From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 6/7] x86/bugs: Fix reporting of LFENCE retpoline
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 08:47:05 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250915134706.3201818-7-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250915134706.3201818-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
The LFENCE retpoline mitigation is not secure but the kernel prints
inconsistent messages about this fact. The dmesg log says 'Mitigation:
LFENCE', implying the system is mitigated. But sysfs reports 'Vulnerable:
LFENCE' implying the system (correctly) is not mitigated.
Fix this by printing a consistent 'Vulnerable: LFENCE' string everywhere
when this mitigation is selected.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 317c26e08827..1f3a20f6fac0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2032,7 +2032,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void)
static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
- [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Vulnerable: LFENCE",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + LFENCE",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + Retpolines",
@@ -3564,9 +3564,6 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
{
- if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
- return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");
-
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n");
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-15 13:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-15 13:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] Bugs clean-up David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] x86/bugs: Simplify SSB cmdline parsing David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] x86/bugs: Remove uses of cpu_mitigations_off() David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] x86/bugs: Fix spectre_v2 forcing David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-09-16 12:54 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Fix reporting of LFENCE retpoline tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] x86/bugs: Report correct retbleed mitigation status David Kaplan
2025-09-16 12:54 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
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