Re: [LTP] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

Re: [LTP] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

[linuxtestproject.agent]

Hi Wei,

On Wed, 22 Jul 2026, Wei Gao wrote:
> lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

Verdict - Reviewed

---
Note:

The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.

Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer

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[LTP] [PATCH v13 0/3] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files

[Wei Gao via ltp]

v12->v13:
- remove unrelated comments
- remove SAFE_WAITPID

Wei Gao (3):
  lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path
  lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
  open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files

 include/tst_uid.h                         |  14 +++
 lib/tst_uid.c                             |  30 ++++-
 runtest/syscalls                          |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c   | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c

-- 
2.55.0


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[LTP] [PATCH v13 1/3] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

[Wei Gao via ltp]

tst_get_free_gid_() prints the found GID when it succeeds, but it
incorrectly includes TERRNO in tst_res_(). This prints whatever value
happens to be in errno (often 0 or a stale value) which is confusing in
a success path.

Remove the spurious TERRNO flag from the tst_res_() success message.

Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
 lib/tst_uid.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/tst_uid.c b/lib/tst_uid.c
index af4ef8cf7..b0b087362 100644
--- a/lib/tst_uid.c
+++ b/lib/tst_uid.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip)
 			continue;
 
 		if (errno == 0 || errno == ENOENT || errno == ESRCH) {
-			tst_res_(file, lineno, TINFO | TERRNO,
+			tst_res_(file, lineno, TINFO,
 				"Found unused GID %d", (int)ret);
 			return ret;
 		}
-- 
2.55.0


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[LTP] [PATCH v13 2/3] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid

[Wei Gao via ltp]

Add tst_get_free_uid() to dynamically find unused UIDs for tests.

Some tests need a completely unassigned, unused UID. This is used by
open16 to verify restricted O_CREAT in sticky directories by running
as a sandboxed user with no file ownership or privileges.

Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
 include/tst_uid.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
 lib/tst_uid.c     | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/tst_uid.h b/include/tst_uid.h
index 2237ddcbf..03f9dc073 100644
--- a/include/tst_uid.h
+++ b/include/tst_uid.h
@@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip);
+
+/**
+ * tst_get_free_uid() - Find a UID not assigned to any user.
+ * @skip: UID value to skip (pass 0 to skip none).
+ *
+ * Scans the password database for the first unused UID starting
+ * from 1, skipping @skip. Calls tst_brk(TBROK) if no free UID
+ * is found or a lookup error occurs.
+ *
+ * Return: An unused uid_t value.
+ */
+#define tst_get_free_uid(skip) tst_get_free_uid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip))
+
 /*
  * Find unassigned gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main
  * group of a specific user in case it's not listed in the group file. If you
diff --git a/lib/tst_uid.c b/lib/tst_uid.c
index b0b087362..47c267bc4 100644
--- a/lib/tst_uid.c
+++ b/lib/tst_uid.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 
 #define TST_NO_DEFAULT_MAIN
@@ -12,6 +13,33 @@
 #include "tst_uid.h"
 
 #define MAX_GID 32767
+#define MAX_UID 32767
+
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip)
+{
+	uid_t ret;
+
+	for (ret = 1; ret < MAX_UID; ret++) {
+		if (ret == skip)
+			continue;
+
+		errno = 0;
+		if (getpwuid(ret))
+			continue;
+
+		if (errno == 0 || errno == ENOENT || errno == ESRCH) {
+			tst_res_(file, lineno, TINFO,
+				"Found unused UID %d", (int)ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK | TERRNO, "User ID lookup failed");
+		return (uid_t)-1;
+	}
+
+	tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK, "No free user ID found");
+	return (uid_t)-1;
+}
 
 gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip)
 {
-- 
2.55.0


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[LTP] [PATCH v13 3/3] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files

[Wei Gao via ltp]

Add LTP coverage for kernel commit 30aba6656f61 (Linux 4.19), which
introduced protection against spoofing attacks via O_CREAT of FIFOs
and regular files in world-writable or group-writable sticky
directories.

This commit adds test cases to verify these security restrictions
(Level 1 and Level 2 protections) for opening FIFOs and regular
files in world-writable or group-writable sticky directories when the
file is not owned by the opener.

Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
 runtest/syscalls                          |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c   | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c

diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index a021c79da..4fd62efa8 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ open12 open12
 open13 open13
 open14 open14
 open15 open15
+open16 open16
 
 openat01 openat01
 openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
 /open13
 /open14
 /open15
+/open16
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d29a56ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Verify restricted opening (:manpage:`open(2)` and :manpage:`openat(2)`) of
+ * FIFOs and regular files in sticky directories. This test covers the positive
+ * case where access is allowed when protection is disabled (level 0), and the
+ * negative cases where access is disallowed (EACCES) in world-writable (level
+ * 1) or group-writable (level 2) sticky directories when the file is not owned
+ * by the opener.
+ *
+ * This test requires root to modify /proc/sys/fs/protected_* sysctls and
+ * to manage file ownership and permissions in sticky directories.
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+#include "tst_uid.h"
+
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
+
+static int dir_fd = -1;
+static uid_t uid1, uid2;
+static gid_t gid1;
+
+static struct tcase {
+	char *level;
+	int exp_errno;
+	uid_t owner_uid;
+	int use_nobody_gid;
+	mode_t dir_mode;
+} tcases[] = {
+	{"0", 0,      0,  0, 0777 | S_ISVTX},
+	{"1", EACCES, 0,  0, 0777 | S_ISVTX},
+	{"2", EACCES, -1, 1, 0030 | S_ISVTX},
+};
+
+static void verify_open(unsigned int n)
+{
+	struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n];
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%s", tc->level);
+	SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%s", tc->level);
+
+	if (tc->owner_uid != (uid_t)-1 || tc->use_nobody_gid) {
+		gid_t gid = tc->use_nobody_gid ? gid1 : 0;
+
+		SAFE_CHOWN(DIR, tc->owner_uid, gid);
+	}
+
+	if (tc->dir_mode)
+		SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, tc->dir_mode);
+
+	pid = SAFE_FORK();
+	if (!pid) {
+		SAFE_SETGID(gid1);
+		SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+
+		if (tc->exp_errno) {
+			TST_EXP_FAIL2(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+				      tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level);
+			TST_EXP_FAIL2(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+				      tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level);
+		} else {
+			int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+			if (TST_PASS)
+				SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+			fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+			if (TST_PASS)
+				SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+		}
+
+		exit(0);
+	}
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+	uid1 = pw->pw_uid;
+	gid1 = pw->pw_gid;
+	uid2 = tst_get_free_uid(uid1);
+
+	umask(0);
+	SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+	dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+
+	int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+
+	SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+	SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
+	SAFE_CHOWN(TEST_FIFO_PATH, uid1, gid1);
+	SAFE_CHOWN(DIR "/" TEST_FILE, uid1, gid1);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+	if (dir_fd != -1)
+		SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+	.setup = setup,
+	.cleanup = cleanup,
+	.needs_root = 1,
+	.tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tcases),
+	.test = verify_open,
+	.needs_tmpdir = 1,
+	.forks_child = 1,
+	.save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+		{PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+		{PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+		{}
+	},
+	.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+		{"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
+		{}
+	}
+};
-- 
2.55.0


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Re: [LTP] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

[linuxtestproject.agent]

Hi Wei,

On Mon, Aug 31, 2026, Wei Gao wrote:
> lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

Verdict - Reviewed

---
Note:

The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.

Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer

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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v13 1/3] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

[Andrea Cervesato via ltp]

Reviewed-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com

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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v13 3/3] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files

[Andrea Cervesato via ltp]

Reviewed-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com

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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v13 2/3] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid

[Andrea Cervesato via ltp]

Reviewed-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com

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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v13 3/3] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files

[Petr Vorel]

Hi Wei,

> Add LTP coverage for kernel commit 30aba6656f61 (Linux 4.19), which
> introduced protection against spoofing attacks via O_CREAT of FIFOs
> and regular files in world-writable or group-writable sticky
> directories.

> This commit adds test cases to verify these security restrictions
> (Level 1 and Level 2 protections) for opening FIFOs and regular
> files in world-writable or group-writable sticky directories when the
> file is not owned by the opener.

I was thinking what level you're talking about.
...
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..3d29a56ca
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2026 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * Verify restricted opening (:manpage:`open(2)` and :manpage:`openat(2)`) of
> + * FIFOs and regular files in sticky directories. This test covers the positive
> + * case where access is allowed when protection is disabled (level 0), and the
> + * negative cases where access is disallowed (EACCES) in world-writable (level
> + * 1) or group-writable (level 2) sticky directories when the file is not owned
> + * by the opener.

Even here it's not clear. Could you just mention that these are
/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos values? man proc_sys_fs(5) which document it does
not talk about levels at all.

> + *
> + * This test requires root to modify /proc/sys/fs/protected_* sysctls and
> + * to manage file ownership and permissions in sticky directories.
> + */
> +
...
> +#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
> +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"

Could you please add these 2 into include/tst_path_defs.h?

> +#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
> +
> +static int dir_fd = -1;
> +static uid_t uid1, uid2;
> +static gid_t gid1;
> +
> +static struct tcase {
> +	char *level;
How about define level as int?

I would even not define it and use unsigned int n in verify_open() since the
values are the same, but up to you.

> +	int exp_errno;
> +	uid_t owner_uid;
> +	int use_nobody_gid;
> +	mode_t dir_mode;
> +} tcases[] = {
> +	{"0", 0,      0,  0, 0777 | S_ISVTX},
> +	{"1", EACCES, 0,  0, 0777 | S_ISVTX},
> +	{"2", EACCES, -1, 1, 0030 | S_ISVTX},
> +};

I usually prefer using designated initializers to
1) not having to specify 0
2) 

> +
> +static void verify_open(unsigned int n)
> +{
> +	struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n];
> +	pid_t pid;
> +
> +	SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%s", tc->level);
> +	SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%s", tc->level);
> +
> +	if (tc->owner_uid != (uid_t)-1 || tc->use_nobody_gid) {
> +		gid_t gid = tc->use_nobody_gid ? gid1 : 0;
> +
> +		SAFE_CHOWN(DIR, tc->owner_uid, gid);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (tc->dir_mode)
> +		SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, tc->dir_mode);
> +
> +	pid = SAFE_FORK();
> +	if (!pid) {

How about:
1) using SAFE_FORK() directly
2) return for parent to save indent (readability)

	if (SAFE_FORK())
		return;

	SAFE_SETGID(gid1);
	SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
	...

> +		SAFE_SETGID(gid1);
> +		SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
> +
> +		if (tc->exp_errno) {
> +			TST_EXP_FAIL2(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
> +				      tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level);
> +			TST_EXP_FAIL2(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
> +				      tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level);
> +		} else {
> +			int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
nit: we don't have to define fd when it's not used, we can use TST_RET.
> +
> +			if (TST_PASS)
> +				SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> +			fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> +			if (TST_PASS)
> +				SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +		}

This else branch use the same code, how about to use TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL()?

	TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
			  tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level);
	if (TST_RET != -1)
		SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET);

	TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
			  tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level);
	if (TST_RET != -1)
		SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET);

@Cyril @Li: I always wondered if TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL() should use TST_EXP_FAIL2().

> +
> +		exit(0);
I guess we need to bother with exit(0) at this point, right?

> +	}
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> +	struct passwd *pw;
> +
> +	pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
> +	uid1 = pw->pw_uid;
> +	gid1 = pw->pw_gid;
> +	uid2 = tst_get_free_uid(uid1);
> +
> +	umask(0);
> +	SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> +	dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
> +
> +	int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
> +
> +	SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +	SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
> +	SAFE_CHOWN(TEST_FIFO_PATH, uid1, gid1);
> +	SAFE_CHOWN(DIR "/" TEST_FILE, uid1, gid1);
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> +	if (dir_fd != -1)
> +		SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> +	.setup = setup,
> +	.cleanup = cleanup,
> +	.needs_root = 1,
> +	.tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tcases),
> +	.test = verify_open,
> +	.needs_tmpdir = 1,
> +	.forks_child = 1,
> +	.save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
> +		{PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> +		{PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> +		{}
> +	},
> +	.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
> +		{"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
30aba6656f61 notes many CVEs, IMHO we should add them as well:

    CVE-2000-1134
    CVE-2007-3852
    CVE-2008-0525
    CVE-2009-0416
    CVE-2011-4834
    CVE-2015-1838
    CVE-2015-7442
    CVE-2016-7489

> +		{}
> +	}
> +};

Feel free to speedup with this (still TODO CVE and using int for "level").

Kind regards,
Petr

diff --git testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
index 3d29a56ca7..0741102103 100644
--- testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
+++ testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ static struct tcase {
 static void verify_open(unsigned int n)
 {
 	struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n];
-	pid_t pid;
 
 	SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%s", tc->level);
 	SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%s", tc->level);
@@ -61,29 +60,21 @@ static void verify_open(unsigned int n)
 	if (tc->dir_mode)
 		SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, tc->dir_mode);
 
-	pid = SAFE_FORK();
-	if (!pid) {
-		SAFE_SETGID(gid1);
-		SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+	if (SAFE_FORK())
+		return;
 
-		if (tc->exp_errno) {
-			TST_EXP_FAIL2(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
-				      tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level);
-			TST_EXP_FAIL2(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
-				      tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level);
-		} else {
-			int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+	SAFE_SETGID(gid1);
+	SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
 
-			if (TST_PASS)
-				SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+	TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+			  tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level);
+	if (TST_RET != -1)
+		SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET);
 
-			fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
-			if (TST_PASS)
-				SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
-		}
-
-		exit(0);
-	}
+	TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+			  tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level);
+	if (TST_RET != -1)
+		SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET);
 }
 
 static void setup(void)

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Re: [LTP] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

[linuxtestproject.agent]

Hi Wei,

On Fri Sep 18 07:52:21 2026 +0000, Wei Gao via ltp <ltp@lists.linux.it> wrote:
> lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

--- [PATCH 3/3] ---

> +/*\
> + * Verify restricted opening (:manpage:`open(2)` and :manpage:`openat(2)`) of
> + * FIFOs and regular files in sticky directories. This protection is controlled via
> + * `/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos` and `/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular` sysctl values:
> + *
> + * - When set to "0", writing/opening is unrestricted.
> + * - When set to "1", O_CREAT open on FIFOs/regular files we don't own in world-writable
> + *   sticky directories is disallowed, unless they are owned by the owner of the directory.
> + * - When set to "2", the same restriction also applies to group-writable sticky directories.
> + *
> + * This test requires root to modify /proc/sys/fs/protected_* sysctls and
> + * to manage file ownership and permissions in sticky directories.
> + */

Use double backticks (``...``) for inline literals in the reST description
block instead of single backticks or unquoted text:
``/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos``, ``/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular``, and
``/proc/sys/fs/protected_*``.

Verdict - Needs revision

---
Note:

The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.

Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer

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Re: [LTP] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

[linuxtestproject.agent]

Hi Wei,

On Sat, 19 Sep 2026, Wei Gao wrote:
> lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path

Verdict - Reviewed

---
Note:

The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.

Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer

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