From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: maz@kernel.org, oupton@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, joey.gouly@arm.com,
seiden@linux.ibm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
yuzenghui@huawei.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, steven.price@arm.com,
vdonnefort@google.com, qperret@google.com, tabba@google.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 07/18] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2026 14:57:00 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261001135711.1640520-8-fuad.tabba@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261001135711.1640520-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
A protected guest's virtual timer is programmed from EL2's own copy of
the state and read back there, so the host can't change the guest's
deadline. cntvoff_el2 is zeroed, so the guest's virtual time is the
physical time.
The flush also preserves the guest's CNTV and CNTP CVAL/CTL across the
host's full-context copy into the hyp vCPU, until the per-EC
marshalling patch removes that copy.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
index b7b9f5afb673b..6f068d0f78d25 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
@@ -154,6 +154,35 @@ static void sync_hyp_vgic_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
host_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i];
}
+static void flush_hyp_timer_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &hyp_vcpu->vcpu;
+
+ if (!pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ /* A hyp vcpu has no offset, and sees vtime == ptime. */
+ write_sysreg(0, cntvoff_el2);
+ write_sysreg_el0(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, CNTV_CVAL_EL0), SYS_CNTV_CVAL);
+ isb();
+ write_sysreg_el0(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, CNTV_CTL_EL0), SYS_CNTV_CTL);
+}
+
+static void sync_hyp_timer_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &hyp_vcpu->vcpu;
+
+ if (!pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Preserve the vtimer state so that it is always correct,
+ * even if the host tries to make a mess.
+ */
+ __vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, CNTV_CVAL_EL0, read_sysreg_el0(SYS_CNTV_CVAL));
+ __vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, CNTV_CTL_EL0, read_sysreg_el0(SYS_CNTV_CTL));
+}
+
static void __copy_vcpu_state(const struct kvm_vcpu *from_vcpu,
struct kvm_vcpu *to_vcpu)
{
@@ -255,7 +284,17 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags = host_vcpu->arch.iflags;
} else {
+ u64 v_cval = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTV_CVAL_EL0];
+ u64 v_ctl = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTV_CTL_EL0];
+ u64 p_cval = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTP_CVAL_EL0];
+ u64 p_ctl = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTP_CTL_EL0];
+
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;
+
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTV_CVAL_EL0] = v_cval;
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTV_CTL_EL0] = v_ctl;
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTP_CVAL_EL0] = p_cval;
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.sys_regs[CNTP_CTL_EL0] = p_ctl;
}
/* __hyp_running_vcpu must be NULL in a guest context. */
@@ -270,6 +309,7 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vsesr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.vsesr_el2;
flush_hyp_vgic_state(hyp_vcpu);
+ flush_hyp_timer_state(hyp_vcpu);
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.pid = host_vcpu->arch.pid;
@@ -318,6 +358,7 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 & HCR_VSE;
sync_hyp_vgic_state(hyp_vcpu);
+ sync_hyp_timer_state(hyp_vcpu);
hyp_vcpu->exit_code = exit_reason;
}
--
2.39.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-01 13:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-01 13:56 [PATCH v4 00/18] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/18] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/18] KVM: arm64: Validate the host vCPU's VM before reading it " Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/18] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC " Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/18] KVM: arm64: Disable steal time for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/18] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/18] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 14:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-01 15:06 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 08/18] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 09/18] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 11/18] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 12/18] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 14:21 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-01 15:08 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 13/18] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 14/18] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 15/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 16/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 14:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-01 15:10 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 17/18] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 18/18] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 14:31 ` [PATCH v4 00/18] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-10-02 15:55 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-10-03 6:57 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-03 8:38 ` Marc Zyngier
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