From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
robin.murphy@arm.com, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, will@kernel.org,
maz@kernel.org, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
jiri@resnulli.us
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] dma-mapping: Avoid double decrypting with DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 13:10:06 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260413161006.GM3694781@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <yq5azf36anmf.fsf@kernel.org>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 08:55:28PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> writes:
>
> > On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 11:30:38AM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> >
> >> I know there is a v3, but I’m commenting here to check whether we really
> >> need to do this now. In my opinion, we can keep this much simpler by
> >> treating all swiotlb allocations as decrypted allocations.
> >
> > That's not going to work when we get to supporting T=1 devices that
> > may still want SWIOTLB for encrypted memory.
> >
>
> Earlier discussions indicated that a T=1 device would not require a
> bounce buffer. On ARM, we require such devices to support 64-bit DMA so
> they can operate with an unprotected IPA.
That was somewhat different. To have a sane system a T=1 device should
be able to access unprotected memory and there is no *requirement*
that bounce buffering is used.
That is very different from saying that SWIOTLB in the kernel is
completely broken and unworking on T=1 devices. We should not do that,
it should work correctly and we should have a sensible architecture
here. It is just something that would never/rarely be triggered.
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-13 16:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-30 14:50 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] dma-mapping: Fixes for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] dma-mapping: Avoid double decrypting with DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:43 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-31 11:34 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-03-31 12:50 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-13 6:00 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-13 12:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13 15:25 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-13 16:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] dma-mapping: Use the correct phys_to_dma() for DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:47 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13 6:08 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-15 20:27 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-16 6:50 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-16 8:35 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] dma-mapping: Decrypt memory on remap Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:49 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13 6:23 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-15 20:31 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] dma-mapping: Refactor memory encryption usage Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] dma-mapping: Add doc for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260413161006.GM3694781@ziepe.ca \
--to=jgg@ziepe.ca \
--cc=aneesh.kumar@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=jiri@resnulli.us \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=m.szyprowski@samsung.com \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
--cc=smostafa@google.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.