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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/13] libcrypto: Provide more __cleanup functions for zeroizing data
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 20:20:20 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260923032020.GA42709@sol> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260916095022.604354-1-thuth@redhat.com>

On Wed, Sep 16, 2026 at 11:50:02AM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
> Code that uses crypto-related structures (containing keys or context data)
> should zeroize their local structures on the stack after use to avoid
> leaking this sensitive material via the stack when the function returns.
> Using the __cleanup() marker is a very elegant way to assert that the
> data is zeroized without having to painfully verify that each early return
> in a function might miss it.
> 
> Thus this series introduces zeroization functions for many crypto-related
> structures that can be used with __cleanup(). The series focuses on the
> introduction of the functions - most call sights will be adjusted to use
> these new functions in separate patch series later (since each subsystem
> needs separate review from the corresponding maintainer).
> 
> Note there is one minor ugliness in the patch "Compile purgatory with
> -D__NO_FORTIFY":  Since sha2.h is also used in the x86 purgatory code,
> and that code ships with its own implementation of string functions, we
> have to compile the x86 purgatory with -D__NO_FORTIFY now to be able
> to include <linux/string.h> in sha2.h.
> 

Applied to https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git/log/?h=libcrypto-next

- Eric

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-23  3:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-16  9:50 [PATCH v4 00/13] libcrypto: Provide more __cleanup functions for zeroizing data Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] lib/crypto: aes: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_key and aes_enckey Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] lib/crypto: aes-xts: Provide function for zeroizing aes_xts_key Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] lib/crypto: aes-gcm: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_gcm* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] lib/crypto: aes-ccm: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_ccm* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] lib/crypto: md5: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_md5 structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] lib/crypto: sm3: Provide a function for zeroizing the sm3_ctx structure Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] lib/crypto: blake2: Provide functions for zeroizing blake2*_ctx structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] lib/crypto: sha1: Provide functions for zeroizing hmac_sha1 structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before returning Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] x86/purgatory: Compile purgatory with -D__NO_FORTIFY Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] lib/crypto: sha2: Provide functions for zeroizing SHA2 hmac_sha* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-24 14:58   ` Nathan Chancellor
2026-09-24 17:49     ` Eric Biggers
2026-09-24 18:40       ` Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] smb: client: Use hmac_sha256_zeroize_ctx function to clear hmac_sha256_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-09-16  9:50 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] lib/crypto: Add documentation about zeroization of key and context data Thomas Huth
2026-09-30 20:14   ` Eric Biggers
2026-10-01  6:51     ` Thomas Huth
2026-09-23  3:20 ` Eric Biggers [this message]

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