From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 7/7] x86/bugs: Report correct retbleed mitigation status
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 08:47:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250915134706.3201818-8-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250915134706.3201818-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
On Intel CPUs, the default retbleed mitigation is IBRS/eIBRS but this
requires that a similar spectre_v2 mitigation is applied. If the user
selects a different spectre_v2 mitigation (like spectre_v2=retpoline) a
warning is printed but sysfs will still report 'Mitigation: IBRS' or
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'. This is incorrect because retbleed is not
mitigated, and IBRS is not actually set.
Fix this by choosing RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE in this scenario so the
kernel correctly reports the system as vulnerable to retbleed.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1f3a20f6fac0..45c9605fc5c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1462,8 +1462,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
break;
default:
- if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF)
+ if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF) {
pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ }
}
}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-15 13:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-15 13:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] Bugs clean-up David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] x86/bugs: Use early_param for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] x86/bugs: Simplify SSB cmdline parsing David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] x86/bugs: Remove uses of cpu_mitigations_off() David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] x86/bugs: Fix spectre_v2 forcing David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] x86/bugs: Fix reporting of LFENCE retpoline David Kaplan
2025-09-16 12:54 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-09-15 13:47 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-09-16 12:54 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Report correct retbleed mitigation status tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
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