* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree
@ 2026-07-15 10:12 gregkh
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/3] nvmet: remove superfluous initialization Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2026-07-15 10:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: flynnnchen, hare, kbusch; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026071506-ankle-quartered-9eb2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 14:18:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against
transfer length
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using
attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields
without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a
small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds
heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or
performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to
sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching
up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before
any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
index f1e613e7c63e..0a85acf1e5c7 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
@@ -132,13 +132,22 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
return 0;
}
-static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
+static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d, u32 tl)
{
struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl;
struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d;
- u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen);
+ u16 dhvlen;
u8 *response;
+ if (tl < sizeof(*data))
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
+
+ dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen);
+
+ /* Validate that hl and dhvlen fit within the transfer length */
+ if (sizeof(*data) + 2 * (size_t)data->hl + dhvlen > tl)
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
+
pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data hl %d cvalid %d dhvlen %u\n",
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid,
data->hl, data->cvalid, dhvlen);
@@ -338,7 +347,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
switch (data->auth_id) {
case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY:
- dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d);
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d, tl);
if (dhchap_status == 0)
req->sq->dhchap_step =
NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.6.y 1/3] nvmet: remove superfluous initialization
2026-07-15 10:12 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree gregkh
@ 2026-07-20 14:10 ` Sasha Levin
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/3] nvmet: return DHCHAP status codes from nvmet_setup_auth() Sasha Levin
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 3/3] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-07-20 14:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Chaitanya Kulkarni, Keith Busch, Sasha Levin
From: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
[ Upstream commit 8d30528a170905ede9ab6ab81f229e441808590b ]
Remove superfluous initialization of status variable in
nvmet_execute_admin_connect() and nvmet_execute_io_connect(), since it
will get overwritten by nvmet_copy_from_sgl().
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 3a413ece2504 ("nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
index fa9e8dc9215398..441a6b6170fda5 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
struct nvmf_connect_command *c = &req->cmd->connect;
struct nvmf_connect_data *d;
struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = NULL;
- u16 status = 0;
+ u16 status;
int ret;
if (!nvmet_check_transfer_len(req, sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_data)))
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_io_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
struct nvmf_connect_data *d;
struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl;
u16 qid = le16_to_cpu(c->qid);
- u16 status = 0;
+ u16 status;
if (!nvmet_check_transfer_len(req, sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_data)))
return;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.6.y 2/3] nvmet: return DHCHAP status codes from nvmet_setup_auth()
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/3] nvmet: remove superfluous initialization Sasha Levin
@ 2026-07-20 14:10 ` Sasha Levin
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 3/3] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length Sasha Levin
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-07-20 14:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Hannes Reinecke, Christoph Hellwig, Hannes Reinecke,
Daniel Wagner, Keith Busch, Sasha Levin
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 44e3c25efae8575e06f1c5d1dc40058a991e3cb2 ]
A failure in nvmet_setup_auth() does not mean that the NVMe
authentication command failed, so we should rather return a protocol
error with a 'failure1' response than an NVMe status.
Also update the type used for dhchap_step and dhchap_status to u8 to
avoid confusions with nvme status. Furthermore, split dhchap_status and
nvme status so we don't accidentally mix these return values.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
[dwagner: - use u8 as type for dhchap_{step|status}
- separate nvme status from dhcap_status]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 3a413ece2504 ("nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/target/auth.c | 20 +++++------
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 49 +++++++++++++-------------
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c | 11 +++---
drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h | 8 ++---
4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
index 74791078fdebc3..9fe6ad89bf83a5 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
@@ -125,12 +125,11 @@ int nvmet_setup_dhgroup(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, u8 dhgroup_id)
return ret;
}
-int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
+u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
{
int ret = 0;
struct nvmet_host_link *p;
struct nvmet_host *host = NULL;
- const char *hash_name;
down_read(&nvmet_config_sem);
if (nvmet_is_disc_subsys(ctrl->subsys))
@@ -148,13 +147,16 @@ int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
}
if (!host) {
pr_debug("host %s not found\n", ctrl->hostnqn);
- ret = -EPERM;
+ ret = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED;
goto out_unlock;
}
ret = nvmet_setup_dhgroup(ctrl, host->dhchap_dhgroup_id);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
pr_warn("Failed to setup DH group");
+ ret = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
if (!host->dhchap_secret) {
pr_debug("No authentication provided\n");
@@ -165,12 +167,6 @@ int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
pr_debug("Re-use existing hash ID %d\n",
ctrl->shash_id);
} else {
- hash_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(host->dhchap_hash_id);
- if (!hash_name) {
- pr_warn("Hash ID %d invalid\n", host->dhchap_hash_id);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
- }
ctrl->shash_id = host->dhchap_hash_id;
}
@@ -179,7 +175,7 @@ int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
ctrl->host_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_secret + 10,
host->dhchap_key_hash);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->host_key)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->host_key);
+ ret = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_NOT_USABLE;
ctrl->host_key = NULL;
goto out_free_hash;
}
@@ -197,7 +193,7 @@ int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_ctrl_secret + 10,
host->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
+ ret = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_NOT_USABLE;
ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
goto out_free_hash;
}
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
index c103eba96350e8..a78f2d5c7d5c85 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ void nvmet_auth_sq_init(struct nvmet_sq *sq)
sq->dhchap_step = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE;
}
-static u16 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
+static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
{
struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl;
struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data *data = d;
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
return 0;
}
-static u16 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
+static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
{
struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl;
struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d;
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
return 0;
}
-static u16 nvmet_auth_failure2(void *d)
+static u8 nvmet_auth_failure2(void *d)
{
struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data = d;
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
void *d;
u32 tl;
u16 status = 0;
+ u8 dhchap_status;
if (req->cmd->auth_send.secp != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER) {
status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
@@ -237,30 +238,32 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
if (data->auth_type == NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES) {
if (data->auth_id == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE) {
/* Restart negotiation */
- pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d reset negotiation\n", __func__,
- ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
+ pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d reset negotiation\n",
+ __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
if (!req->sq->qid) {
- if (nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl) < 0) {
- status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL;
- pr_err("ctrl %d qid 0 failed to setup"
- "re-authentication",
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
+ if (dhchap_status) {
+ pr_err("ctrl %d qid 0 failed to setup re-authentication\n",
ctrl->cntlid);
- goto done_failure1;
+ req->sq->dhchap_status = dhchap_status;
+ req->sq->dhchap_step =
+ NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE1;
+ goto done_kfree;
}
}
- req->sq->dhchap_step = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE;
+ req->sq->dhchap_step =
+ NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE;
} else if (data->auth_id != req->sq->dhchap_step)
goto done_failure1;
/* Validate negotiation parameters */
- status = nvmet_auth_negotiate(req, d);
- if (status == 0)
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_negotiate(req, d);
+ if (dhchap_status == 0)
req->sq->dhchap_step =
NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_CHALLENGE;
else {
req->sq->dhchap_step =
NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE1;
- req->sq->dhchap_status = status;
- status = 0;
+ req->sq->dhchap_status = dhchap_status;
}
goto done_kfree;
}
@@ -284,15 +287,14 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
switch (data->auth_id) {
case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY:
- status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d);
- if (status == 0)
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d);
+ if (dhchap_status == 0)
req->sq->dhchap_step =
NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1;
else {
req->sq->dhchap_step =
NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE1;
- req->sq->dhchap_status = status;
- status = 0;
+ req->sq->dhchap_status = dhchap_status;
}
goto done_kfree;
case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS2:
@@ -301,13 +303,12 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
goto done_kfree;
case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE2:
- status = nvmet_auth_failure2(d);
- if (status) {
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_failure2(d);
+ if (dhchap_status) {
pr_warn("ctrl %d qid %d: authentication failed (%d)\n",
- ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, status);
- req->sq->dhchap_status = status;
+ ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, dhchap_status);
+ req->sq->dhchap_status = dhchap_status;
req->sq->authenticated = false;
- status = 0;
}
goto done_kfree;
default:
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
index 441a6b6170fda5..e8dd276dfc6223 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
struct nvmf_connect_data *d;
struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = NULL;
u16 status;
- int ret;
+ u8 dhchap_status;
if (!nvmet_check_transfer_len(req, sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_data)))
return;
@@ -252,11 +252,12 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
uuid_copy(&ctrl->hostid, &d->hostid);
- ret = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
- if (ret < 0) {
- pr_err("Failed to setup authentication, error %d\n", ret);
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
+ if (dhchap_status) {
+ pr_err("Failed to setup authentication, dhchap status %u\n",
+ dhchap_status);
nvmet_ctrl_put(ctrl);
- if (ret == -EPERM)
+ if (dhchap_status == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED)
status = (NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_HOST | NVME_SC_DNR);
else
status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL;
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h b/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
index 15b00ed7be16a8..c0648216b9e4bd 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ struct nvmet_sq {
bool authenticated;
struct delayed_work auth_expired_work;
u16 dhchap_tid;
- u16 dhchap_status;
- int dhchap_step;
+ u8 dhchap_status;
+ u8 dhchap_step;
u8 *dhchap_c1;
u8 *dhchap_c2;
u32 dhchap_s1;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_receive(struct nvmet_req *req);
int nvmet_auth_set_key(struct nvmet_host *host, const char *secret,
bool set_ctrl);
int nvmet_auth_set_host_hash(struct nvmet_host *host, const char *hash);
-int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl);
+u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl);
void nvmet_auth_sq_init(struct nvmet_sq *sq);
void nvmet_destroy_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl);
void nvmet_auth_sq_free(struct nvmet_sq *sq);
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_ctrl_exponential(struct nvmet_req *req,
int nvmet_auth_ctrl_sesskey(struct nvmet_req *req,
u8 *buf, int buf_size);
#else
-static inline int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
+static inline u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
{
return 0;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.6.y 3/3] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/3] nvmet: remove superfluous initialization Sasha Levin
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/3] nvmet: return DHCHAP status codes from nvmet_setup_auth() Sasha Levin
@ 2026-07-20 14:10 ` Sasha Levin
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-07-20 14:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Tianchu Chen, Hannes Reinecke, Keith Busch, Sasha Levin
From: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
[ Upstream commit 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 ]
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using
attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields
without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a
small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds
heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or
performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to
sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching
up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before
any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
index a78f2d5c7d5c85..ccd5dd3dac85f9 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
@@ -109,13 +109,22 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
return 0;
}
-static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
+static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d, u32 tl)
{
struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl;
struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d;
- u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen);
+ u16 dhvlen;
u8 *response;
+ if (tl < sizeof(*data))
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
+
+ dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen);
+
+ /* Validate that hl and dhvlen fit within the transfer length */
+ if (sizeof(*data) + 2 * (size_t)data->hl + dhvlen > tl)
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
+
pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data hl %d cvalid %d dhvlen %u\n",
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid,
data->hl, data->cvalid, dhvlen);
@@ -287,7 +296,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
switch (data->auth_id) {
case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY:
- dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d);
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d, tl);
if (dhchap_status == 0)
req->sq->dhchap_step =
NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-07-20 14:10 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-07-15 10:12 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree gregkh
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/3] nvmet: remove superfluous initialization Sasha Levin
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/3] nvmet: return DHCHAP status codes from nvmet_setup_auth() Sasha Levin
2026-07-20 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 3/3] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length Sasha Levin
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