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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Wei Hu" <weh@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 07/13] mshv: default to safe partition CPU features
Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2026 15:15:50 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260807151551.6C1361F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260807135134.303943-8-weh@linux.microsoft.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

New issues:
- [High] Functional regression and uninitialized stack memory use on ARM64 for legacy partition creation.

Pre-existing issues:
- [Medium] TOCTOU double-fetch race allows validation and use of flag-gated parameters outside their flag gate.
--

--- Patch [7]: [PATCH v1 07/13] mshv: default to safe partition CPU features ---
commit 85299e9eb98a0db0daae1adea69f8e739d17d8db
Author: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

mshv: default to safe partition CPU features

For legacy create-partition callers, disable all processor and xsave
features first, then enable only the default feature set known to be
supported. Passing an all-zero disabled feature mask can make SEV-SNP
partition creation fail on Hyper-V.

> diff --git a/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c b/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c
> index cc38507570ac4..11d3c86050b45 100644
> --- a/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c
> @@ -2333,6 +2333,86 @@ static long mshv_ioctl_process_pt_flags(void __user *user_arg, u64 *pt_flags,
>  	disabled_procs = &cr_props->disabled_processor_features;
>  	disabled_xsave = &cr_props->disabled_processor_xsave_features;
>  
> +	/* Disable all processor features first. */
> +	for (i = 0; i < HV_PARTITION_PROCESSOR_FEATURES_BANKS; i++)
> +		disabled_procs->as_uint64[i] = U64_MAX;
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)
> +	/* Enable default features that are known to be supported. */

[ ... ]

> +	disabled_xsave->as_uint64 = U64_MAX;
> +	disabled_xsave->xsave_support = 0;
> +	disabled_xsave->xsaveopt_support = 0;
> +	disabled_xsave->avx_support = 0;
> +#endif
> +
>  	/* Check if user provided newer struct with feature fields */
>  	if (args.pt_flags & BIT_ULL(MSHV_PT_BIT_CPU_AND_XSAVE_FEATURES)) {
>  		if (copy_from_user(&args, user_arg, sizeof(args)))
>  			return -EFAULT;

[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this second fetch from userspace
introduce a race condition?

If a concurrent userspace thread clears the MSHV_PT_BIT_CPU_AND_XSAVE_FEATURES
flag between the first and second fetch, args.pt_flags will be overwritten
with the new value. The code does not re-verify the flag before proceeding to
validate and use extended v2 fields like args.pt_num_cpu_fbanks.

This could allow the kernel to operate on uninitialized userspace garbage.

[ ... ]

> @@ -2371,16 +2451,6 @@ static long mshv_ioctl_process_pt_flags(void __user *user_arg, u64 *pt_flags,
>  		if (mshv_field_nonzero(args, pt_rsvd2))
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  #endif
> -	} else {
> -		/*
> -		 * v1 behavior: try to enable everything. The hypervisor will
> -		 * disable features that are not supported. The banks can be
> -		 * queried via the get partition property hypercall.
> -		 */
> -		for (i = 0; i < HV_PARTITION_PROCESSOR_FEATURES_BANKS; i++)
> -			disabled_procs->as_uint64[i] = 0;
> -
> -		disabled_xsave->as_uint64 = 0;
>  	}
>  
>  	/* Only support EXO partitions */

[Severity: High]
Does removing this fallback initialization break legacy v1 callers on ARM64?

With this code removed, disabled_procs->as_uint64[i] is unconditionally set
to U64_MAX earlier in mshv_ioctl_process_pt_flags(), which disables all
processor features. Because the new default initializations are inside an
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) block, ARM64 callers never get those defaults
nor the old 0 initialization.

Additionally, disabled_xsave points to the disabled_processor_xsave_features
field of cr_props (which is on the stack in mshv_ioctl_create_partition).
Since it is no longer initialized to 0 here for non-x86 v1 callers, will it
send uninitialized stack memory to the hypervisor?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260807135134.303943-1-weh@linux.microsoft.com?part=7

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-07 15:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-07 13:51 [PATCH v1 00/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP support for MSHV root partitions Wei Hu
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 01/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP UAPI definitions Wei Hu
2026-08-07 14:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 02/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP PSP request hypercall Wei Hu
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 03/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP isolated page hypercalls Wei Hu
2026-08-07 14:21   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 04/13] mshv: wire SEV-SNP partition ioctls Wei Hu
2026-08-07 14:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 05/13] hyperv: fix hv_input_get_system_property layout for SNP status Wei Hu
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 06/13] mshv: detect and report SEV-SNP support at init Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:04   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 07/13] mshv: default to safe partition CPU features Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:15   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 08/13] mshv: accept partial CPU feature banks Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:30   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 09/13] mshv: define full processor and xsave feature masks Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:42   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 10/13] mshv: unmap SNP memory before state teardown Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:53   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 11/13] mshv: unlock SNP pages on panic for crashdump collection Wei Hu
2026-08-07 16:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 12/13] hyperv: add MSHV Dom0 root-partition boot enablement (EFI HvLoader) Wei Hu
2026-08-07 16:22   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 13/13] mshv: set up own SynIC registers on a nested root partition Wei Hu
2026-08-07 16:36   ` sashiko-bot

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