From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 09/13] security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before returning
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:50:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260916095022.604354-10-thuth@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260916095022.604354-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Clear the hmac_sha1_ctx structure via __cleanup(hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx)
to make sure that the function does not leak sensitive data on the stack
when returning without calling hmac_sha1_final().
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index bf0bf7f369705..e5a904b5c1946 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int keylen, ...)
{
- struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;
+ struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx __cleanup(hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx);
va_list argp;
unsigned int dlen;
unsigned char *data;
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-16 9:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-16 9:50 [PATCH v4 00/13] libcrypto: Provide more __cleanup functions for zeroizing data Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] lib/crypto: aes: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_key and aes_enckey Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] lib/crypto: aes-xts: Provide function for zeroizing aes_xts_key Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] lib/crypto: aes-gcm: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_gcm* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] lib/crypto: aes-ccm: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_ccm* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] lib/crypto: md5: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_md5 structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] lib/crypto: sm3: Provide a function for zeroizing the sm3_ctx structure Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] lib/crypto: blake2: Provide functions for zeroizing blake2*_ctx structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] lib/crypto: sha1: Provide functions for zeroizing hmac_sha1 structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` Thomas Huth [this message]
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] x86/purgatory: Compile purgatory with -D__NO_FORTIFY Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] lib/crypto: sha2: Provide functions for zeroizing SHA2 hmac_sha* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-24 14:58 ` Nathan Chancellor
2026-09-24 17:49 ` Eric Biggers
2026-09-24 18:40 ` Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] smb: client: Use hmac_sha256_zeroize_ctx function to clear hmac_sha256_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-09-16 9:50 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] lib/crypto: Add documentation about zeroization of key and context data Thomas Huth
2026-09-30 20:14 ` Eric Biggers
2026-10-01 6:51 ` Thomas Huth
2026-09-23 3:20 ` [PATCH v4 00/13] libcrypto: Provide more __cleanup functions for zeroizing data Eric Biggers
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