-10-12 13:56   ` test Arnaud lecomte
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud lecomte @ 2025-10-12 13:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b; +Cc: bpf, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

#syz test

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index 3615c06b7dfa..c0ee51db8eed 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -42,6 +42,28 @@ static inline int stack_map_data_size(struct bpf_map *map)
                sizeof(struct bpf_stack_build_id) : sizeof(u64);
 }

+/**
+ * stack_map_calculate_max_depth - Calculate maximum allowed stack trace depth
+ * @size:  Size of the buffer/map value in bytes
+ * @elem_size:  Size of each stack trace element
+ * @flags:  BPF stack trace flags (BPF_F_USER_STACK, BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID, ...)
+ *
+ * Return: Maximum number of stack trace entries that can be safely stored
+ */
+static u32 stack_map_calculate_max_depth(u32 size, u32 elem_size, u64 flags)
+{
+       u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
+       u32 max_depth;
+       u32 curr_sysctl_max_stack = READ_ONCE(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
+
+       max_depth = size / elem_size;
+       max_depth += skip;
+       if (max_depth > curr_sysctl_max_stack)
+               return curr_sysctl_max_stack;
+
+       return max_depth;
+}
+
 static int prealloc_elems_and_freelist(struct bpf_stack_map *smap)
 {
        u64 elem_size = sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) +
@@ -251,8 +273,8 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 {
        struct bpf_stack_map *smap = container_of(map, struct bpf_stack_map, map);
        struct stack_map_bucket *bucket, *new_bucket, *old_bucket;
+       u32 hash, id, trace_nr, trace_len, i, max_depth;
        u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
-       u32 hash, id, trace_nr, trace_len, i;
        bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
        u64 *ips;
        bool hash_matches;
@@ -261,7 +283,8 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
                /* skipping more than usable stack trace */
                return -EFAULT;

-       trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
+       max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, stack_map_data_size(map), flags);
+       trace_nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr - skip, max_depth - skip);
        trace_len = trace_nr * sizeof(u64);
        ips = trace->ip + skip;
        hash = jhash2((u32 *)ips, trace_len / sizeof(u32), 0);
@@ -300,20 +323,17 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid, struct pt_regs *, regs, struct bpf_map *, map,
           u64, flags)
 {
-       u32 max_depth = map->value_size / stack_map_data_size(map);
-       u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
+       u32 elem_size = stack_map_data_size(map);
        bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
        struct perf_callchain_entry *trace;
        bool kernel = !user;
+       u32 max_depth;

        if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK | BPF_F_USER_STACK |
                               BPF_F_FAST_STACK_CMP | BPF_F_REUSE_STACKID)))
                return -EINVAL;

-       max_depth += skip;
-       if (max_depth > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack)
-               max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
-
+       max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
        trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
                                   false, false);

@@ -390,15 +410,11 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
                return -EFAULT;

        nr_kernel = count_kernel_ip(trace);
+       __u64 nr = trace->nr; /* save original */

        if (kernel) {
-               __u64 nr = trace->nr;
-
                trace->nr = nr_kernel;
                ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
-
-               /* restore nr */
-               trace->nr = nr;
        } else { /* user */
                u64 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;

@@ -409,6 +425,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
                flags = (flags & ~BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK) | skip;
                ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
        }
+
+       /* restore nr */
+       trace->nr = nr;
+
        return ret;
 }

@@ -426,7 +446,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
                            struct perf_callchain_entry *trace_in,
                            void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags, bool may_fault)
 {
-       u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, num_elem, max_depth;
+       u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, max_depth;
        bool user_build_id = flags & BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID;
        bool crosstask = task && task != current;
        u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
@@ -458,21 +478,20 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
                goto clear;
        }

-       num_elem = size / elem_size;
-       max_depth = num_elem + skip;
-       if (sysctl_perf_event_max_stack < max_depth)
-               max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
+       max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(size, elem_size, flags);

        if (may_fault)
                rcu_read_lock(); /* need RCU for perf's callchain below */

-       if (trace_in)
+       if (trace_in) {
                trace = trace_in;
-       else if (kernel && task)
+               trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
+       } else if (kernel && task) {
                trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(task, max_depth);
-       else
+       } else {
                trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
                                           crosstask, false);
+       }

        if (unlikely(!trace) || trace->nr < skip) {
                if (may_fault)
@@ -481,7 +500,6 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
        }

        trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
-       trace_nr = (trace_nr <= num_elem) ? trace_nr : num_elem;
        copy_len = trace_nr * elem_size;

        ips = trace->ip + skip;
--
2.47.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid
  2025-10-12 13:04   ` Syz Test Arnaud lecomte
@ 2025-10-12 13:29     ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-10-12 13:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bpf, contact, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot tried to test the proposed patch but the build/boot failed:

failed to apply patch:
checking file kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
patch: **** unexpected end of file in patch



Tested on:

commit:         67029a49 Merge tag 'trace-v6.18-3' of git://git.kernel..
git tree:       bpf
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=412ee2f8b704a5e6
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
compiler:       
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=14465b34580000


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* test
  2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
  2025-07-29  7:22   ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
  2025-10-12 13:04   ` Syz Test Arnaud lecomte
@ 2025-10-12 13:56   ` Arnaud lecomte
  2025-10-12 14:22     ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 30+ messages in thread
From: Arnaud lecomte @ 2025-10-12 13:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
  Cc: bpf, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs, contact

#syz test

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index 3615c06b7dfa..c0ee51db8eed 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c

 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid, struct pt_regs *, regs, struct bpf_map *, map,
           u64, flags)
 {
-       u32 max_depth = map->value_size / stack_map_data_size(map);
-       u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
+       u32 elem_size = stack_map_data_size(map);
        bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
        struct perf_callchain_entry *trace;
        bool kernel = !user;
+       u32 max_depth;

        if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK | BPF_F_USER_STACK |
                               BPF_F_FAST_STACK_CMP | BPF_F_REUSE_STACKID)))
                return -EINVAL;

-       max_depth += skip;
-       if (max_depth > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack)
-               max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
-
+       max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
        trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
                                   false, false);

@@ -371,15 +391,11 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
                return -EFAULT;

        nr_kernel = count_kernel_ip(trace);
+       __u64 nr = trace->nr; /* save original */

        if (kernel) {
-               __u64 nr = trace->nr;
-
                trace->nr = nr_kernel;
                ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
-
-               /* restore nr */
-               trace->nr = nr;
        } else { /* user */
                u64 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;

@@ -390,6 +406,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
                flags = (flags & ~BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK) | skip;
                ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
        }
+
+       /* restore nr */
+       trace->nr = nr;
+
        return ret;
 }

@@ -406,7 +426,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
                            struct perf_callchain_entry *trace_in,
                            void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags, bool may_fault)
 {
-       u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, num_elem, max_depth;
+       u32 trace_nr, copy_len, elem_size, max_depth;
        bool user_build_id = flags & BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID;
        bool crosstask = task && task != current;
        u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
@@ -438,21 +458,20 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
                goto clear;
        }

-       num_elem = size / elem_size;
-       max_depth = num_elem + skip;
-       if (sysctl_perf_event_max_stack < max_depth)
-               max_depth = sysctl_perf_event_max_stack;
+       max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(size, elem_size, flags);

        if (may_fault)
                rcu_read_lock(); /* need RCU for perf's callchain below */

-       if (trace_in)
+       if (trace_in) {
                trace = trace_in;
-       else if (kernel && task)
+               trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
+       } else if (kernel && task) {
                trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(task, max_depth);
-       else
+       } else {
                trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, 0, kernel, user, max_depth,
                                           crosstask, false);
+       }

        if (unlikely(!trace) || trace->nr < skip) {
                if (may_fault)
@@ -461,7 +480,6 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
        }

        trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
-       trace_nr = (trace_nr <= num_elem) ? trace_nr : num_elem;
        copy_len = trace_nr * elem_size;

        ips = trace->ip + skip;
--
2.47.3

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid
  2025-10-12 13:56   ` test Arnaud lecomte
@ 2025-10-12 14:22     ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2025-10-12 14:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bpf, contact, linux-kernel, netdev, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-by: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         67029a49 Merge tag 'trace-v6.18-3' of git://git.kernel..
git tree:       bpf
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16848c58580000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=308983f9c02338e8
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
compiler:       Debian clang version 20.1.8 (++20250708063551+0c9f909b7976-1~exp1~20250708183702.136), Debian LLD 20.1.8
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=175d3304580000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2025-10-12 14:22 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2025-07-28 20:55 [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
2025-07-28 23:37 ` syzbot
2025-07-29  7:22   ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-07-29  8:56     ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
2025-10-12 13:04   ` Syz Test Arnaud lecomte
2025-10-12 13:29     ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
2025-10-12 13:56   ` test Arnaud lecomte
2025-10-12 14:22     ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
2025-09-04 10:17 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-09-04 11:54   ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
2025-09-04 14:11 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-09-04 14:32   ` [syzbot] [bpf?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __bpf_get_stackid syzbot
2025-09-04 14:47   ` syztest Jakub Kicinski
2025-09-04 14:53     ` syztest Lecomte, Arnaud
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-07-29 21:58 [syzbot] [fuse?] [block?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in disk_add_events syzbot
2025-07-30  5:51 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-07-30  6:09   ` syztest Yu Kuai
2025-07-30  7:10     ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-04-25  0:57 [syzbot] [block?] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in guard_bio_eod syzbot
2025-04-27 15:57 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-04-27 16:03 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-04-24  2:02 [syzbot] [xfs?] KMSAN: uninit-value in xfs_dialloc_ag_inobt syzbot
2025-04-24  8:59 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-04-24  8:59   ` syztest syzbot
2025-04-10  6:58 [syzbot] [bcachefs?] kernel BUG in __bch2_str_hash_check_key syzbot
2025-04-28 16:09 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-04-28 16:26   ` syztest Kent Overstreet
2025-03-31 20:23 [syzbot] [rdma?] [s390?] [net?] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock syzbot
2025-06-29 13:29 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-06-30  6:51   ` syztest Paolo Abeni
2025-06-29 14:47 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2025-06-29 15:10 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2024-12-06 20:05 [syzbot] [input?] [usb?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in mcp2221_raw_event syzbot
2025-07-26 20:41 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2024-01-22  9:48 [syzbot] [hfs?] KASAN: out-of-bounds Read in hfsplus_bnode_move syzbot
2025-07-27 18:17 ` syztest Arnaud Lecomte
2023-06-17  5:30 [syzbot] [hfs?] kernel BUG in hfsplus_bnode_put syzbot
2025-08-29  6:30 ` syztest Chenzhi Yang

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