From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
workflows@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 15:52:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aoW1NiglZavo68pc@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260819134039.286793-1-johan@kernel.org>
Hi Johan,
On Wed, Aug 19, 2026 at 03:40:39PM +0200, Johan Hovold wrote:
> Fix a '/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which
> is not accessible to regular users).
Actually it wasn't "replaced", it's because I didn't know about /dev/kmsg,
for having been used to /proc/kmsg for decades long before its /dev cousin
was born :-)
> Fixes: a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug")
> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Thanks,
Willy
> ---
> Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
> index a68be888ce8e..04e5df6a6f78 100644
> --- a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
> @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document.
> The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which
> can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them
> are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g.
> -kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
> +kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
> represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the
> administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not
> designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these
> --
> 2.54.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-19 13:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-19 13:40 [PATCH] docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference Johan Hovold
2026-08-19 13:52 ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
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