* [wrecked] tools-bootconfig-fix-integer-overflow-and-truncation-in-size-checks.patch removed from -mm tree
@ 2026-09-22 19:45 Andrew Morton
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From: Andrew Morton @ 2026-09-22 19:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mm-commits, thomas.weissschuh, stable, sashiko-bot, ryan.roberts,
mark.rutland, leitao, ekffu200098, dianders, chenhuacai, brauner,
mhiramat, akpm
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The quilt patch titled
Subject: tools/bootconfig: fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
tools-bootconfig-fix-integer-overflow-and-truncation-in-size-checks.patch
This patch was dropped because other changes were merged, which wrecked this patch
------------------------------------------------------
From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: tools/bootconfig: fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:15:24 +0900
Sashiko reported that on 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts size in the
bootconfig footer such that adding BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE wraps around
(for instance, if size is 0xFFFFFFFF), the size check in
load_xbc_from_initrd() can be bypassed:
if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n");
return -E2BIG;
}
Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, comparing a
corrupted 32-bit size (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF) against stat.st_size -
BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE can also bypass the check if size is not bounded.
Similarly, load_xbc_file() passes 64-bit stat.st_size directly into the
32-bit int size parameter of load_xbc_fd(), truncating large standalone
files (>= 2GB).
In both cases, passing 0xFFFFFFFF to load_xbc_fd() truncates to -1,
resulting in malloc(0), an integer overflow in read(), and an
out-of-bounds null-byte write.
Fix this by:
1. Rejecting size > XBC_DATA_MAX or
size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE in load_xbc_from_initrd().
2. Rejecting stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX in load_xbc_file() before passing
it to load_xbc_fd().
3. Checking size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX defensively in load_xbc_fd().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/178905332413.213925.3179977110281463499.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909161113.16C691F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.8-flash
Reviewed-by: Sang-Heon Jeon <ekffu200098@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
---
tools/bootconfig/main.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c~tools-bootconfig-fix-integer-overflow-and-truncation-in-size-checks
+++ a/tools/bootconfig/main.c
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ static int load_xbc_fd(int fd, char **bu
{
int ret;
+ if (size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
*buf = malloc(size + 1);
if (!*buf)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -168,6 +171,13 @@ static int load_xbc_file(const char *pat
return ret;
}
+ if (stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s size is too big\n", path);
+ ret = -E2BIG;
+ close(fd);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
ret = load_xbc_fd(fd, buf, stat.st_size);
close(fd);
@@ -218,7 +228,8 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd,
csum = le32toh(csum);
/* Wrong size error */
- if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
+ if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX ||
+ size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n");
return -E2BIG;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from mhiramat@kernel.org are
bootconfig-reject-unexpected-data-after-null-character.patch
tools-bootconfig-consolidate-xbc_init-to-error-message-wrapper.patch
bootconfig-skip-internal-tree-sanity-checks-in-kernel.patch
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2026-09-22 19:45 [wrecked] tools-bootconfig-fix-integer-overflow-and-truncation-in-size-checks.patch removed from -mm tree Andrew Morton
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