All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/19] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 17:12:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261110151224.GM8635@unreal> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <sashiko-outbox-206511@kernel.org>

On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 07:35:20AM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
> issues to consider:
> - [High] driver core: device_trust_prepare_full() breaks default boots
>   with -EPERM
> - [Medium] driver core: device_trust_prepare_full() calls
>   trust_resolve() unlocked
> --
> 
> commit cc9d85465ea19f97fc7a0889f6993f37d1a58048
> Author: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> 
> driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level
> 
> This commit adds generic device trust admission and a device_trust.default
> boot parameter to resolve a device's trust policy into an active trust
> level before driver probing.
> 
> > diff --git a/drivers/base/trust.c b/drivers/base/trust.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000000000..6a71abf10b3bb
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/base/trust.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +
> > +#include <linux/device.h>
> > +#include <linux/errno.h>
> > +#include <linux/export.h>
> > +#include <linux/init.h>
> > +#include <linux/string.h>
> > +#include <kunit/visibility.h>
> > +
> > +#include "base.h"
> > +
> > +static enum device_trust_policy device_trust_default_policy __ro_after_init;
> 
> [ ... ]
> 
> > +static int __device_trust_prepare(struct device *dev,
> > +				  const struct device_driver *drv, bool full_only)
> > +{
> > +	enum device_trust_policy policy;
> > +	enum device_trust_level level;
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	policy = dev->trust_policy;
> > +
> > +	if (policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED)
> > +		return -EPERM;
> > +	if (dev->bus && dev->bus->trust_resolve) {
> > +		ret = dev->bus->trust_resolve(dev, drv, policy, &level);
> > +		if (ret)
> > +			return ret;
> > +	} else {
> > +		level = policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY ?
> > +			DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY : DEVICE_TRUST_FULL;
> > +	}
> > +	if (level == DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED)
> > +		return -EPERM;
> > +	if (full_only && level != DEVICE_TRUST_FULL)
> > +		return -EPERM;
> > +	if (dev->p->trust_state == DEVICE_TRUST_COMMITTED &&
> > +	    dev->trust_committed_level != level)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_committed_level, level);
> > +	dev->p->trust_state = DEVICE_TRUST_COMMITTED;
> > +	WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_level, level);
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int device_trust_prepare(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv)
> > +{
> > +	device_lock_assert(dev);
> > +	return __device_trust_prepare(dev, drv, false);
> > +}
> > +
> > +int device_trust_prepare_full(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv)
> > +{
> > +	if (device_trust_default_policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL)
> > +		return -EPERM;
> 
> [Severity: High]
> Does requiring device_trust_default_policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL
> here cause device_driver_attach_full() to fail with -EPERM on every
> default boot where device_trust.default= is not passed on the command
> line?
> 
> When device_trust.default= is omitted, device_trust_default_policy remains
> DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DEFAULT, even though that policy resolves to
> DEVICE_TRUST_FULL on buses without trust_resolve.  Callers converted to
> device_driver_attach_full(), such as phy_attach_direct() when attaching
> the generic PHY fallback driver and serio_bind_driver(), will then fail
> with -EPERM unless the kernel is booted with device_trust.default=full.

While I did this intentionally to make sure that missing option won't
leave system unprotected, I had second thought now as it will break
backward compatibility.

> 
> > +
> > +	return __device_trust_prepare(dev, drv, true);
> > +}
> 
> [Severity: Medium]
> Can device_trust_prepare_full() end up calling dev->bus->trust_resolve()
> without holding the device lock?

Not for the upstream code, both serio and PHY are connected to the
buses without ->trust_resolve().

Thanks

> 
> The kernel-doc for struct bus_type::trust_resolve requires the device lock
> to be held, and the kernel-doc for device_driver_attach_full() states that
> buses with a trust resolver must use device_driver_attach().  Unlike
> device_bind_driver(), which rejects dev->bus->trust_resolve with
> -EOPNOTSUPP, device_trust_prepare_full() calls __device_trust_prepare()
> unlocked without checking dev->bus->trust_resolve.
> 
> -- 
> Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261109-device-trust-core-v2-0-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com?part=11
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-10 15:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-09  7:33 [PATCH v2 00/19] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 10:06   ` driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding bluez.test.bot
2026-11-10  7:35   ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 14:19     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] USB: Release interface claims refused during registration Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 14:23     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] driver core: Report deferred probes through sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] driver core: Add a compatibility API for manual driver attachment Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] Input: serio - use the compatibility driver attachment API Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 14:29     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] net: phy: Use " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 13:45   ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-10  7:39     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10 14:31       ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-10 14:58         ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 15:12     ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] driver core: Expose device trust authorization interfaces Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] driver core: Expose committed device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 13:53   ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-10 12:22     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10 14:25       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 14:34         ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-09  7:33 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] USB: Authorize devices and interfaces through " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-10  7:35   ` sashiko-bot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261110151224.GM8635@unreal \
    --to=leon@kernel.org \
    --cc=dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-input@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-usb@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.