FAILED: patch "[PATCH] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

[gregkh]

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026072949-fresh-evolution-3660@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 00:17:35 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()

decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations
that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds
reads:

1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds
   check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the
   internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an
   OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with
   p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads
   4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is
   passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.

   The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses
   ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call.
   decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.

2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding
   bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop
   advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads
   one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed
   directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by
   callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct
   influence over the lock type field.

Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
  ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers,
                                           err_inval)
  ceph_decode_8(p)  -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type,
                                          err_free_lockers)

The goto targets differ intentionally:
  err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for
  the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated
  and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().

  err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the
  post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must
  be freed.

ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that
err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation.
Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from
the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.

-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the
OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure
class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).

[ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
index c6956f1df333..377336982f7d 100644
--- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	*num_lockers = ceph_decode_32(p);
+	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval);
 	*lockers = kzalloc_objs(**lockers, *num_lockers, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (!*lockers)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -310,7 +310,8 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
 			goto err_free_lockers;
 	}
 
-	*type = ceph_decode_8(p);
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers);
 	s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (IS_ERR(s)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(s);
@@ -320,6 +321,9 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
 	*tag = s;
 	return 0;
 
+err_inval:
+	return -EINVAL;
+
 err_free_lockers:
 	ceph_free_lockers(*lockers, *num_lockers);
 	return ret;

[PATCH 5.10.y] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227 ]

decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations
that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds
reads:

1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds
   check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the
   internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an
   OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with
   p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads
   4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is
   passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.

   The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses
   ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call.
   decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.

2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding
   bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop
   advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads
   one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed
   directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by
   callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct
   influence over the lock type field.

Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
  ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers,
                                           err_inval)
  ceph_decode_8(p)  -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type,
                                          err_free_lockers)

The goto targets differ intentionally:
  err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for
  the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated
  and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().

  err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the
  post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must
  be freed.

ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that
err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation.
Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from
the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.

-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the
OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure
class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).

[ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
index 17447c19d9376..fd39cbda60f65 100644
--- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	*num_lockers = ceph_decode_32(p);
+	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval);
 	*lockers = kcalloc(*num_lockers, sizeof(**lockers), GFP_NOIO);
 	if (!*lockers)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
 			goto err_free_lockers;
 	}
 
-	*type = ceph_decode_8(p);
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers);
 	s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (IS_ERR(s)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(s);
@@ -314,6 +315,9 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
 	*tag = s;
 	return 0;
 
+err_inval:
+	return -EINVAL;
+
 err_free_lockers:
 	ceph_free_lockers(*lockers, *num_lockers);
 	return ret;
-- 
2.53.0