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From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
	workflows@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 15:40:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260819134039.286793-1-johan@kernel.org> (raw)

Fix a '/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which
is not accessible to regular users).

Fixes: a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
---
 Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
index a68be888ce8e..04e5df6a6f78 100644
--- a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document.
 The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which
 can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them
 are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g.
-kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
+kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
 represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the
 administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not
 designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these
-- 
2.54.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-08-19 13:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-19 13:40 Johan Hovold [this message]
2026-08-19 13:52 ` [PATCH] docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference Willy Tarreau

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