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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Wei Hu" <weh@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 10/13] mshv: unmap SNP memory before state teardown
Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2026 15:53:32 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260807155333.3BF061F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260807135134.303943-11-weh@linux.microsoft.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Userspace can trigger a kernel memory leak or DoS by unmapping memory regions of an active encrypted partition.
--

--- Patch [10]: [PATCH v1 10/13] mshv: unmap SNP memory before state teardown ---
commit f9f61905fec1fff131a4505ade5ecacaee8647a1
Author: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

mshv: unmap SNP memory before state teardown

This commit updates the partition teardown process to unmap memory regions
before destroying the SNP partition state. The regions are only released
after the SNP state is fully torn down, which allows the host to regain
access while the partition is still secure.

[ ... ]
> diff --git a/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c b/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c
> index c81a8d0493c19..0fbd2158968da 100644
> --- a/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -2166,10 +2166,8 @@ static void destroy_partition(struct mshv_partition *partition)
>  		if (mshv_partition_encrypted(partition)) {
>  			hlist_for_each_entry_safe(region, n,
>  						  &partition->pt_mem_regions,
> -						  hnode) {
> -				hlist_del(&region->hnode);
> -				mshv_region_put(region);
> -			}
> +						  hnode)
> +				mshv_region_unmap(region);
>  
>  			ret = destroy_snp_partition_state(partition);
>  			if (ret) {

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does a similar problem occur when userspace
unmaps memory via the MSHV_SET_GUEST_MEMORY ioctl?

When a userspace process unmaps memory from an active SEV-SNP partition,
mshv_unmap_user_memory() drops the region unconditionally without checking the
SNP state:

drivers/hv/mshv_root_main.c:mshv_unmap_user_memory() {
    ...
    region = mshv_partition_region_by_gfn(partition, mem->guest_pfn);
    ...
    hlist_del(&region->hnode);
    ...
    mshv_region_put(region);
}

Because the partition's SNP state is still active, could mshv_region_share()
fail to regain host access during teardown?

drivers/hv/mshv_regions.c:mshv_region_destroy() {
    ...
    if (mshv_partition_encrypted(partition)) {
        ret = mshv_region_share(region);
        if (ret) {
            pt_err(partition,
                   "Failed to regain access to memory...\n",
                   ret);
            return;
        }
    }
}

If it returns early here, does this result in a permanent leak of the pinned
host pages and kernel structures?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260807135134.303943-1-weh@linux.microsoft.com?part=10

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-07 15:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-07 13:51 [PATCH v1 00/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP support for MSHV root partitions Wei Hu
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 01/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP UAPI definitions Wei Hu
2026-08-07 14:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 02/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP PSP request hypercall Wei Hu
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 03/13] mshv: add SEV-SNP isolated page hypercalls Wei Hu
2026-08-07 14:21   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 04/13] mshv: wire SEV-SNP partition ioctls Wei Hu
2026-08-07 14:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 05/13] hyperv: fix hv_input_get_system_property layout for SNP status Wei Hu
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 06/13] mshv: detect and report SEV-SNP support at init Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:04   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 07/13] mshv: default to safe partition CPU features Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 08/13] mshv: accept partial CPU feature banks Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:30   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 09/13] mshv: define full processor and xsave feature masks Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:42   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 10/13] mshv: unmap SNP memory before state teardown Wei Hu
2026-08-07 15:53   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 11/13] mshv: unlock SNP pages on panic for crashdump collection Wei Hu
2026-08-07 16:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 12/13] hyperv: add MSHV Dom0 root-partition boot enablement (EFI HvLoader) Wei Hu
2026-08-07 16:22   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 13:51 ` [PATCH v1 13/13] mshv: set up own SynIC registers on a nested root partition Wei Hu
2026-08-07 16:36   ` sashiko-bot

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