From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.de>
To: Linux Test Project <ltp@lists.linux.it>
Subject: [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 06/16] fchroot03: test fchroot() permission checks
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 23:24:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260819-fchroot-v1-6-2dc2c3c3cf29@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260819-fchroot-v1-0-2dc2c3c3cf29@suse.com>
From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
Verify that with a regular directory fd the kernel first checks the
execute permission on the directory and then CAP_SYS_CHROOT: an
unprivileged process with an accessible directory fails with EPERM and
a process without execute permission fails with EACCES.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
runtest/staging | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot03.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
diff --git a/runtest/staging b/runtest/staging
index e12230218..13635037b 100644
--- a/runtest/staging
+++ b/runtest/staging
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
fchroot01 fchroot01
fchroot02 fchroot02
+fchroot03 fchroot03
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore
index fb3287612..235befd99 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
fchroot01
fchroot02
+fchroot03
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot03.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot03.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4c1350e21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot03.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2026 SUSE LLC Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Test the :manpage:`fchroot(2)` permission checks with a regular directory
+ * fd.
+ *
+ * fchroot() was introduced in Linux v7.3. With a regular directory fd the
+ * kernel first checks that the caller has execute permission on the
+ * directory, then that it holds CAP_SYS_CHROOT:
+ *
+ * - an unprivileged process with an accessible directory fails with EPERM
+ * - a process without execute permission on the directory fails with
+ * EACCES, proving the permission check comes before the capability
+ * check
+ *
+ * Root is required to open the directory file descriptors before dropping
+ * to an unprivileged user in forked children.
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "lapi/fcntl.h"
+#include "lapi/syscalls.h"
+
+static struct tcase {
+ const char *dir;
+ mode_t mode;
+ int exp_errno;
+ const char *desc;
+} tcases[] = {
+ {"pubdir", 0755, EPERM, "no CAP_SYS_CHROOT"},
+ {"privdir", 0600, EACCES, "no execute permission"},
+};
+
+static struct passwd *ltpuser;
+
+static void run(unsigned int i)
+{
+ struct tcase *tc = &tcases[i];
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ int dfd = SAFE_OPEN(tc->dir, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+
+ SAFE_SETRESUID(ltpuser->pw_uid, ltpuser->pw_uid,
+ ltpuser->pw_uid);
+
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(tst_syscall(__NR_fchroot, dfd, 0),
+ tc->exp_errno, "fchroot() with %s", tc->desc);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tcases); i++) {
+ SAFE_MKDIR(tcases[i].dir, tcases[i].mode);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(tcases[i].dir, tcases[i].mode);
+ }
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .test = run,
+ .tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tcases),
+ .setup = setup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+};
--
2.51.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-19 21:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-19 21:24 [LTP] [PATCH 00/16] fchroot: add fchroot() testing suite Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH 01/16] syscalls: add v7.3 syscall numbers Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH 02/16] syscalls: update outdated syscall entries Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH 03/16] lapi: fallback fchroot() parameters Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 22:27 ` [LTP] syscalls: add v7.3 syscall numbers linuxtestproject.agent
2026-08-20 6:03 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 04/16] fchroot01: test fchroot() with a directory fd Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 05/16] fchroot02: test fchroot() invalid arguments Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` Andrea Cervesato [this message]
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 07/16] fchroot04: test fchroot() into failfs as root Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 08/16] fchroot05: test failfs root can not be referenced Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 09/16] fchroot06: test path walks under failfs root Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 10/16] fchroot07: test execve blocked by " Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 11/16] fchroot08: test failfs root fork inheritance Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 12/16] fchroot09: test setns escape from failfs root Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 13/16] fchroot10: test failfs entry without no_new_privs Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 14/16] fchroot11: test failfs entry with no_new_privs Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 15/16] fchroot12: test failfs entry with shared fs_struct Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-19 21:24 ` [LTP] [PATCH STAGING 16/16] fchroot13: test failfs entry when chrooted Andrea Cervesato
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