[PATCH net-next v3 08/12] udp: Validate UDP length in udp_gro_receive

[Alice Mikityanska <alice.kernel@fastmail.im>]

From: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>

In the previous commit we started using uh->len = 0 as a marker of a GRO
packet bigger than 65536 bytes. To prevent abuse by maliciously crafted
packets, check the length in the UDP header in udp_gro_receive.

Note that a similar check was present in udp_gro_receive_segment, but
not in the UDP socket gro_receive flow. By adding an early check to
udp_gro_receive, the check in udp_gro_receive_segment can be dropped.

Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
---
 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
index 23653872ca65..4bb37c8d234f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c
@@ -704,12 +704,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp_gro_receive_segment(struct list_head *head,
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	/* Do not deal with padded or malicious packets, sorry ! */
 	ulen = udp_get_len_short(uh);
-	if (ulen <= sizeof(*uh) || ulen != skb_gro_len(skb)) {
-		NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
-		return NULL;
-	}
+
 	/* pull encapsulating udp header */
 	skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
 
@@ -779,8 +775,14 @@ struct sk_buff *udp_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_buff *p;
 	struct udphdr *uh2;
 	unsigned int off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
+	unsigned int ulen;
 	int flush = 1;
 
+	/* Do not deal with padded or malicious packets, sorry! */
+	ulen = udp_get_len_short(uh);
+	if (ulen <= sizeof(*uh) || ulen != skb_gro_len(skb))
+		goto out;
+
 	/* We can do L4 aggregation only if the packet can't land in a tunnel
 	 * otherwise we could corrupt the inner stream. Detecting such packets
 	 * cannot be foolproof and the aggregation might still happen in some
-- 
2.53.0