From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuniyu@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:22:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261021212256.27961-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261021212256.27961-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Reword the description of SCM_SECURITY to not be specific to SELinux.
The security context is populated in scm_passec() in linux.git
net/core/scm.c, through the security_secid_to_secctx() LSM hook, which
is currently implemented by SELinux, Smack and AppArmor.
Also clarify the properties of the returned string:
* There is no NAME_MAX limit on the length; SELinux contexts can be
longer than that. If the control buffer is too small, put_cmsg()
truncates the data and sets MSG_CTRUNC.
* Whether the string is null-terminated also depends on the LSM:
SELinux includes the null byte in the length, but smack_to_secctx()
in security/smack/smack_lsm.c uses strlen() and doesn't.
Fixes: ffad6a017f91 (2018-07-28; "unix.7: Document SCM_SECURITY ancillary data")
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
Notes:
This feature is also available in other LSMs. Unfortunately, they
implemented it inconsistently and that complicates the description of
how string boundaries are handled. Linux does indeed neither
guarantee that this terminates with a NUL byte, nor that NAME_MAX is
large enough to hold it.
This is the verbose variant, but I am open for suggestions regarding
what level of detail is appropriate here.
man/man7/unix.7 | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/man/man7/unix.7 b/man/man7/unix.7
index ded82768322b..4abd216d19c7 100644
--- a/man/man7/unix.7
+++ b/man/man7/unix.7
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ and returned as the result of
is an integer boolean flag.
.TP
.B SO_PASSSEC
-Enables receiving of the SELinux security label of the peer socket
+Enables receiving of the security label of the peer socket
in an ancillary message of type
.B SCM_SECURITY
(see below).
@@ -544,13 +544,26 @@ message, the
option must be enabled on the socket.
.TP
.B SCM_SECURITY
-Receive the SELinux security context (the security label)
-of the peer socket.
-The received ancillary data is a null-terminated string containing
+Receive the security context (the security label)
+of the peer socket,
+as provided by the active Linux Security Module (LSM),
+such as SELinux or Smack.
+The received ancillary data is a string containing
the security context.
-The receiver should allocate at least
+Whether the string includes a terminating null byte
+depends on the LSM;
+the length of the data is given by the
+.I cmsg_len
+field.
+There is no fixed limit on the length of the security context;
+allocating
.B NAME_MAX
-bytes in the data portion of the ancillary message for this data.
+bytes in the data portion of the ancillary message
+is usually enough.
+If the buffer is too small,
+the data is truncated and the
+.B MSG_CTRUNC
+flag is set (see below).
.IP
To receive the security context, the
.B SO_PASSSEC
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-21 21:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-21 21:22 [PATCH 0/7] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Günther Noack
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 1/7] man/man7/unix.7: ERRORS: ETOOMANYREFS: Fix the conditions Günther Noack
2026-10-22 21:14 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-23 16:50 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-24 4:45 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 2/7] man/man7/unix.7: Multiple same-typed SCM_* messages may be sent in one message Günther Noack
2026-10-22 21:28 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-23 17:09 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 3/7] man/man7/unix.7: Autobind: Clarify when it happens, and mention SO_PASSPIDFD Günther Noack
2026-10-24 4:57 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-26 21:55 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 5:04 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-10-23 9:57 ` [PATCH 4/7] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-23 17:57 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-23 18:13 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-26 22:41 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 8:54 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 21:46 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-27 22:30 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 22:59 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-28 6:19 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-28 12:45 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-27 16:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-10-27 21:52 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 5/7] man/man7/unix.7: SO_PASSSEC: wfix Günther Noack
2026-10-24 5:02 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-24 8:36 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-10-26 22:42 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 5:05 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 6/7] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSPIDFD, SO_PEERPIDFD, and SCM_PIDFD Günther Noack
2026-10-24 5:22 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-26 23:02 ` Günther Noack
2026-10-27 5:06 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-21 21:22 ` [PATCH 7/7] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSRIGHTS Günther Noack
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