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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Bryam Vargas" <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: "Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/iucv: take a private, writable frame before rewriting it in place
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2026 16:07:32 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260816160732.E93661F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260815-b4-disp-dc82fde4-v1-2-e83b10b22ce9@proton.me>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Unprotected socket state modification from softirq context
--

--- Patch [2]: [PATCH net 2/2] net/iucv: take a private, writable frame before rewriting it in place ---
commit 656ba922e59efdf102e7aa3950857e3c0061f9b8
Author: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>

net/iucv: take a private, writable frame before rewriting it in place

This commit modifies afiucv_hs_rcv() to take a private, writable copy
of the socket buffer before rewriting the frame in place. It unshares
the skb and uses skb_cow_head() to ensure enough headroom.

Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813-b4-disp-60433a46-v1-1-509e1200533e@proton.me?part=1

> diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
> index e3ec965d96ca7..10cfc5e82f047 100644
> --- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
> +++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
> @@ -2069,11 +2069,20 @@ static int afiucv_hs_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
>  		return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
>  	}
>  

[ ... ]

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but while reviewing this file I noticed
an unprotected socket state modification:

net/iucv/af_iucv.c:afiucv_hs_callback_txnotify() {
        ...
        if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CONNECTED) {
                sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
                sk->sk_state_change(sk);
        }
        ...
}

Does this modification risk corrupting the socket state?

When qeth hardware issues TX completions, qeth_notify_skbs() is called from
softirq (NAPI) context and invokes afiucv_hs_callback_txnotify().

This modifies sk->sk_state directly without acquiring the socket lock
or checking sock_owned_by_user().

Could this lead to missed state transitions or concurrent execution with
process-context operations that assume exclusive access under lock_sock()?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260815-b4-disp-dc82fde4-v1-0-e83b10b22ce9@proton.me?part=2

      reply	other threads:[~2026-08-16 16:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-15 16:07 [PATCH net 0/2] net/iucv: give afiucv_hs_rcv() the preamble a packet_type handler needs Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay
2026-08-15 16:07 ` Bryam Vargas
2026-08-15 16:07 ` [PATCH net 1/2] net/iucv: drop HiperSockets frames from other network namespaces Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay
2026-08-15 16:07   ` Bryam Vargas
2026-08-16 16:07   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-15 16:07 ` [PATCH net 2/2] net/iucv: take a private, writable frame before rewriting it in place Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay
2026-08-15 16:07   ` Bryam Vargas
2026-08-16 16:07   ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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