* [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt()
@ 2026-08-27 23:55 Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-27 23:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni
Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin,
ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity,
xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy
From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>
do_tcp_getsockopt() has two lockless reads of icsk_ca_ops. Since BPF
struct_ops congestion control made icsk_ca_ops point to dynamically
allocated memory, a concurrent setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) can replace
the pointer and free the old object while either reader is using it.
Patch 1 fixes the TCP_CONGESTION path by copying ca_ops->name to a
stack buffer while holding rcu_read_lock(). It also uses READ_ONCE()
for the lockless load and annotates the relevant icsk_ca_ops stores
with WRITE_ONCE().
Patch 2 fixes the TCP_CC_INFO path by keeping the READ_ONCE() load,
ca_ops->get_info lookup, and call inside an RCU read-side critical
section.
Changes since v2 [1]:
- Fix the TCP_CONGESTION build failure by loading icsk_ca_ops inline.
- Drop the unrelated WRITE_ONCE() conversion in mptcp_ca_reset().
- Add READ_ONCE() to dctcp_get_info()'s icsk_ca_ops comparison.
Changes in v2 [2]:
- Add READ_ONCE() to both lockless icsk_ca_ops loads.
- Add WRITE_ONCE() to all six explicit icsk_ca_ops stores.
- Include the data-race annotations in the UAF series as requested
by Eric Dumazet [3].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260826171344.4133-1-blbllhy@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-1-blbllhy@gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iKr1ypEFeL+7te3xWoNaK5AFyYQmr+pDh2zSZAxfgNKjw@mail.gmail.com/
Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) (2):
tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)
tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO)
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
base-commit: a3dee9bb902ee4357fa02e49b415d7724ee0140a
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread* [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-27 23:55 [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-27 23:55 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 3:26 ` Jiayuan Chen ` (2 more replies) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 1:05 ` [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() MPTCP CI 2 siblings, 3 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-27 23:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy, stable From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate the relevant icsk_ca_ops stores with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN data-race issue. Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/ Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com> --- Note: The adjacent TCP_ULP case has a similar read pattern on icsk_ulp_ops->name, but icsk_ulp_ops always points to static module data (no BPF struct_ops equivalent), so it is not affected. Changes in v3: - Fix the build failure by loading icsk_ca_ops inline. - Drop the unrelated WRITE_ONCE() conversion in mptcp_ca_reset(). Changes in v2: - Add READ_ONCE() for the icsk_ca_ops load. - Add WRITE_ONCE() for every explicit icsk_ca_ops store. --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 14 +++++++++++--- net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 455441f1b..55ca74f60 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4576,16 +4576,24 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, val = !inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk); break; - case TCP_CONGESTION: + case TCP_CONGESTION: { + char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX] = {}; + if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; len = min_t(unsigned int, len, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX); if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; - if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len)) + + rcu_read_lock(); + memcpy(ca_name, READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops)->name, + sizeof(ca_name)); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, ca_name, len)) return -EFAULT; return 0; - + } case TCP_ULP: if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c index e9f6c77e0..8e83ef81f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void tcp_assign_congestion_control(struct sock *sk) ca = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control); if (unlikely(!bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) ca = &tcp_reno; - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); rcu_read_unlock(); memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv)); @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static void tcp_reinit_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(sk); - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt = 1; memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv)); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c index 274e628e7..99f68c299 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc static void dctcp_init(struct sock *sk) /* No ECN support? Fall back to Reno. Also need to clear * ECT from sk since it is set during 3WHS for DCTCP. */ - inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops = &dctcp_reno; + WRITE_ONCE(inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops, &dctcp_reno); INET_ECN_dontxmit(sk); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c index 6ab3e3a0b..def3b25ab 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ void tcp_ca_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst) ca = tcp_ca_find_key(ca_key); if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) { icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst); - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); ca_got_dst = true; } rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index d7c1444b5..e72ebfe7b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -4092,7 +4092,7 @@ static void tcp_ca_dst_init(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst) if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) { bpf_module_put(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->owner); icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst); - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); } rcu_read_unlock(); } -- 2.43.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-28 3:26 ` Jiayuan Chen 2026-08-28 9:41 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-28 12:38 ` Breno Leitao 2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Jiayuan Chen @ 2026-08-28 3:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft), edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable on 8/28/26 7:55 AM, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote: > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding > rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support > tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically > allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via > setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 > _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, > using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a > stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate the relevant > icsk_ca_ops stores with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN > data-race issue. > > Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") > Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> > Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/ > Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 > Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 3:26 ` Jiayuan Chen @ 2026-08-28 9:41 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-28 12:38 ` Breno Leitao 2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthieu Baerts @ 2026-08-28 9:41 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft), edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable On 28/08/2026 01:55, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote: > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding > rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support > tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically > allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via > setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 > _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, > using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a > stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate the relevant > icsk_ca_ops stores with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN > data-race issue. Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Cheers, Matt -- Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 3:26 ` Jiayuan Chen 2026-08-28 9:41 ` Matthieu Baerts @ 2026-08-28 12:38 ` Breno Leitao 2026-08-28 13:02 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Breno Leitao @ 2026-08-28 12:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Cc: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni, kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable On Thu, Aug 27, 2026 at 07:55:10PM -0400, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote: > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding > rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support > tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically > allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via > setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 > _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, > using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a > stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate the relevant > icsk_ca_ops stores with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN > data-race issue. > > Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") > Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> > Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c > @@ -4576,16 +4576,24 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, > val = !inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk); > break; > > - case TCP_CONGESTION: > + case TCP_CONGESTION: { > + char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX] = {}; nit: Do you need to zero this string? It will be safely overwritten below, no? ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-28 12:38 ` Breno Leitao @ 2026-08-28 13:02 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 14:17 ` Breno Leitao 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-28 13:02 UTC (permalink / raw) To: leitao Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity, andriin, ast, blbllhy, bpf, davem, edumazet, geliang, horms, kafai, kuba, kuniyu, kys, linux-kernel, martineau, matttbe, mptcp, ncardwell, netdev, pabeni, stable, tgopinath, xmei5, yhs > nit: Do you need to zero this string? It will be safely overwritten > below, no? Thanks for catching this. That initialization is unnecessary. Would you prefer a new version for this, or are you okay with keeping it as-is? I may need a few days before I can send a new version due to an ongoing email account approval process. Cen ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-28 13:02 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-28 14:17 ` Breno Leitao 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Breno Leitao @ 2026-08-28 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity, andriin, ast, bpf, davem, edumazet, geliang, horms, kafai, kuba, kuniyu, kys, linux-kernel, martineau, matttbe, mptcp, ncardwell, netdev, pabeni, stable, tgopinath, xmei5, yhs On Fri, Aug 28, 2026 at 09:02:12AM -0400, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote: > > nit: Do you need to zero this string? It will be safely overwritten > > below, no? > > Thanks for catching this. That initialization is unnecessary. Would > you prefer a new version for this, or are you okay with keeping it > as-is? I may need a few days before I can send a new version due to an > ongoing email account approval process. Right, this is just a nit, as I noted above. We could leave it for the netdev maintainers to flag, but given how strict netdev's review process is, I wouldn't be surprised if they still ask for it to be cleaned up. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) 2026-08-27 23:55 [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-27 23:55 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 3:14 ` Jiayuan Chen 2026-08-28 9:42 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-28 1:05 ` [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() MPTCP CI 2 siblings, 2 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-27 23:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy, stable From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564) tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load the icsk_ca_ops pointer. Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com> --- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-3-blbllhy@gmail.com/ (v1) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260826171344.4133-3-blbllhy@gmail.com/ (v2) Changes in v3: - Annotate dctcp_get_info()'s icsk_ca_ops comparison with READ_ONCE(). Changes in v2: - Add READ_ONCE() for the icsk_ca_ops load. --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 55ca74f60..71d4c5e6b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4561,9 +4561,11 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; - ca_ops = icsk->icsk_ca_ops; + rcu_read_lock(); + ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops); if (ca_ops && ca_ops->get_info) sz = ca_ops->get_info(sk, ~0U, &attr, &info); + rcu_read_unlock(); len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sz); if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int))) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c index 99f68c299..5b457f68a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static size_t dctcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, u32 ext, int *attr, if (ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_DCTCPINFO - 1)) || ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO - 1))) { memset(&info->dctcp, 0, sizeof(info->dctcp)); - if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops != &dctcp_reno) { + if (READ_ONCE(inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops) != &dctcp_reno) { info->dctcp.dctcp_enabled = 1; info->dctcp.dctcp_ce_state = (u16) ca->ce_state; info->dctcp.dctcp_alpha = ca->dctcp_alpha; -- 2.43.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-28 3:14 ` Jiayuan Chen 2026-08-28 9:42 ` Matthieu Baerts 1 sibling, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Jiayuan Chen @ 2026-08-28 3:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft), edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable 在 8/28/26 7:55 AM, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote: > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the > get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops > congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory > that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the > kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 > Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within > rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load > the icsk_ca_ops pointer. > > Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") > Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> > Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 > Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 3:14 ` Jiayuan Chen @ 2026-08-28 9:42 ` Matthieu Baerts 1 sibling, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthieu Baerts @ 2026-08-28 9:42 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft), edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable On 28/08/2026 01:55, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote: > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the > get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops > congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory > that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the > kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 > Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within > rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load > the icsk_ca_ops pointer. Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Cheers, Matt -- Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() 2026-08-27 23:55 [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-28 1:05 ` MPTCP CI 2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: MPTCP CI @ 2026-08-28 1:05 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang; +Cc: mptcp Hi Cen, Thank you for your modifications, that's great! Our CI did some validations and here is its report: - KVM Validation: normal (except selftest_mptcp_join): Success! ✅ - KVM Validation: normal (only selftest_mptcp_join): Success! ✅ - KVM Validation: debug (except selftest_mptcp_join): Success! ✅ - KVM Validation: debug (only selftest_mptcp_join): Success! ✅ - KVM Validation: btf-normal (only bpftest_all): Success! ✅ - KVM Validation: btf-debug (only bpftest_all): Success! ✅ - Task: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/actions/runs/33129226428 Initiator: Patchew Applier Commits: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/commits/2486bca7e19c Patchwork: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/mptcp/list/?series=1152901 If there are some issues, you can reproduce them using the same environment as the one used by the CI thanks to a docker image, e.g.: $ cd [kernel source code] $ docker run -v "${PWD}:${PWD}:rw" -w "${PWD}" --privileged --rm -it \ --pull always mptcp/mptcp-upstream-virtme-docker:latest \ auto-normal For more details: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp-upstream-virtme-docker Please note that despite all the efforts that have been already done to have a stable tests suite when executed on a public CI like here, it is possible some reported issues are not due to your modifications. Still, do not hesitate to help us improve that ;-) Cheers, MPTCP GH Action bot Bot operated by Matthieu Baerts (NGI0 Core) ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-08-28 14:17 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-08-27 23:55 [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 3:26 ` Jiayuan Chen 2026-08-28 9:41 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-28 12:38 ` Breno Leitao 2026-08-28 13:02 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 14:17 ` Breno Leitao 2026-08-27 23:55 ` [PATCH net v3 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-28 3:14 ` Jiayuan Chen 2026-08-28 9:42 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-28 1:05 ` [PATCH net v3 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() MPTCP CI
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