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From: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
To: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>,
	Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>,
	Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>,
	linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	Phoebe Buckheister <phoebe.buckheister@itwm.fraunhofer.de>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	lvc-project@linuxtesting.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:52:34 +0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116065235.27348-1-petrvaganoff@gmail.com> (raw)

During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
 ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
 ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
 ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
 wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
 dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
 ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
 x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:51 [inline]
 ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa5b/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
 ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
 wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
 dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
 ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
 x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Commit f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
introduced mac802154_set_header_security() as the sole function
responsible for enabling frame-level security: it sets both
hdr->fc.security_enabled = 1 and initializes hdr->sec together,
maintaining the invariant that security_enabled = 1 implies hdr->sec
is initialized.

However, ieee802154_header_create() was left with a pre-existing
assignment:

    hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;

This assignment can set security_enabled = 1 (from a stale cb->secen)
even when mac802154_set_header_security() returns 0 without initializing
hdr.sec, violating that invariant. ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() then
reads uninitialized hdr.sec fields.

The stale value in cb->secen arises from a specific setsockopt()
sequence: calling WPAN_SECURITY_ON (secen_override=1, secen=1) and
then WPAN_SECURITY_DEFAULT (secen_override=0, secen unchanged at 1).
This undocumented combination likely explains why the bug was rarely
triggered.

Remove the redundant assignment; mac802154_set_header_security() is the
only correct place to set security_enabled.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=60a66d44892b66b56545
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=23f21e76e9d2d1ed587cb5e71515260d6d025b63
Fixes: f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
---
 net/mac802154/iface.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac802154/iface.c b/net/mac802154/iface.c
index f437b8daa00d..7b7332805ecc 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/iface.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/iface.c
@@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ static int ieee802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
 	hdr.fc.type = cb->type;
-	hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
 	hdr.fc.ack_request = cb->ackreq;
 	hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
 
-- 
2.55.0

             reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16  6:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-16  6:52 Petr Vaganov [this message]
2026-11-17 11:06 ` [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment Miquel Raynal
2026-11-18  2:04 ` netdev-bot+sashiko

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