[merged mm-stable] mm-mseal-remove-further-superfluous-comments-do_mseal.patch removed from -mm tree

[merged mm-stable] mm-mseal-remove-further-superfluous-comments-do_mseal.patch removed from -mm tree

[Andrew Morton]

The quilt patch titled
     Subject: mm/mseal: remove further superfluous comments, do_mseal()
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     mm-mseal-remove-further-superfluous-comments-do_mseal.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

------------------------------------------------------
From: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
Subject: mm/mseal: remove further superfluous comments, do_mseal()
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 18:27:11 +0100

There's no need to abstract do_mseal() any longer so put the system call
implementation in the system call declaration.

The comment around do_mseal() is strangely formatted, overly long and adds
a lot of superfluous information that the code already provides, so boil
it down to the essentials.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260717-mseal-fixups-v2-3-0daa0014b813@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <liam@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 mm/mseal.c |   74 +++++++++++----------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/mseal.c~mm-mseal-remove-further-superfluous-comments-do_mseal
+++ a/mm/mseal.c
@@ -99,61 +99,25 @@ void mseal_mmap_page_zero(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * mseal(2) seals the VM's meta data from
- * selected syscalls.
+ * Seal VMAs in the specified input range to prevent an attacker replacing what
+ * is mapped in the range with something else.
  *
- * addr/len: VM address range.
+ * Disallows:
+ * - VMA unmapping, remapping or shrinking.
+ * - Overwriting the VMA with another one via mmap(), mremap() or similar.
+ * - Alteration of properties via mprotect()/pkey_mprotect().
+ * - Destructive madvise() behaviours (like MADV_DONTNEED) on anonymous read-only
+ *   ranges.
  *
- *  The address range by addr/len must meet:
- *   start (addr) must be in a valid VMA.
- *   end (addr + len) must be in a valid VMA.
- *   no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
- *   start (addr) must be page aligned.
+ * Since unmapped ranges can be mapped at any time, the input range must span
+ * mapped ranges only.
  *
- *  len: len will be page aligned implicitly.
- *
- *   Below VMA operations are blocked after sealing.
- *   1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking
- *	the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty
- *	space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new
- *	set of attributes.
- *   2> Moving or expanding a different vma into the current location,
- *	via mremap().
- *   3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
- *   4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
- *	specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
- *	the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
- *	merging to expand a sealed VMA.
- *   5> mprotect and pkey_mprotect.
- *   6> Some destructive madvice() behavior (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
- *      for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
- *	memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
- *	effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
- *
- *  flags: reserved.
- *
- * return values:
- *  zero: success.
- *  -EINVAL:
- *   invalid input flags.
- *   start address is not page aligned.
- *   Address range (start + len) overflow.
- *  -ENOMEM:
- *   addr is not a valid address (not allocated).
- *   end (start + len) is not a valid address.
- *   a gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
- *  -EPERM:
- *  - In 32 bit architecture, sealing is not supported.
- * Note:
- *  user can call mseal(2) multiple times, adding a seal on an
- *  already sealed memory is a no-action (no error).
- *
- *  unseal() is not supported.
+ * The flags parameter is currently reserved.
  */
-static int do_mseal(unsigned long start, size_t len_in, unsigned long flags)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, flags)
 {
+	size_t len_aligned;
 	unsigned long end;
-	size_t len;
 
 	/* Verify flags not set. */
 	if (flags)
@@ -163,12 +127,12 @@ static int do_mseal(unsigned long start,
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	len = PAGE_ALIGN(len_in);
+	len_aligned = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
 	/* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero. */
-	if (len_in && !len)
+	if (len && !len_aligned)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	end = start + len;
+	end = start + len_aligned;
 	if (end < start)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -177,9 +141,3 @@ static int do_mseal(unsigned long start,
 
 	return mseal_range(start, end);
 }
-
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long,
-		flags)
-{
-	return do_mseal(start, len, flags);
-}
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from ljs@kernel.org are

x86-mm-pat-acquire-init_mm-write-lock-on-collapse-to-avoid-uaf.patch
x86-mm-pat-acquire-init_mm-read-lock-on-attribute-change-to-avoid-uaf.patch
x86-mm-pat-allocate-split-page-tables-as-kernel-page-tables.patch
mm-vma-introduce-vma-anon-page-offset-field-and-add-helpers.patch
mm-provide-vma_is_cow_mapping-and-remove-is_cow_mapping.patch
mm-introduce-linear_anon_page_index.patch
mm-abstract-vma_address-and-introduce-vma_anon_address.patch
mm-update-print_bad_page_map-to-show-anon-index-if-appropriate.patch
mm-introduce-and-use-vma_filebacked_address.patch
mm-vma-fix-self-merge-check-in-copy_vma.patch
tools-testing-vma-add-tests-for-copy_vma-self-merge.patch
mm-propagate-vma-anonymous-page-offset-on-map-remap-split-merge.patch
mm-rmap-track-whether-the-page-vma-mapped-pgoff-is-anonymous.patch
mm-clean-up-vma_address_end.patch
mm-huge_memory-update-remove_migration_pmd-to-accept-a-folio.patch
mm-migrate-calculate-large-folio-page-index-using-pfn.patch
mm-rmap-use-anon-pgoff-to-track-map_private-file-backed-anon-folios.patch
tools-testing-vma-expand-vma-merge-tests-to-assert-anon-pgoff.patch
tools-testing-selftests-mm-test-anonymous-page-offset-merge-behaviour.patch
mm-vma-only-permit-map_private-dev-zero-to-be-mapped-anonymous.patch
mm-vma-make-map_private-mapped-dev-zero-mappings-truly-anonymous.patch
tools-testing-vma-add-test-to-assert-map_private-dev-zero-is-anon.patch
tools-testing-selftests-mm-add-map_private-dev-zero-merge-tests.patch
mm-add-some-missing-includes-to-mm-local-headers.patch