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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7.1.y 0/6] cBPF JIT spray hardening
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 17:03:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260710163023.agent5-0011@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260709-cbpf-jit-spray-hardening-7-1-y-v1-0-5ac5a2d6797f@linux.intel.com>

On Thu, Jul 09, 2026 at 03:22:54PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> These backports harden BPF JIT against spectre-v2 class of attacks. Without
> a predictor flush, execution of new BPF program may use stale prediction
> left behind by the freed one.
>
> To avoid this, issue an IBPB flush on all CPUs on JIT program allocation.
> The flush is conditional to spectre-v2 mitigation applied.

Queued the series for 7.1, thanks.

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7.1.y 0/6] cBPF JIT spray hardening
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 17:03:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260710163023.agent5-0011@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260709-cbpf-jit-spray-hardening-7-1-y-v1-0-5ac5a2d6797f@linux.intel.com>

On Thu, Jul 09, 2026 at 03:22:54PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> These backports harden BPF JIT against spectre-v2 class of attacks. Without
> a predictor flush, execution of new BPF program may use stale prediction
> left behind by the freed one.
>
> To avoid this, issue an IBPB flush on all CPUs on JIT program allocation.
> The flush is conditional to spectre-v2 mitigation applied.

Queued the series for 7.1, thanks.

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha

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linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-10 21:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-09 22:22 [PATCH 7.1.y 0/6] cBPF JIT spray hardening Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:22 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23 ` [PATCH 7.1.y 1/6] bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-13 16:44     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:52   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-07-09 22:52     ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-07-13 16:37     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-13 16:37       ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23 ` [PATCH 7.1.y 2/6] x86/bugs: Enable IBPB flush on BPF JIT allocation Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-13 17:13     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23 ` [PATCH 7.1.y 3/6] bpf: Restrict JIT predictor flush to cBPF Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-13 17:24     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23 ` [PATCH 7.1.y 4/6] bpf: Skip redundant IBPB in pack allocator Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:23   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:24 ` [PATCH 7.1.y 5/6] bpf: Prefer packs that won't trigger an IBPB flush on allocation Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:24   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:24 ` [PATCH 7.1.y 6/6] bpf: Prefer dirty packs for eBPF allocations Pawan Gupta
2026-07-09 22:24   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-07-10 21:03 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-07-10 21:03   ` [PATCH 7.1.y 0/6] cBPF JIT spray hardening Sasha Levin

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