[PATCH bpf v6 0/4] Fixes for bpf link update

[PATCH bpf v6 0/4] Fixes for bpf link update

[Pu Lehui]

From: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

This patch series addresses a few concurrency UAF issues within bpf link update.

v6:
- BPF_F_LINK flag set means the relative id_or_fd is a link, not the object being
  attached. We can not get the link while attach a bare prog with relative link.
  So passing expected link type from callers of bpf_mprog_attach/detach. (Sashiko)
- Add comment to explain that why ptype == UNSPEC in bpf_mprog_detach. (Emil)

v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260721041048.1394085-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
- Remove rcu_read_lock_trace as rcu_read_unlock is sufficient. (Mykyta)
- Improve commit msg for patch 2. (Amery)
- Add Reviewed-by tag by Amery.

v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260720134547.1289964-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
- Add new fix for UAF due to missing link type check in mprog. (Sashiko)
- Add new fix for UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog. (Sashiko)
- Include the storage and flags rollbacks to patch4 for sake of code rigor,
  as it's hard to make update_effective_progs fail in __cgroup_bpf_attach.

v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260720033055.1215477-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
- Add new fix for UAF issue when reading bpf link info. (Sashiko)
- Add new fix for storage not restored when update_effective_progs
  failed. (Sashiko)

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260717073343.958862-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
- Fix invalid access for in-place update when storage changed. (Sashiko)

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260714014659.401063-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com

Pu Lehui (4):
  bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog
  bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog
  bpf: Fix potential UAF when reading bpf link info
  bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog

 drivers/net/netkit.c       | 13 ++++++-----
 include/linux/bpf_mprog.h  |  6 ++++--
 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c        | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/bpf/mprog.c         | 23 ++++++++++++--------
 kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c | 14 +++++++-----
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c       | 21 ++++++++++++++----
 kernel/bpf/tcx.c           | 13 ++++++-----
 7 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH bpf v6 1/4] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog

[Pu Lehui]

From: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

In bpf_netns_link_update_prog, the checks for old_prog and prog type
are currently performed locklessly before acquiring netns_bpf_mutex.
This creates a race condition that can lead to a UAF issue.

If two threads concurrently execute BPF_LINK_UPDATE on the same netns
link, the following execution path can trigger a UAF:

CPU0                                          CPU1
bpf_netns_link_update_prog
  if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog)
    return -EPERM;
                                              bpf_netns_link_update_prog
                                                if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog)
                                                ...
                                                old_prog = xchg(&link->prog, new_prog);
                                                bpf_prog_put(old_prog);
  if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type) <-- trigger UAF

Fix this by moving the old_prog and prog->type checks inside the
netns_bpf_mutex critical section.

Fixes: 7f045a49fee0 ("bpf: Add link-based BPF program attachment to network namespace")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
index 25f30f9edaef..9fc62db1441c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
@@ -171,13 +171,17 @@ static int bpf_netns_link_update_prog(struct bpf_link *link,
 	struct net *net;
 	int idx, ret;
 
-	if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog)
-		return -EPERM;
-	if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	mutex_lock(&netns_bpf_mutex);
 
+	if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
 	net = net_link->net;
 	if (!net || !check_net(net)) {
 		/* Link auto-detached or netns dying */
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH bpf v6 1/4] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog

[sashiko-bot]

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Preexisting Use-After-Free in generic bpf_link information retrieval and mprog attachment due to lockless access to link->prog.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf v6 1/4] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog ---
commit d5c566078955c1f4dfc1d9f1e23e9f6213c3dcfb
Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog

This commit fixes a potential use-after-free issue in
bpf_netns_link_update_prog() by moving the old_prog and prog->type checks
inside the netns_bpf_mutex critical section.

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
> index 25f30f9edaefd..9fc62db1441c6 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
> @@ -171,13 +171,17 @@ static int bpf_netns_link_update_prog(struct bpf_link *link,
>  	struct net *net;
>  	int idx, ret;
>  
> -	if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog)
> -		return -EPERM;
> -	if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type)
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -
>  	mutex_lock(&netns_bpf_mutex);
>  
> +	if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog) {
> +		ret = -EPERM;
> +		goto out_unlock;
> +	}
> +	if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type) {
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto out_unlock;
> +	}
> +

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but while this change fixes the
concurrent update race in bpf_netns_link_update_prog(), could the subsequent
xchg() of link->prog cause a use-after-free regression in other functions
that read it locklessly?

If a user-space application concurrently calls bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd() or
reads fdinfo, the retrieval functions read link->prog locklessly without
holding rcu_read_lock(). If the reader thread is preempted immediately after
reading the pointer, and a concurrent link update replaces and frees the old
program, will the reader dereference freed memory?

This can happen in bpf_link_get_info_by_fd():

    if (link->prog)
        info.prog_id = link->prog->aux->id;

It also appears in bpf_link_show_fdinfo():

    const struct bpf_prog *prog = link->prog;
    ...
    bin2hex(prog_tag, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag));

And in bpf_mprog_link():

    if (type && link->prog->type != type) {

Do these lockless accesses need rcu_read_lock() protection to safely read
the program fields when updates can happen concurrently?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260722072326.1545677-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com?part=1

Re: [PATCH bpf v6 1/4] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog

[Pu Lehui]

On 2026/7/22 15:36, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
> 
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [High] Preexisting Use-After-Free in generic bpf_link information retrieval and mprog attachment due to lockless access to link->prog.
> --
> 
> --- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf v6 1/4] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog ---
> commit d5c566078955c1f4dfc1d9f1e23e9f6213c3dcfb
> Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
> 
> bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog
> 
> This commit fixes a potential use-after-free issue in
> bpf_netns_link_update_prog() by moving the old_prog and prog->type checks
> inside the netns_bpf_mutex critical section.
> 
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
>> index 25f30f9edaefd..9fc62db1441c6 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
>> @@ -171,13 +171,17 @@ static int bpf_netns_link_update_prog(struct bpf_link *link,
>>   	struct net *net;
>>   	int idx, ret;
>>   
>> -	if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog)
>> -		return -EPERM;
>> -	if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type)
>> -		return -EINVAL;
>> -
>>   	mutex_lock(&netns_bpf_mutex);
>>   
>> +	if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog) {
>> +		ret = -EPERM;
>> +		goto out_unlock;
>> +	}
>> +	if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type) {
>> +		ret = -EINVAL;
>> +		goto out_unlock;
>> +	}
>> +
> 
> [Severity: High]
> This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but while this change fixes the
> concurrent update race in bpf_netns_link_update_prog(), could the subsequent
> xchg() of link->prog cause a use-after-free regression in other functions
> that read it locklessly?
> 
> If a user-space application concurrently calls bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd() or
> reads fdinfo, the retrieval functions read link->prog locklessly without
> holding rcu_read_lock(). If the reader thread is preempted immediately after
> reading the pointer, and a concurrent link update replaces and frees the old
> program, will the reader dereference freed memory?
> 
> This can happen in bpf_link_get_info_by_fd():
> 
>      if (link->prog)
>          info.prog_id = link->prog->aux->id;
> 
> It also appears in bpf_link_show_fdinfo():
> 
>      const struct bpf_prog *prog = link->prog;
>      ...
>      bin2hex(prog_tag, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag));
> 
> And in bpf_mprog_link():
> 
>      if (type && link->prog->type != type) {

patch 2 and patch 3 will cover these issue.

> 
> Do these lockless accesses need rcu_read_lock() protection to safely read
> the program fields when updates can happen concurrently?
> 

[PATCH bpf v6 2/4] bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog

[Pu Lehui]

From: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

In bpf_mprog_link, the code does not check the link->type first before
dereferencing link->prog->type. This missing validation allows a user to
pass an abnormal non-netkit or non-tcx link via relative_fd. If doing
BPF_LINK_UPDATE on the abnormal link, it can trigger a UAF issue.

CPU0                                      CPU1
netkit_link_prog_attach
bpf_mprog_attach
bpf_mprog_tuple_relative
bpf_mprog_link
  /* non-netkit or non-tcx link */
  link = bpf_link_get_from_fd(id_or_fd);
                                          BPF_LINK_UPDATE on relative link
                                          ...
                                          old_prog = xchg(&link->link.prog, new_prog);
                                          bpf_prog_put(old_prog);
  if (type && link->prog->type != type) <-- trigger UAF

The reason for the UAF is that each subsystem provides its own
protection for link->prog. Since there is no cross subsystem protection
(if not considering the RCU of prog tear down), dereferencing the prog
of an anchor link that does not belong to the current subsystem is not
safe: it may have been freed. Therefore, we need to validate link->type
to reject foreign anchors.

Fix this by strictly validating link->type in bpf_mprog_link against the
expected link type. mprog APIs is also adjusted to accept and pass down
the expected link type. Meanwhile, add a comment explaining that when
ptype == UNSPEC in bpf_mprog_detach, it acts as a wildcard.

Fixes: 053c8e1f235d ("bpf: Add generic attach/detach/query API for multi-progs")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
---
 drivers/net/netkit.c      | 13 ++++++-------
 include/linux/bpf_mprog.h |  6 ++++--
 kernel/bpf/mprog.c        | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
 kernel/bpf/tcx.c          | 13 ++++++-------
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/netkit.c b/drivers/net/netkit.c
index a3931cd82132..99ddf2befb23 100644
--- a/drivers/net/netkit.c
+++ b/drivers/net/netkit.c
@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ int netkit_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	}
 	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, replace_prog,
 			       attr->attach_flags, attr->relative_fd,
-			       attr->expected_revision);
+			       attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (entry != entry_new) {
 			netkit_entry_update(dev, entry_new);
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int netkit_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, attr->attach_flags,
-			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision);
+			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (!bpf_mprog_total(entry_new))
 			entry_new = NULL;
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static int netkit_link_prog_attach(struct bpf_link *link, u32 flags,
 	ASSERT_RTNL();
 	entry = netkit_entry_fetch(dev, true);
 	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, NULL, flags,
-			       id_or_fd, revision);
+			       id_or_fd, revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (entry != entry_new) {
 			netkit_entry_update(dev, entry_new);
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ static void netkit_link_release(struct bpf_link *link)
 		ret = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0);
+	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (!bpf_mprog_total(entry_new))
 			entry_new = NULL;
@@ -919,9 +919,8 @@ static int netkit_link_update(struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_prog *nprog,
 		ret = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog,
-			       BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
-			       link->prog->aux->id, 0);
+	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog, BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
+			       link->prog->aux->id, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
 	if (!ret) {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(entry != entry_new);
 		oprog = xchg(&link->prog, nprog);
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h b/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h
index 0b9f4caeeb0a..1fbe1a923968 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h
@@ -321,12 +321,14 @@ int bpf_mprog_attach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
 		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
 		     struct bpf_prog *prog_new, struct bpf_link *link,
 		     struct bpf_prog *prog_old,
-		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision);
+		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
+		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type);
 
 int bpf_mprog_detach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
 		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
 		     struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_link *link,
-		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision);
+		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
+		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type);
 
 int bpf_mprog_query(const union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr,
 		    struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
index 1394168062e8..b4a1b35ff569 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 static int bpf_mprog_link(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
 			  u32 id_or_fd, u32 flags,
-			  enum bpf_prog_type type)
+			  enum bpf_link_type type)
 {
 	struct bpf_link *link = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	bool id = flags & BPF_F_ID;
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static int bpf_mprog_link(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
 		link = bpf_link_get_from_fd(id_or_fd);
 	if (IS_ERR(link))
 		return PTR_ERR(link);
-	if (type && link->prog->type != type) {
+	if (type && link->type != type) {
 		bpf_link_put(link);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -52,21 +52,22 @@ static int bpf_mprog_prog(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
 
 static int bpf_mprog_tuple_relative(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
 				    u32 id_or_fd, u32 flags,
-				    enum bpf_prog_type type)
+				    enum bpf_link_type ltype,
+				    enum bpf_prog_type ptype)
 {
 	bool link = flags & BPF_F_LINK;
 	bool id = flags & BPF_F_ID;
 
 	memset(tuple, 0, sizeof(*tuple));
 	if (link)
-		return bpf_mprog_link(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, type);
+		return bpf_mprog_link(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, ltype);
 	/* If no relevant flag is set and no id_or_fd was passed, then
 	 * tuple link/prog is just NULLed. This is the case when before/
 	 * after selects first/last position without passing fd.
 	 */
 	if (!id && !id_or_fd)
 		return 0;
-	return bpf_mprog_prog(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, type);
+	return bpf_mprog_prog(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, ptype);
 }
 
 static void bpf_mprog_tuple_put(struct bpf_tuple *tuple)
@@ -226,7 +227,8 @@ int bpf_mprog_attach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
 		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
 		     struct bpf_prog *prog_new, struct bpf_link *link,
 		     struct bpf_prog *prog_old,
-		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision)
+		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
+		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type)
 {
 	struct bpf_tuple rtuple, ntuple = {
 		.prog = prog_new,
@@ -243,6 +245,7 @@ int bpf_mprog_attach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
 		return -EEXIST;
 	ret = bpf_mprog_tuple_relative(&rtuple, id_or_fd,
 				       flags & ~BPF_F_REPLACE,
+				       expected_link_type,
 				       prog_new->type);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -328,7 +331,8 @@ static int bpf_mprog_fetch(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
 int bpf_mprog_detach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
 		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
 		     struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_link *link,
-		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision)
+		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
+		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type)
 {
 	struct bpf_tuple rtuple, dtuple = {
 		.prog = prog,
@@ -343,8 +347,9 @@ int bpf_mprog_detach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
 	if (!bpf_mprog_total(entry))
 		return -ENOENT;
 	ret = bpf_mprog_tuple_relative(&rtuple, id_or_fd, flags,
-				       prog ? prog->type :
-				       BPF_PROG_TYPE_UNSPEC);
+				       expected_link_type,
+				       /* Use UNSPEC as wildcard when prog is NULL */
+				       prog ? prog->type : BPF_PROG_TYPE_UNSPEC);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	if (dtuple.prog) {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
index 02db0113b8e7..f208cef13a98 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int tcx_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	}
 	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, replace_prog,
 			       attr->attach_flags, attr->relative_fd,
-			       attr->expected_revision);
+			       attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (entry != entry_new) {
 			tcx_entry_update(dev, entry_new, ingress);
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int tcx_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, attr->attach_flags,
-			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision);
+			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (!tcx_entry_is_active(entry_new))
 			entry_new = NULL;
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int tcx_link_prog_attach(struct bpf_link *link, u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd,
 	if (!entry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, NULL, flags,
-			       id_or_fd, revision);
+			       id_or_fd, revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (entry != entry_new) {
 			tcx_entry_update(dev, entry_new, ingress);
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static void tcx_link_release(struct bpf_link *link)
 		ret = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0);
+	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (!tcx_entry_is_active(entry_new))
 			entry_new = NULL;
@@ -229,9 +229,8 @@ static int tcx_link_update(struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_prog *nprog,
 		ret = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog,
-			       BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
-			       link->prog->aux->id, 0);
+	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog, BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
+			       link->prog->aux->id, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
 	if (!ret) {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(entry != entry_new);
 		oprog = xchg(&link->prog, nprog);
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH bpf v6 2/4] bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog

[sashiko-bot]

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing `rcu_read_lock()` in `bpf_link_show_fdinfo` and `bpf_link_get_info_by_fd` allows Use-After-Free of `link->prog`.
--

--- Patch [2]: [PATCH bpf v6 2/4] bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog ---
commit d6fd76d2df1307731a401336010d5bd9b2102da9
Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog

This patch validates the link type in bpf_mprog_link before accessing
the underlying program type. This prevents a use-after-free when an
unsupported link is updated concurrently.

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
> index 1394168062e85..b4a1b35ff5693 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
> @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static int bpf_mprog_link(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
>  		link = bpf_link_get_from_fd(id_or_fd);
>  	if (IS_ERR(link))
>  		return PTR_ERR(link);
> -	if (type && link->prog->type != type) {
> +	if (type && link->type != type) {

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but I noticed another potential UAF involving
link->prog being accessed without RCU protection.

When a BPF link is updated, link->prog is swapped and the old program is freed
after an RCU grace period. If a thread invokes sys_bpf with
BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD or reads fdinfo for a BPF link, it accesses link->prog.

In kernel/bpf/syscall.c:bpf_link_show_fdinfo():

	const struct bpf_prog *prog = link->prog;
...
	if (prog) {
		bin2hex(prog_tag, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag));
		seq_printf(m,
			   "prog_tag:\t%s\n"
			   "prog_id:\t%u\n",
			   prog_tag,
			   prog->aux->id);

Can this dereference a freed prog pointer if a concurrent BPF_LINK_UPDATE
swaps and frees the program before the grace period expires, since
rcu_read_lock() is not held?

A similar pattern appears in kernel/bpf/syscall.c:bpf_link_get_info_by_fd():

	if (link->prog)
		info.prog_id = link->prog->aux->id;

Does this code also need RCU protection against concurrent updates?

>  		bpf_link_put(link);
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260722072326.1545677-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com?part=2

Re: [PATCH bpf v6 2/4] bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog

[Pu Lehui]

On 2026/7/22 15:33, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
> 
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [High] Missing `rcu_read_lock()` in `bpf_link_show_fdinfo` and `bpf_link_get_info_by_fd` allows Use-After-Free of `link->prog`.
> --
> 
> --- Patch [2]: [PATCH bpf v6 2/4] bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog ---
> commit d6fd76d2df1307731a401336010d5bd9b2102da9
> Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
> 
> bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog
> 
> This patch validates the link type in bpf_mprog_link before accessing
> the underlying program type. This prevents a use-after-free when an
> unsupported link is updated concurrently.
> 
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
>> index 1394168062e85..b4a1b35ff5693 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
>> @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static int bpf_mprog_link(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
>>   		link = bpf_link_get_from_fd(id_or_fd);
>>   	if (IS_ERR(link))
>>   		return PTR_ERR(link);
>> -	if (type && link->prog->type != type) {
>> +	if (type && link->type != type) {
> 
> [Severity: High]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but I noticed another potential UAF involving
> link->prog being accessed without RCU protection.
> 
> When a BPF link is updated, link->prog is swapped and the old program is freed
> after an RCU grace period. If a thread invokes sys_bpf with
> BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD or reads fdinfo for a BPF link, it accesses link->prog.
> 
> In kernel/bpf/syscall.c:bpf_link_show_fdinfo():
> 
> 	const struct bpf_prog *prog = link->prog;
> ...
> 	if (prog) {
> 		bin2hex(prog_tag, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag));
> 		seq_printf(m,
> 			   "prog_tag:\t%s\n"
> 			   "prog_id:\t%u\n",
> 			   prog_tag,
> 			   prog->aux->id);
> 
> Can this dereference a freed prog pointer if a concurrent BPF_LINK_UPDATE
> swaps and frees the program before the grace period expires, since
> rcu_read_lock() is not held?

patch 3 will cover these issue.

> 
> A similar pattern appears in kernel/bpf/syscall.c:bpf_link_get_info_by_fd():
> 
> 	if (link->prog)
> 		info.prog_id = link->prog->aux->id;
> 
> Does this code also need RCU protection against concurrent updates?
> 
>>   		bpf_link_put(link);
>>   		return -EINVAL;
>>   	}
> 

Re: [PATCH bpf v6 2/4] bpf: Fix UAF due to missing link type check in mprog

[Emil Tsalapatis]

On Wed Jul 22, 2026 at 3:23 AM EDT, Pu Lehui wrote:
> From: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
>
> In bpf_mprog_link, the code does not check the link->type first before
> dereferencing link->prog->type. This missing validation allows a user to
> pass an abnormal non-netkit or non-tcx link via relative_fd. If doing
> BPF_LINK_UPDATE on the abnormal link, it can trigger a UAF issue.
>
> CPU0                                      CPU1
> netkit_link_prog_attach
> bpf_mprog_attach
> bpf_mprog_tuple_relative
> bpf_mprog_link
>   /* non-netkit or non-tcx link */
>   link = bpf_link_get_from_fd(id_or_fd);
>                                           BPF_LINK_UPDATE on relative link
>                                           ...
>                                           old_prog = xchg(&link->link.prog, new_prog);
>                                           bpf_prog_put(old_prog);
>   if (type && link->prog->type != type) <-- trigger UAF
>
> The reason for the UAF is that each subsystem provides its own
> protection for link->prog. Since there is no cross subsystem protection
> (if not considering the RCU of prog tear down), dereferencing the prog
> of an anchor link that does not belong to the current subsystem is not
> safe: it may have been freed. Therefore, we need to validate link->type
> to reject foreign anchors.
>
> Fix this by strictly validating link->type in bpf_mprog_link against the
> expected link type. mprog APIs is also adjusted to accept and pass down
> the expected link type. Meanwhile, add a comment explaining that when
> ptype == UNSPEC in bpf_mprog_detach, it acts as a wildcard.
>
> Fixes: 053c8e1f235d ("bpf: Add generic attach/detach/query API for multi-progs")
> Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

Unless I'm missing something, at the very least there's no need for the
extra argument in detach() since we pass UNSPEC to bpf_mprog_link() and
never use it otherwise.

Even for the attach case, aren't we required to provide a new link
for attachment, and so already have the ltype available to test
against?

> ---
>  drivers/net/netkit.c      | 13 ++++++-------
>  include/linux/bpf_mprog.h |  6 ++++--
>  kernel/bpf/mprog.c        | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
>  kernel/bpf/tcx.c          | 13 ++++++-------
>  4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/netkit.c b/drivers/net/netkit.c
> index a3931cd82132..99ddf2befb23 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/netkit.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/netkit.c
> @@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ int netkit_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>  	}
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, replace_prog,
>  			       attr->attach_flags, attr->relative_fd,
> -			       attr->expected_revision);
> +			       attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (entry != entry_new) {
>  			netkit_entry_update(dev, entry_new);
> @@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int netkit_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, attr->attach_flags,
> -			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision);
> +			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (!bpf_mprog_total(entry_new))
>  			entry_new = NULL;
> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static int netkit_link_prog_attach(struct bpf_link *link, u32 flags,
>  	ASSERT_RTNL();
>  	entry = netkit_entry_fetch(dev, true);
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, NULL, flags,
> -			       id_or_fd, revision);
> +			       id_or_fd, revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (entry != entry_new) {
>  			netkit_entry_update(dev, entry_new);
> @@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ static void netkit_link_release(struct bpf_link *link)
>  		ret = -ENOENT;
>  		goto out;
>  	}
> -	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0);
> +	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (!bpf_mprog_total(entry_new))
>  			entry_new = NULL;
> @@ -919,9 +919,8 @@ static int netkit_link_update(struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_prog *nprog,
>  		ret = -ENOENT;
>  		goto out;
>  	}
> -	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog,
> -			       BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
> -			       link->prog->aux->id, 0);
> +	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog, BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
> +			       link->prog->aux->id, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETKIT);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		WARN_ON_ONCE(entry != entry_new);
>  		oprog = xchg(&link->prog, nprog);
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h b/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h
> index 0b9f4caeeb0a..1fbe1a923968 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_mprog.h
> @@ -321,12 +321,14 @@ int bpf_mprog_attach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
>  		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
>  		     struct bpf_prog *prog_new, struct bpf_link *link,
>  		     struct bpf_prog *prog_old,
> -		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision);
> +		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
> +		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type);
>  
>  int bpf_mprog_detach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
>  		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
>  		     struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_link *link,
> -		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision);
> +		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
> +		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type);
>  
>  int bpf_mprog_query(const union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr,
>  		    struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry);
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
> index 1394168062e8..b4a1b35ff569 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/mprog.c
> @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
>  
>  static int bpf_mprog_link(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
>  			  u32 id_or_fd, u32 flags,
> -			  enum bpf_prog_type type)
> +			  enum bpf_link_type type)
>  {
>  	struct bpf_link *link = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	bool id = flags & BPF_F_ID;
> @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ static int bpf_mprog_link(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
>  		link = bpf_link_get_from_fd(id_or_fd);
>  	if (IS_ERR(link))
>  		return PTR_ERR(link);
> -	if (type && link->prog->type != type) {
> +	if (type && link->type != type) {
>  		bpf_link_put(link);
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
> @@ -52,21 +52,22 @@ static int bpf_mprog_prog(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
>  
>  static int bpf_mprog_tuple_relative(struct bpf_tuple *tuple,
>  				    u32 id_or_fd, u32 flags,
> -				    enum bpf_prog_type type)
> +				    enum bpf_link_type ltype,
> +				    enum bpf_prog_type ptype)
>  {
>  	bool link = flags & BPF_F_LINK;
>  	bool id = flags & BPF_F_ID;
>  
>  	memset(tuple, 0, sizeof(*tuple));
>  	if (link)
> -		return bpf_mprog_link(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, type);
> +		return bpf_mprog_link(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, ltype);
>  	/* If no relevant flag is set and no id_or_fd was passed, then
>  	 * tuple link/prog is just NULLed. This is the case when before/
>  	 * after selects first/last position without passing fd.
>  	 */
>  	if (!id && !id_or_fd)
>  		return 0;
> -	return bpf_mprog_prog(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, type);
> +	return bpf_mprog_prog(tuple, id_or_fd, flags, ptype);
>  }
>  
>  static void bpf_mprog_tuple_put(struct bpf_tuple *tuple)
> @@ -226,7 +227,8 @@ int bpf_mprog_attach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
>  		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
>  		     struct bpf_prog *prog_new, struct bpf_link *link,
>  		     struct bpf_prog *prog_old,
> -		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision)
> +		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
> +		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type)
>  {
>  	struct bpf_tuple rtuple, ntuple = {
>  		.prog = prog_new,
> @@ -243,6 +245,7 @@ int bpf_mprog_attach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
>  		return -EEXIST;
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_tuple_relative(&rtuple, id_or_fd,
>  				       flags & ~BPF_F_REPLACE,
> +				       expected_link_type,
>  				       prog_new->type);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
> @@ -328,7 +331,8 @@ static int bpf_mprog_fetch(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
>  int bpf_mprog_detach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
>  		     struct bpf_mprog_entry **entry_new,
>  		     struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_link *link,
> -		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision)
> +		     u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision,
> +		     enum bpf_link_type expected_link_type)
>  {
>  	struct bpf_tuple rtuple, dtuple = {
>  		.prog = prog,
> @@ -343,8 +347,9 @@ int bpf_mprog_detach(struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry,
>  	if (!bpf_mprog_total(entry))
>  		return -ENOENT;
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_tuple_relative(&rtuple, id_or_fd, flags,
> -				       prog ? prog->type :
> -				       BPF_PROG_TYPE_UNSPEC);
> +				       expected_link_type,
> +				       /* Use UNSPEC as wildcard when prog is NULL */
> +				       prog ? prog->type : BPF_PROG_TYPE_UNSPEC);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  	if (dtuple.prog) {
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
> index 02db0113b8e7..f208cef13a98 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
> @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int tcx_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>  	}
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, replace_prog,
>  			       attr->attach_flags, attr->relative_fd,
> -			       attr->expected_revision);
> +			       attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (entry != entry_new) {
>  			tcx_entry_update(dev, entry_new, ingress);
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int tcx_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, prog, NULL, attr->attach_flags,
> -			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision);
> +			       attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (!tcx_entry_is_active(entry_new))
>  			entry_new = NULL;
> @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int tcx_link_prog_attach(struct bpf_link *link, u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd,
>  	if (!entry)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, NULL, flags,
> -			       id_or_fd, revision);
> +			       id_or_fd, revision, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (entry != entry_new) {
>  			tcx_entry_update(dev, entry_new, ingress);
> @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static void tcx_link_release(struct bpf_link *link)
>  		ret = -ENOENT;
>  		goto out;
>  	}
> -	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0);
> +	ret = bpf_mprog_detach(entry, &entry_new, link->prog, link, 0, 0, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		if (!tcx_entry_is_active(entry_new))
>  			entry_new = NULL;
> @@ -229,9 +229,8 @@ static int tcx_link_update(struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_prog *nprog,
>  		ret = -ENOENT;
>  		goto out;
>  	}
> -	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog,
> -			       BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
> -			       link->prog->aux->id, 0);
> +	ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, link, oprog, BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_ID,
> +			       link->prog->aux->id, 0, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX);
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		WARN_ON_ONCE(entry != entry_new);
>  		oprog = xchg(&link->prog, nprog);

[PATCH bpf v6 3/4] bpf: Fix potential UAF when reading bpf link info

[Pu Lehui]

From: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

In bpf_link_show_fdinfo and bpf_link_get_info_by_fd, link->prog is
accessed without holding any locks. If the prog is concurrently replaced
via bpf_link_update, the old prog can be freed, leading to a potential
UAF issue.

Before dereferencing the prog, both normal RCU and RCU Tasks Trace read
locks would normally be required, as BPF_LINK_TYPE_ITER supports both
non-sleepable and sleepable progs. However, as commit 57b23c0f612d
("bpf: Retire rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp()") clarifies, an RCU Tasks Trace
grace period implies an RCU grace period, so holding only
rcu_read_lock() is already sufficient.

Fixes: 0c991ebc8c69 ("bpf: Implement bpf_prog replacement for an active bpf_cgroup_link")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 6db306d23b47..cad986807d53 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -3471,9 +3471,10 @@ static const char *bpf_link_type_strs[] = {
 static void bpf_link_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
 {
 	const struct bpf_link *link = filp->private_data;
-	const struct bpf_prog *prog = link->prog;
+	const struct bpf_prog *prog;
 	enum bpf_link_type type = link->type;
 	char prog_tag[sizeof(prog->tag) * 2 + 1] = { };
+	u32 prog_id;
 
 	if (type < ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_link_type_strs) && bpf_link_type_strs[type]) {
 		if (link->type == BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI)
@@ -3490,13 +3491,20 @@ static void bpf_link_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
 	}
 	seq_printf(m, "link_id:\t%u\n", link->id);
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	prog = READ_ONCE(link->prog);
 	if (prog) {
 		bin2hex(prog_tag, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag));
+		prog_id = prog->aux->id;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (prog) {
 		seq_printf(m,
 			   "prog_tag:\t%s\n"
 			   "prog_id:\t%u\n",
 			   prog_tag,
-			   prog->aux->id);
+			   prog_id);
 	}
 	if (link->ops->show_fdinfo)
 		link->ops->show_fdinfo(link, m);
@@ -5535,6 +5543,7 @@ static int bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file,
 {
 	struct bpf_link_info __user *uinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->info.info);
 	struct bpf_link_info info;
+	const struct bpf_prog *prog;
 	u32 info_len = attr->info.info_len;
 	int err;
 
@@ -5549,8 +5558,12 @@ static int bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file,
 
 	info.type = link->type;
 	info.id = link->id;
-	if (link->prog)
-		info.prog_id = link->prog->aux->id;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	prog = READ_ONCE(link->prog);
+	if (prog)
+		info.prog_id = prog->aux->id;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (link->ops->fill_link_info) {
 		err = link->ops->fill_link_info(link, &info);
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH bpf v6 4/4] bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog

[Pu Lehui]

From: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

Syzkaller reported a storage null-ptr-deref issue after replacing prog.
This occurs in the following scenario:
1. prog A, an empty prog, is attached to a cgrp.
2. prog B uses BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE and calls the
   bpf_get_local_storage helper.
3. link_update is called to replace prog A with prog B.

The reason is that __cgroup_bpf_replace fails to alloc and assign the
required cgrp storage for the incoming replacement prog. Consequently,
the new prog inherits an uninit storage, leading to null-ptr-deref panic
when kick the new prog.

Fix this by properly allocating the storage and comparing the old and
new storage pointers. If the storage changed, fallback to
update_effective_progs which performs a RCU-safe update of the entire
array. If the storage remains unchanged, we can safely retain the
fast-path in-place update.

Additionally, handle the error path in __cgroup_bpf_attach strictly.
Although it is rare for update_effective_progs to fail in this context,
proper rollbacks for storage and flags are added for code rigor.

Fixes: 0c991ebc8c69 ("bpf: Implement bpf_prog replacement for an active bpf_cgroup_link")
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
index 4355ccb78a9c..56d538f05520 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -813,10 +813,12 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp,
 	struct bpf_prog *old_prog = NULL;
 	struct bpf_cgroup_storage *storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_TYPE] = {};
 	struct bpf_cgroup_storage *new_storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_TYPE] = {};
+	struct bpf_cgroup_storage *old_storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_TYPE] = {};
 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog = prog ? : link->link.prog;
 	enum cgroup_bpf_attach_type atype;
 	struct bpf_prog_list *pl;
 	struct hlist_head *progs;
+	u8 old_flags;
 	int err;
 
 	if (((flags & BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE) && (flags & BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI)) ||
@@ -883,7 +885,10 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp,
 	pl->prog = prog;
 	pl->link = link;
 	pl->flags = flags;
+	if (old_prog)
+		bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(old_storage, pl->storage);
 	bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, storage);
+	old_flags = cgrp->bpf.flags[atype];
 	cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] = saved_flags;
 
 	if (type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
@@ -915,12 +920,14 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp,
 	if (old_prog) {
 		pl->prog = old_prog;
 		pl->link = NULL;
+		bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, old_storage);
 	}
 	bpf_cgroup_storages_free(new_storage);
 	if (!old_prog) {
 		hlist_del(&pl->node);
 		kfree(pl);
 	}
+	cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] = old_flags;
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -1032,11 +1039,17 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_replace(struct cgroup *cgrp,
 				struct bpf_cgroup_link *link,
 				struct bpf_prog *new_prog)
 {
+	struct bpf_cgroup_storage *new_storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_TYPE] = {};
+	struct bpf_cgroup_storage *old_storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_TYPE] = {};
+	struct bpf_cgroup_storage *storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_TYPE] = {};
+	enum bpf_cgroup_storage_type stype;
 	enum cgroup_bpf_attach_type atype;
+	bool storage_changed = false;
 	struct bpf_prog *old_prog;
 	struct bpf_prog_list *pl;
 	struct hlist_head *progs;
 	bool found = false;
+	int err;
 
 	atype = bpf_cgroup_atype_find(link->link.attach_type, new_prog->aux->attach_btf_id);
 	if (atype < 0)
@@ -1056,10 +1069,39 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_replace(struct cgroup *cgrp,
 	if (!found)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
+	if (bpf_cgroup_storages_alloc(storage, new_storage, link->link.attach_type,
+				      new_prog, cgrp))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for_each_cgroup_storage_type(stype) {
+		if (storage[stype] != pl->storage[stype]) {
+			storage_changed = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	cgrp->bpf.revisions[atype] += 1;
 	old_prog = xchg(&link->link.prog, new_prog);
-	replace_effective_prog(cgrp, atype, pl);
+
+	if (!storage_changed) {
+		replace_effective_prog(cgrp, atype, pl);
+		bpf_prog_put(old_prog);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(old_storage, pl->storage);
+	bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, storage);
+	err = update_effective_progs(cgrp, atype);
+	if (err) {
+		xchg(&link->link.prog, old_prog);
+		bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, old_storage);
+		bpf_cgroup_storages_free(new_storage);
+		cgrp->bpf.revisions[atype] -= 1;
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	bpf_prog_put(old_prog);
+	bpf_cgroup_storages_link(new_storage, cgrp, link->link.attach_type);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH bpf v6 4/4] bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog

[sashiko-bot]

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing rollback of `pl->flags` on the error path in `__cgroup_bpf_attach` permanently corrupts the execution order of the replaced program.
--

--- Patch [4]: [PATCH bpf v6 4/4] bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog ---
commit f8726e124d0a4e72b87976830f0741e286d474df
Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>

bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog

Syzkaller reported a storage null-ptr-deref issue after replacing a prog.
The issue is fixed by properly allocating the storage and comparing the old
and new storage pointers, falling back to an RCU-safe update if they change.
Additionally, proper rollbacks for storage and flags are added to the error
path in __cgroup_bpf_attach for code rigor.

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> @@ -883,7 +885,10 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp,
>  	pl->prog = prog;
>  	pl->link = link;
>  	pl->flags = flags;
> +	if (old_prog)
> +		bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(old_storage, pl->storage);
>  	bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, storage);
> +	old_flags = cgrp->bpf.flags[atype];
>  	cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] = saved_flags;
>  
>  	if (type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {

[ ... ]

> @@ -915,12 +920,14 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp,
>  	if (old_prog) {
>  		pl->prog = old_prog;
>  		pl->link = NULL;
> +		bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, old_storage);
>  	}

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since this patch tightens the error handling
and rollbacks in __cgroup_bpf_attach(), should we also restore the original
pl->flags here?

Earlier in the function, pl->flags is overwritten with the incoming flags:

	pl->prog = prog;
	pl->link = link;
	pl->flags = flags;

If update_effective_progs() later fails (e.g., due to memory allocation
failure), the error path restores pl->prog, pl->link, and pl->storage, but
misses pl->flags. If a user attempts to replace a program using BPF_F_REPLACE
with different BPF_F_PREORDER settings and the replacement fails, could this
leave the original program active but with its execution order silently
corrupted?

>  	bpf_cgroup_storages_free(new_storage);
>  	if (!old_prog) {
>  		hlist_del(&pl->node);
>  		kfree(pl);
>  	}
> +	cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] = old_flags;
>  	return err;
>  }

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260722072326.1545677-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com?part=4

Re: [PATCH bpf v6 4/4] bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog

[Pu Lehui]

On 2026/7/22 15:35, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
> 
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [High] Missing rollback of `pl->flags` on the error path in `__cgroup_bpf_attach` permanently corrupts the execution order of the replaced program.
> --
> 
> --- Patch [4]: [PATCH bpf v6 4/4] bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog ---
> commit f8726e124d0a4e72b87976830f0741e286d474df
> Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
> 
> bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog
> 
> Syzkaller reported a storage null-ptr-deref issue after replacing a prog.
> The issue is fixed by properly allocating the storage and comparing the old
> and new storage pointers, falling back to an RCU-safe update if they change.
> Additionally, proper rollbacks for storage and flags are added to the error
> path in __cgroup_bpf_attach for code rigor.
> 
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
>> @@ -883,7 +885,10 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp,
>>   	pl->prog = prog;
>>   	pl->link = link;
>>   	pl->flags = flags;
>> +	if (old_prog)
>> +		bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(old_storage, pl->storage);
>>   	bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, storage);
>> +	old_flags = cgrp->bpf.flags[atype];
>>   	cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] = saved_flags;
>>   
>>   	if (type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
> 
> [ ... ]
> 
>> @@ -915,12 +920,14 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp,
>>   	if (old_prog) {
>>   		pl->prog = old_prog;
>>   		pl->link = NULL;
>> +		bpf_cgroup_storages_assign(pl->storage, old_storage);
>>   	}
> 
> [Severity: High]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but since this patch tightens the error handling
> and rollbacks in __cgroup_bpf_attach(), should we also restore the original
> pl->flags here?


> 
> Earlier in the function, pl->flags is overwritten with the incoming flags:
> 
> 	pl->prog = prog;
> 	pl->link = link;
> 	pl->flags = flags;
> 
> If update_effective_progs() later fails (e.g., due to memory allocation

It's hard to make update_effective_progs fail in __cgroup_bpf_attach, as 
it will failed only when allocating failed:

progs = bpf_prog_array_alloc(cnt, GFP_KERNEL);

failed for the above alloc is not a high issue, as cnt max is no more 
than BPF_CGROUP_MAX_PROGS.

> failure), the error path restores pl->prog, pl->link, and pl->storage, but
> misses pl->flags. If a user attempts to replace a program using BPF_F_REPLACE
> with different BPF_F_PREORDER settings and the replacement fails, could this
> leave the original program active but with its execution order silently
> corrupted?
> 
>>   	bpf_cgroup_storages_free(new_storage);
>>   	if (!old_prog) {
>>   		hlist_del(&pl->node);
>>   		kfree(pl);
>>   	}
>> +	cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] = old_flags;
>>   	return err;
>>   }
>