[PATCH net] tls: Preserve sk_err across recvmsg() when data has been copied

[PATCH net] tls: Preserve sk_err across recvmsg() when data has been copied

[Chuck Lever]

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

The sk_err check in tls_rx_rec_wait() consumes the error via
sock_error(), which clears sk_err atomically. When the caller
(tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, or tls_sw_read_sock) already
has bytes copied to userspace, it returns those bytes and discards
the error from this call. sk_err is now zero on the socket, so the
next read syscall observes only RCV_SHUTDOWN and reports a clean
EOF instead of the actual error (typically -ECONNRESET).

The race is reachable when tls_read_flush_backlog()'s periodic
sk_flush_backlog() triggers tcp_reset() in the middle of a
multi-record read.

Pass a has_copied flag to tls_rx_rec_wait(). When has_copied is
false, consume sk_err via sock_error() as before. When has_copied
is true, report the error from READ_ONCE() but leave sk_err set:
the caller returns the byte count and discards the err from this
call, and the next read syscall surfaces the preserved sk_err. This
mirrors the tcp_recvmsg() preserve-and-surface pattern.

The decrypt-abort path is unaffected: tls_err_abort() raises
sk_err to EBADMSG after tls_rx_rec_wait() returns, and nothing
on the caller's return path consumes it, so the EBADMSG surfaces
on the next read.

tls_sw_splice_read() passes has_copied=false: it processes
one record per call, so no bytes have been copied within the
function when tls_rx_rec_wait() runs. A reset that arrives
between iterations of splice_direct_to_actor() (the sendfile()
path) is still consumed by sock_error() in the later call, and the
outer loop returns the prior iterations' byte count and drops the
error. tcp_splice_read() exhibits the same pattern at the iteration
boundary; addressing it belongs at the splice_direct_to_actor()
layer and is out of scope here.

Fixes: c46b01839f7a ("tls: rx: periodically flush socket backlog")
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
---
 net/tls/tls_sw.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 2590e855f6a5..c4cc4e357848 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1356,9 +1356,14 @@ void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)
 	mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
 }
 
+/* When has_copied is true the caller has already moved bytes to
+ * userspace. Report sk_err but leave it set so the next read
+ * surfaces it instead of a spurious EOF, otherwise sk_err is
+ * consumed via sock_error().
+ */
 static int
 tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
-		bool released)
+		bool released, bool has_copied)
 {
 	struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
 	struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
@@ -1376,8 +1381,11 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
 		if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock))
 			return 0;
 
-		if (sk->sk_err)
+		if (sk->sk_err) {
+			if (has_copied)
+				return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
 			return sock_error(sk);
+		}
 
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
@@ -1413,7 +1421,7 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(&ctx->strp, released)))
-		return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false);
+		return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false, has_copied);
 
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -2100,7 +2108,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		int to_decrypt, chunk;
 
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
-				      released);
+				      released, !!(decrypted + copied));
 		if (err <= 0) {
 			if (psock) {
 				chunk = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len,
@@ -2287,7 +2295,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
-				      true);
+				      true, false);
 		if (err <= 0)
 			goto splice_read_end;
 
@@ -2373,7 +2381,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 		} else {
 			struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 
-			err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released);
+			err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released, !!copied);
 			if (err <= 0)
 				goto read_sock_end;
 
-- 
2.54.0

[PATCH 0/3] three lockd fixes

[Chuck Lever]

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

Jeff reported an issue earlier today, and while crafting the fix,
LLM review found two more pre-existing nearby problems.

Chuck Lever (3):
  lockd: Plug nlm_file leak when nlm_do_fopen() fails
  lockd: Plug nlm_file refcount leak on cached nlm_do_fopen() failure
  lockd: Avoid hashing uninitialized bytes in nlm4svc_lookup_file()

 fs/lockd/lockd.h    | 8 ++++++++
 fs/lockd/svc4proc.c | 3 +++
 fs/lockd/svcsubs.c  | 7 ++++---
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

-- 
2.54.0

[PATCH 1/3] lockd: Plug nlm_file leak when nlm_do_fopen() fails

[Chuck Lever]

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

A client can repeatedly drive nlm_do_fopen() failures by presenting
file handles that the underlying export rejects. After kzalloc_obj()
succeeds in nlm_lookup_file(), the freshly allocated nlm_file is not
yet inserted into nlm_files[]. The nlm_do_fopen() failure path jumps
to out_unlock, which releases nlm_file_mutex and returns without
freeing the allocation, so each failure leaks one nlm_file.

Route the failure through out_free so kfree() runs before the
function returns.

Fixes: 7f024fcd5c97 ("Keep read and write fds with each nlm_file")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
---
 fs/lockd/svcsubs.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
index e24bacea7e03..0b81d8db0919 100644
--- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
+++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ nlm_lookup_file(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_file **result,
 
 	nfserr = nlm_do_fopen(rqstp, file, mode);
 	if (nfserr)
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out_free;
 
 	hlist_add_head(&file->f_list, &nlm_files[hash]);
 
-- 
2.54.0

[PATCH net] tls: Preserve sk_err across recvmsg() when data has been copied

[Chuck Lever]

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

The sk_err check in tls_rx_rec_wait() consumes the error via
sock_error(), which clears sk_err atomically. When the caller
(tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, or tls_sw_read_sock) already
has bytes copied to userspace, it returns those bytes and discards
the error from this call. sk_err is now zero on the socket, so the
next read syscall observes only RCV_SHUTDOWN and reports a clean
EOF instead of the actual error (typically -ECONNRESET).

The race is reachable when tls_read_flush_backlog()'s periodic
sk_flush_backlog() triggers tcp_reset() in the middle of a
multi-record read.

Pass a has_copied flag to tls_rx_rec_wait(). When has_copied is
false, consume sk_err via sock_error() as before. When has_copied
is true, report the error from READ_ONCE() but leave sk_err set:
the caller returns the byte count and discards the err from this
call, and the next read syscall surfaces the preserved sk_err. This
mirrors the tcp_recvmsg() preserve-and-surface pattern.

The decrypt-abort path is unaffected: tls_err_abort() raises
sk_err to EBADMSG after tls_rx_rec_wait() returns, and nothing
on the caller's return path consumes it, so the EBADMSG surfaces
on the next read.

tls_sw_splice_read() passes has_copied=false: it processes
one record per call, so no bytes have been copied within the
function when tls_rx_rec_wait() runs. A reset that arrives
between iterations of splice_direct_to_actor() (the sendfile()
path) is still consumed by sock_error() in the later call, and the
outer loop returns the prior iterations' byte count and drops the
error. tcp_splice_read() exhibits the same pattern at the iteration
boundary; addressing it belongs at the splice_direct_to_actor()
layer and is out of scope here.

Fixes: c46b01839f7a ("tls: rx: periodically flush socket backlog")
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
---
 net/tls/tls_sw.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 2590e855f6a5..c4cc4e357848 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1356,9 +1356,14 @@ void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)
 	mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
 }
 
+/* When has_copied is true the caller has already moved bytes to
+ * userspace. Report sk_err but leave it set so the next read
+ * surfaces it instead of a spurious EOF, otherwise sk_err is
+ * consumed via sock_error().
+ */
 static int
 tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
-		bool released)
+		bool released, bool has_copied)
 {
 	struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
 	struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
@@ -1376,8 +1381,11 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
 		if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock))
 			return 0;
 
-		if (sk->sk_err)
+		if (sk->sk_err) {
+			if (has_copied)
+				return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
 			return sock_error(sk);
+		}
 
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
@@ -1413,7 +1421,7 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(&ctx->strp, released)))
-		return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false);
+		return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false, has_copied);
 
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -2100,7 +2108,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		int to_decrypt, chunk;
 
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
-				      released);
+				      released, !!(decrypted + copied));
 		if (err <= 0) {
 			if (psock) {
 				chunk = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len,
@@ -2287,7 +2295,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
-				      true);
+				      true, false);
 		if (err <= 0)
 			goto splice_read_end;
 
@@ -2373,7 +2381,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 		} else {
 			struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 
-			err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released);
+			err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released, !!copied);
 			if (err <= 0)
 				goto read_sock_end;
 
-- 
2.54.0

[PATCH 2/3] lockd: Plug nlm_file refcount leak on cached nlm_do_fopen() failure

[Chuck Lever]

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

The cached-file path in nlm_lookup_file() reaches the found: label
unconditionally, even when nlm_do_fopen() fails. At that label
*result and file->f_count are updated before the error is returned.
The wrappers nlm3svc_lookup_file() and nlm4svc_lookup_file() then
bail out of their switch without copying *result back to their
caller, so the proc handler's local nlm_file pointer remains NULL
and the cleanup path skips nlm_release_file(). The f_count
increment is never released, and nlm_traverse_files() can no
longer reap the file because its refcount never returns to zero
between requests.

Short-circuit the cached path so neither *result nor f_count is
touched when nlm_do_fopen() fails on a hashed nlm_file.

Fixes: 7f024fcd5c97 ("Keep read and write fds with each nlm_file")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
---
 fs/lockd/svcsubs.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
index 0b81d8db0919..58b87ec52930 100644
--- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
+++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ nlm_lookup_file(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_file **result,
 			mutex_lock(&file->f_mutex);
 			nfserr = nlm_do_fopen(rqstp, file, mode);
 			mutex_unlock(&file->f_mutex);
+			if (nfserr)
+				goto out_unlock;
 			goto found;
 		}
 	nlm_debug_print_fh("creating file for", &lock->fh);
-- 
2.54.0

[PATCH 3/3] lockd: Avoid hashing uninitialized bytes in nlm4svc_lookup_file()

[Chuck Lever]

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

file_hash() digests the first LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE bytes of
nfs_fh.data when bucketing nlm_files[], independent of fh.size.
Commit 3de744ee4e45 ("lockd: Use xdrgen XDR functions for the
NLMv4 TEST procedure") set .pc_argzero to zero for the converted
procedures and moved file-handle population into
nlm4svc_lookup_file(), which copies only xdr_lock->fh.len bytes
into lock->fh.data.

When an NLMv4 client presents a file handle shorter than
LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE, bytes fh.len..31 retain whatever the argument
buffer held from an earlier request.  The same wire handle then
hashes to different buckets across calls; nlm_lookup_file() misses
the existing nlm_file entry, and lock-state lookups fail.

Zero only the tail bytes that file_hash() would otherwise consume.
Handles of LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE or larger already populate every byte
that file_hash() reads.

Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5229a9746d723a3f830120c0b966510f75badfc2.camel@kernel.org
Fixes: 3de744ee4e45 ("lockd: Use xdrgen XDR functions for the NLMv4 TEST procedure")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
---
 fs/lockd/lockd.h    | 8 ++++++++
 fs/lockd/svc4proc.c | 3 +++
 fs/lockd/svcsubs.c  | 3 +--
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/lockd/lockd.h b/fs/lockd/lockd.h
index 0be0dac59ea2..e418a50c4180 100644
--- a/fs/lockd/lockd.h
+++ b/fs/lockd/lockd.h
@@ -52,6 +52,14 @@
  */
 #define LOCKD_DFLT_TIMEO	10
 
+/*
+ * Number of leading bytes of nfs_fh.data that file_hash()
+ * digests when bucketing nlm_files[]. Sized for historical
+ * NFSv2 handles; nfs_fh.data must be initialized at least
+ * this far before lookup, regardless of fh.size.
+ */
+#define LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE	32
+
 /* error codes new to NLMv4 */
 #define	nlm4_deadlock		cpu_to_be32(NLM_DEADLCK)
 #define	nlm4_rofs		cpu_to_be32(NLM_ROFS)
diff --git a/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c b/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c
index 997f4f437997..78e675470c4b 100644
--- a/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c
+++ b/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ nlm4svc_lookup_file(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_host *host,
 		return nlm_lck_denied_nolocks;
 	lock->fh.size = xdr_lock->fh.len;
 	memcpy(lock->fh.data, xdr_lock->fh.data, xdr_lock->fh.len);
+	if (xdr_lock->fh.len < LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE)
+		memset(lock->fh.data + xdr_lock->fh.len, 0,
+		       LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE - xdr_lock->fh.len);
 
 	lock->oh.len = xdr_lock->oh.len;
 	lock->oh.data = xdr_lock->oh.data;
diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
index 58b87ec52930..a0d1a6fbf61e 100644
--- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
+++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #include <linux/sunrpc/addr.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <uapi/linux/nfs2.h>
 
 #include "lockd.h"
 #include "share.h"
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ static inline unsigned int file_hash(struct nfs_fh *f)
 {
 	unsigned int tmp=0;
 	int i;
-	for (i=0; i<NFS2_FHSIZE;i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE; i++)
 		tmp += f->data[i];
 	return tmp & (FILE_NRHASH - 1);
 }
-- 
2.54.0

Re: [PATCH net] tls: Preserve sk_err across recvmsg() when data has been copied

[Chuck Lever]

On 5/14/26 4:56 PM, Chuck Lever wrote:
> From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
> 
> The sk_err check in tls_rx_rec_wait() consumes the error via
> sock_error(), which clears sk_err atomically. When the caller
> (tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, or tls_sw_read_sock) already
> has bytes copied to userspace, it returns those bytes and discards
> the error from this call. sk_err is now zero on the socket, so the
> next read syscall observes only RCV_SHUTDOWN and reports a clean
> EOF instead of the actual error (typically -ECONNRESET).
> 
> The race is reachable when tls_read_flush_backlog()'s periodic
> sk_flush_backlog() triggers tcp_reset() in the middle of a
> multi-record read.
> 
> Pass a has_copied flag to tls_rx_rec_wait(). When has_copied is
> false, consume sk_err via sock_error() as before. When has_copied
> is true, report the error from READ_ONCE() but leave sk_err set:
> the caller returns the byte count and discards the err from this
> call, and the next read syscall surfaces the preserved sk_err. This
> mirrors the tcp_recvmsg() preserve-and-surface pattern.
> 
> The decrypt-abort path is unaffected: tls_err_abort() raises
> sk_err to EBADMSG after tls_rx_rec_wait() returns, and nothing
> on the caller's return path consumes it, so the EBADMSG surfaces
> on the next read.
> 
> tls_sw_splice_read() passes has_copied=false: it processes
> one record per call, so no bytes have been copied within the
> function when tls_rx_rec_wait() runs. A reset that arrives
> between iterations of splice_direct_to_actor() (the sendfile()
> path) is still consumed by sock_error() in the later call, and the
> outer loop returns the prior iterations' byte count and drops the
> error. tcp_splice_read() exhibits the same pattern at the iteration
> boundary; addressing it belongs at the splice_direct_to_actor()
> layer and is out of scope here.
> 
> Fixes: c46b01839f7a ("tls: rx: periodically flush socket backlog")
> Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
> ---
>  net/tls/tls_sw.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> index 2590e855f6a5..c4cc4e357848 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> @@ -1356,9 +1356,14 @@ void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)
>  	mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
>  }
>  
> +/* When has_copied is true the caller has already moved bytes to
> + * userspace. Report sk_err but leave it set so the next read
> + * surfaces it instead of a spurious EOF, otherwise sk_err is
> + * consumed via sock_error().
> + */
>  static int
>  tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
> -		bool released)
> +		bool released, bool has_copied)
>  {
>  	struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
>  	struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
> @@ -1376,8 +1381,11 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
>  		if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock))
>  			return 0;
>  
> -		if (sk->sk_err)
> +		if (sk->sk_err) {
> +			if (has_copied)
> +				return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
>  			return sock_error(sk);
> +		}
>  
>  		if (ret < 0)
>  			return ret;
> @@ -1413,7 +1421,7 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
>  	}
>  
>  	if (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(&ctx->strp, released)))
> -		return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false);
> +		return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false, has_copied);
>  
>  	return 1;
>  }
> @@ -2100,7 +2108,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
>  		int to_decrypt, chunk;
>  
>  		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
> -				      released);
> +				      released, !!(decrypted + copied));
>  		if (err <= 0) {
>  			if (psock) {
>  				chunk = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len,
> @@ -2287,7 +2295,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
>  		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
>  
>  		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
> -				      true);
> +				      true, false);
>  		if (err <= 0)
>  			goto splice_read_end;
>  
> @@ -2373,7 +2381,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
>  		} else {
>  			struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
>  
> -			err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released);
> +			err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released, !!copied);
>  			if (err <= 0)
>  				goto read_sock_end;
>  

Ignore this email. It looks like something left over from a previous
posting.


-- 
Chuck Lever

Re: [PATCH net] tls: Preserve sk_err across recvmsg() when data has been copied

[patchwork-bot+netdevbpf]

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>:

On Wed, 13 May 2026 08:58:25 -0400 you wrote:
> From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
> 
> The sk_err check in tls_rx_rec_wait() consumes the error via
> sock_error(), which clears sk_err atomically. When the caller
> (tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, or tls_sw_read_sock) already
> has bytes copied to userspace, it returns those bytes and discards
> the error from this call. sk_err is now zero on the socket, so the
> next read syscall observes only RCV_SHUTDOWN and reports a clean
> EOF instead of the actual error (typically -ECONNRESET).
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net] tls: Preserve sk_err across recvmsg() when data has been copied
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/f508262ae9f2

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